Narrative:

As we approached cheng chav from the southwest we were given vectors to intercept the localizer for runway 13. Then we heard the aircraft ahead of us cleared for the igs 13 approach 'GS inoperative.' this was the first we had heard of the GS being inoperative. We looked at the GS inoperative part of the approach, reset the altimeter mins, and thought we had it under control. The vector had us intercepting the localizer at 12 DME and 4500 ft. The first officer noticed we were in close and started the aircraft down. Here is where we made a mistake. An altitude of 700 ft for mins was set in the flight director. There is a note on the side view portion of the approach plate that says for fs inoperative to descend as for a 3 degree GS to cross the OM at 1800 ft. We broke out below 2000 ft and I was in awe of the many obstacles. As the marker beacon was sounding, we got a call requesting our altitude. I then realized that we were below the 3 degree glide path that is called for by the GS inoperative note. We leveled about 1400 ft. The runway was in sight and we landed without incident. Hong kong radar asked for me to give them a call. They said they were having problems with their equipment because of the rain. They wanted to be sure that I was aware of the 1800 ft crossing at the OM. What could have prevented this? First, I don't think mins for a GS inoperative approach in that environment should be so low (5 ft higher than with a GS). This is a very precarious procedure at best. More time to set up for the approach would have helped of course. But not knowing of the GS inoperative until late in the approach was probably the main factor for the mistake. A contributing factor was being vectored for an in-close intercept of the localizer. However, I think we would have, by habit, set in 1800 ft altitude on the flight director for the OM crossing if there had been the normal GS inoperative depiction. A dotted line, step down depiction on the side view of the approach is what we are used to and have practiced for years. There is probably a reason this is not done on this particular approach. But also I am sure that I never thought that I would have to do that approach without a GS so I didn't make a mental note of the difference. I think approach control should have informed everyone that the GS was inoperative immediately by radio and not depend on the ATIS. If it was even on the new ATIS, we were not aware of it. Also, more time should be spent in the simulator familiarizing us with all aspects of the approachs to hong kong. The short time I had on hong kong did not prepare me for that environment even for visual conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB FLC ARRIVING HKG WAS CAUGHT OFF GUARD WHEN THEY LEARNED THAT THE GS WAS INOP ON THE IGS RWY 13 APCH. FLC FAILED TO FOLLOW THE GS OUT PROC AND WENT LOW ON APCH.

Narrative: AS WE APCHED CHENG CHAV FROM THE SW WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR RWY 13. THEN WE HEARD THE ACFT AHEAD OF US CLRED FOR THE IGS 13 APCH 'GS INOP.' THIS WAS THE FIRST WE HAD HEARD OF THE GS BEING INOP. WE LOOKED AT THE GS INOP PART OF THE APCH, RESET THE ALTIMETER MINS, AND THOUGHT WE HAD IT UNDER CTL. THE VECTOR HAD US INTERCEPTING THE LOC AT 12 DME AND 4500 FT. THE FO NOTICED WE WERE IN CLOSE AND STARTED THE ACFT DOWN. HERE IS WHERE WE MADE A MISTAKE. AN ALT OF 700 FT FOR MINS WAS SET IN THE FLT DIRECTOR. THERE IS A NOTE ON THE SIDE VIEW PORTION OF THE APCH PLATE THAT SAYS FOR FS INOP TO DSND AS FOR A 3 DEG GS TO CROSS THE OM AT 1800 FT. WE BROKE OUT BELOW 2000 FT AND I WAS IN AWE OF THE MANY OBSTACLES. AS THE MARKER BEACON WAS SOUNDING, WE GOT A CALL REQUESTING OUR ALT. I THEN REALIZED THAT WE WERE BELOW THE 3 DEG GLIDE PATH THAT IS CALLED FOR BY THE GS INOP NOTE. WE LEVELED ABOUT 1400 FT. THE RWY WAS IN SIGHT AND WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. HONG KONG RADAR ASKED FOR ME TO GIVE THEM A CALL. THEY SAID THEY WERE HAVING PROBLEMS WITH THEIR EQUIP BECAUSE OF THE RAIN. THEY WANTED TO BE SURE THAT I WAS AWARE OF THE 1800 FT XING AT THE OM. WHAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS? FIRST, I DON'T THINK MINS FOR A GS INOP APCH IN THAT ENVIRONMENT SHOULD BE SO LOW (5 FT HIGHER THAN WITH A GS). THIS IS A VERY PRECARIOUS PROC AT BEST. MORE TIME TO SET UP FOR THE APCH WOULD HAVE HELPED OF COURSE. BUT NOT KNOWING OF THE GS INOP UNTIL LATE IN THE APCH WAS PROBABLY THE MAIN FACTOR FOR THE MISTAKE. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS BEING VECTORED FOR AN IN-CLOSE INTERCEPT OF THE LOC. HOWEVER, I THINK WE WOULD HAVE, BY HABIT, SET IN 1800 FT ALT ON THE FLT DIRECTOR FOR THE OM XING IF THERE HAD BEEN THE NORMAL GS INOP DEPICTION. A DOTTED LINE, STEP DOWN DEPICTION ON THE SIDE VIEW OF THE APCH IS WHAT WE ARE USED TO AND HAVE PRACTICED FOR YEARS. THERE IS PROBABLY A REASON THIS IS NOT DONE ON THIS PARTICULAR APCH. BUT ALSO I AM SURE THAT I NEVER THOUGHT THAT I WOULD HAVE TO DO THAT APCH WITHOUT A GS SO I DIDN'T MAKE A MENTAL NOTE OF THE DIFFERENCE. I THINK APCH CTL SHOULD HAVE INFORMED EVERYONE THAT THE GS WAS INOP IMMEDIATELY BY RADIO AND NOT DEPEND ON THE ATIS. IF IT WAS EVEN ON THE NEW ATIS, WE WERE NOT AWARE OF IT. ALSO, MORE TIME SHOULD BE SPENT IN THE SIMULATOR FAMILIARIZING US WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE APCHS TO HONG KONG. THE SHORT TIME I HAD ON HONG KONG DID NOT PREPARE ME FOR THAT ENVIRONMENT EVEN FOR VISUAL CONDITIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.