Narrative:

At XA15 pm local time I was called to do a 'lifeguard' charter. I was to pick up a team of doctors at teterboro, nj (teb) and bring them to syracuse, ny (syr) where they were to remove a heart from a person who had died and bring it back to teterboro, nj (teb). I arrived in white plains, ny (hpn), where our operation is based, at XB10. My first officer had done the flight planning and told me that 'it's VFR and we're ready to go.' we started the engines at XB15 and taxied to runway 29. When I listened to the ATIS during the taxi, I thought I heard the ATIS state that '...runway 11/29 will be closed on jul/xx/92....' in reality the ATIS said '...runway 11/29 is closed until jul/xx/92....' at XB20, the first officer announced on the CTAF that 'small transport is taking the active runway 29 for departure at westchester.' once in position on runway 29, I handed the controls of the aircraft over to the first officer and then I announced on the CTAF 'small transport is departing runway 29 at westchester. We then departed runway 29 without incident and completed our trip. Westchester tower was closed at the time of departure. We arrived back at westchester and after landing, westchester operations asked me to come see them before I left the airport. It was at that time I found out about the incident. The biggest factor that contributed to this was the failure of the flight crew to do an adequate preflight. Body organs are very time critical so you rush around too much and overlook things. Also, westchester operations never heard either of our radio transmissions that we were using runway 29. The best way that this incident could have been avoided is for the flight crew to slow down and don't take short cuts. All aspects of flight planning are important to the safety of flight. A better look at NOTAMS and field conditions was needed. Also, a direct call to westchester operations for 'airport advisories' would have prevented this incident. This incident has proved to me that there is no excuse, not even time critical, life threatening body organs, for an incomplete or rushed preflight. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated that this was a 'lifeguard' flight and 'rush, rush.' at the time of incident it had been 55 mins since called and 'doctors were waiting' for their pick-up and transport of vital organs for transplant at nearby hospital. Reporter states first officer very inexperienced and rush situation created high workload. Reporter states that complacency was also contributor as this was the usual runway for takeoff at that airport. This was beginning of a positioning flight. No patients or medical team on board.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LIFEGUARD FLT DEPARTS FROM CLOSED RWY, TWR CLOSED AT TIME.

Narrative: AT XA15 PM LCL TIME I WAS CALLED TO DO A 'LIFEGUARD' CHARTER. I WAS TO PICK UP A TEAM OF DOCTORS AT TETERBORO, NJ (TEB) AND BRING THEM TO SYRACUSE, NY (SYR) WHERE THEY WERE TO REMOVE A HEART FROM A PERSON WHO HAD DIED AND BRING IT BACK TO TETERBORO, NJ (TEB). I ARRIVED IN WHITE PLAINS, NY (HPN), WHERE OUR OP IS BASED, AT XB10. MY FO HAD DONE THE FLT PLANNING AND TOLD ME THAT 'IT'S VFR AND WE'RE READY TO GO.' WE STARTED THE ENGS AT XB15 AND TAXIED TO RWY 29. WHEN I LISTENED TO THE ATIS DURING THE TAXI, I THOUGHT I HEARD THE ATIS STATE THAT '...RWY 11/29 WILL BE CLOSED ON JUL/XX/92....' IN REALITY THE ATIS SAID '...RWY 11/29 IS CLOSED UNTIL JUL/XX/92....' AT XB20, THE FO ANNOUNCED ON THE CTAF THAT 'SMT IS TAKING THE ACTIVE RWY 29 FOR DEP AT WESTCHESTER.' ONCE IN POS ON RWY 29, I HANDED THE CTLS OF THE ACFT OVER TO THE FO AND THEN I ANNOUNCED ON THE CTAF 'SMT IS DEPARTING RWY 29 AT WESTCHESTER. WE THEN DEPARTED RWY 29 WITHOUT INCIDENT AND COMPLETED OUR TRIP. WESTCHESTER TWR WAS CLOSED AT THE TIME OF DEP. WE ARRIVED BACK AT WESTCHESTER AND AFTER LNDG, WESTCHESTER OPS ASKED ME TO COME SEE THEM BEFORE I LEFT THE ARPT. IT WAS AT THAT TIME I FOUND OUT ABOUT THE INCIDENT. THE BIGGEST FACTOR THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS WAS THE FAILURE OF THE FLC TO DO AN ADEQUATE PREFLT. BODY ORGANS ARE VERY TIME CRITICAL SO YOU RUSH AROUND TOO MUCH AND OVERLOOK THINGS. ALSO, WESTCHESTER OPS NEVER HEARD EITHER OF OUR RADIO TRANSMISSIONS THAT WE WERE USING RWY 29. THE BEST WAY THAT THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IS FOR THE FLC TO SLOW DOWN AND DON'T TAKE SHORT CUTS. ALL ASPECTS OF FLT PLANNING ARE IMPORTANT TO THE SAFETY OF FLT. A BETTER LOOK AT NOTAMS AND FIELD CONDITIONS WAS NEEDED. ALSO, A DIRECT CALL TO WESTCHESTER OPS FOR 'ARPT ADVISORIES' WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT. THIS INCIDENT HAS PROVED TO ME THAT THERE IS NO EXCUSE, NOT EVEN TIME CRITICAL, LIFE THREATENING BODY ORGANS, FOR AN INCOMPLETE OR RUSHED PREFLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A 'LIFEGUARD' FLT AND 'RUSH, RUSH.' AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT IT HAD BEEN 55 MINS SINCE CALLED AND 'DOCTORS WERE WAITING' FOR THEIR PICK-UP AND TRANSPORT OF VITAL ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT AT NEARBY HOSPITAL. RPTR STATES FO VERY INEXPERIENCED AND RUSH SITUATION CREATED HIGH WORKLOAD. RPTR STATES THAT COMPLACENCY WAS ALSO CONTRIBUTOR AS THIS WAS THE USUAL RWY FOR TKOF AT THAT ARPT. THIS WAS BEGINNING OF A POSITIONING FLT. NO PATIENTS OR MEDICAL TEAM ON BOARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.