Narrative:

Holding instructions were to hold on J207 southwest of rdu, lt, efc of 1845. As we approached rdu, I looked at the holding speed card and told the first officer, who was flying the leg, that the card showed 234 KIAS but that I thought 250 or even greater was more appropriate because of our altitude and weight at the time. We discussed that it was no problem with center with the holding speed being good up to 265 KIAS. Just prior to rdu, I told the first officer I would be off for a while, since I wanted to call the company and let them know what was happening. Later, the first officer asked me the low speed buffet speed at that altitude. I looked at the airspeed indicator and upon seeing 200 KIAS told him I thought he was already below it. I pushed the throttles to maximum continuous thrust and told him to start a slow descent for 300 ft. I called center and told them we wanted FL330 (it took 2 calls of course). They said unable and I advised them that we were unable to hold FL350 because we were at low speed buffet speed. The first officer had disconnected the autoplt and as he attempted to level at 34700 ft I could feel the onset of buffet. The first officer was still only 200 KIAS. Told him not to get it into buffet and to continue a slow descent. Center told us to turn right to an assigned heading. I acknowledged and told the first officer not to turn past 15 degrees of bank at that speed since it appeared to me he was going to too great a bank angle for the situation. I emphasized the point by manually stopping the control wheel. As I prepared to call center to emphasize our situation and declare an emergency, center called and cleared us to FL330. I noted the altitude lost at around 750 ft at the time. I acknowledged and thanked him profusely. We then descended and returned to normal flight. The remainder of the flight was routine for the situation as previously described, ie, more holding, trw avoidance, etc, etc. The experience level in the cockpit was not the problem. (We both have well over 10000 hours each and have flown together many times. The first officer has flown captain while at another carrier and has extensive jet experience. We both have over 3 yrs in type). Complacency on my part was definitely a factor. I assumed too much and while attending to other duties did not monitor the acfts progress. I honestly can't say for sure if I looked at the airspeed from the time the first officer started the turn into holding until the speed had bled to 200 KIAS. If I did, it either was not the abnormal or didn't register. The first officer told me later that the airspeed started to decay after the turn into holding, yet he let the situation deteriorate and attempted no corrective action. I should have declared an emergency immediately upon being refused lower. Except for the altitude deviation the controller had no way of knowing the severity of the situation unless he knew what low speed buffet at altitude means. I still find it hard to believe that 2 experienced pilots could let this happen. If someone had told me the same story prior to this happening to me, I would have thought 'what a couple of dumb ____south!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO STALLS MLG IN HOLDING PATTERN AT FL350 WHILE CAPT IS TALKING TO COMPANY. ALTDEV RESULTS.

Narrative: HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO HOLD ON J207 SW OF RDU, LT, EFC OF 1845. AS WE APCHED RDU, I LOOKED AT THE HOLDING SPD CARD AND TOLD THE FO, WHO WAS FLYING THE LEG, THAT THE CARD SHOWED 234 KIAS BUT THAT I THOUGHT 250 OR EVEN GREATER WAS MORE APPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF OUR ALT AND WT AT THE TIME. WE DISCUSSED THAT IT WAS NO PROBLEM WITH CTR WITH THE HOLDING SPD BEING GOOD UP TO 265 KIAS. JUST PRIOR TO RDU, I TOLD THE FO I WOULD BE OFF FOR A WHILE, SINCE I WANTED TO CALL THE COMPANY AND LET THEM KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING. LATER, THE FO ASKED ME THE LOW SPD BUFFET SPD AT THAT ALT. I LOOKED AT THE AIRSPD INDICATOR AND UPON SEEING 200 KIAS TOLD HIM I THOUGHT HE WAS ALREADY BELOW IT. I PUSHED THE THROTTLES TO MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST AND TOLD HIM TO START A SLOW DSCNT FOR 300 FT. I CALLED CTR AND TOLD THEM WE WANTED FL330 (IT TOOK 2 CALLS OF COURSE). THEY SAID UNABLE AND I ADVISED THEM THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO HOLD FL350 BECAUSE WE WERE AT LOW SPD BUFFET SPD. THE FO HAD DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND AS HE ATTEMPTED TO LEVEL AT 34700 FT I COULD FEEL THE ONSET OF BUFFET. THE FO WAS STILL ONLY 200 KIAS. TOLD HIM NOT TO GET IT INTO BUFFET AND TO CONTINUE A SLOW DSCNT. CTR TOLD US TO TURN R TO AN ASSIGNED HDG. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND TOLD THE FO NOT TO TURN PAST 15 DEGS OF BANK AT THAT SPD SINCE IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS GOING TO TOO GREAT A BANK ANGLE FOR THE SITUATION. I EMPHASIZED THE POINT BY MANUALLY STOPPING THE CTL WHEEL. AS I PREPARED TO CALL CTR TO EMPHASIZE OUR SITUATION AND DECLARE AN EMER, CTR CALLED AND CLRED US TO FL330. I NOTED THE ALT LOST AT AROUND 750 FT AT THE TIME. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND THANKED HIM PROFUSELY. WE THEN DSNDED AND RETURNED TO NORMAL FLT. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS ROUTINE FOR THE SITUATION AS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED, IE, MORE HOLDING, TRW AVOIDANCE, ETC, ETC. THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL IN THE COCKPIT WAS NOT THE PROBLEM. (WE BOTH HAVE WELL OVER 10000 HRS EACH AND HAVE FLOWN TOGETHER MANY TIMES. THE FO HAS FLOWN CAPT WHILE AT ANOTHER CARRIER AND HAS EXTENSIVE JET EXPERIENCE. WE BOTH HAVE OVER 3 YRS IN TYPE). COMPLACENCY ON MY PART WAS DEFINITELY A FACTOR. I ASSUMED TOO MUCH AND WHILE ATTENDING TO OTHER DUTIES DID NOT MONITOR THE ACFTS PROGRESS. I HONESTLY CAN'T SAY FOR SURE IF I LOOKED AT THE AIRSPD FROM THE TIME THE FO STARTED THE TURN INTO HOLDING UNTIL THE SPD HAD BLED TO 200 KIAS. IF I DID, IT EITHER WAS NOT THE ABNORMAL OR DIDN'T REGISTER. THE FO TOLD ME LATER THAT THE AIRSPD STARTED TO DECAY AFTER THE TURN INTO HOLDING, YET HE LET THE SITUATION DETERIORATE AND ATTEMPTED NO CORRECTIVE ACTION. I SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING REFUSED LOWER. EXCEPT FOR THE ALTDEV THE CTLR HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THE SEVERITY OF THE SITUATION UNLESS HE KNEW WHAT LOW SPD BUFFET AT ALT MEANS. I STILL FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT 2 EXPERIENCED PLTS COULD LET THIS HAPPEN. IF SOMEONE HAD TOLD ME THE SAME STORY PRIOR TO THIS HAPPENING TO ME, I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT 'WHAT A COUPLE OF DUMB ____S!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.