Narrative:

I had scheduled a routine training flight with a multi-engine student to prepare him for his multi-engine private pilot chkride to follow immediately after the flight. We preflted the plane, received ATIS, performed the necessary ground checks, and departed the airport with stage ii radar service northeast to 4000 ft. After the initial level-off and the clean stall to the horn, we did simulated engine failures, pulling back the right throttle each time knowing that we would be advancing this throttle for the upcoming demonstrations to try and balance the workload on the engines. Now, following the shoreline sbound, we proceeded with the VMC demonstration, windmilling the left engine and advancing the throttle of the right. We then performed the drag demonstration. During the entire maneuver the right engine is at full power. Upon completion the student began the recovery procedure. After a short while he then brought the throttles together at about 22 inches manifold pressure. It was at this point we felt an unfamiliar shaking. I took the controls and felt no power from the left engine. I had to use sufficient right rudder and right bank to maintain control and turned right towards cameron county airport, southwest of our position. I advanced the mixture, propellers and the left throttle. Knowing we were probably 4 to 5 mi from the airport and at 4000 ft I immediately began to descend. I did advance the left throttle as per procedure and to verify the loss of power. After advancing the throttle, I checked the fuel selectors 'on' and the electric fuel pumps 'on' and tried a few different mixture and throttle settings with no change. With the left throttle advanced again I asked the student to note the manifold pressure indications. Approximately 25 inches on the right and about 12 inches on the left. He verified them. I then pointed out that the left propeller was windmilling and he verified the same. I then called valley approach as we were stage ii. Valley approach responded and I cancelled stage ii with cameron county in sight from where we were on the left downwind leg for runway 13. I was instructed to change to advisory frequency and did so. Shortly after the left engine feathered I felt a loss of power on the right side. The engine began to windmill and feathered automatically. I immediately told the student to press the starter for the right side. He did so as he put the feather restart checklist in his lap and verified the steps. I worked the throttle of the right engine. After the loss of power on the right I tried to concentrate on glide. At first, I thought we might make it to the runway, but as we never demonstrate such a setup I was not sure how far we would glide. Very quickly we knew we were not going to make it to the runway. I instructed the student to tighten his seat belt as I did. We selected a road at the approach end, and I very shortly realized we were not going to make the road. Noting my airspeed I knew we were committed to a small clearing ahead, I banked the aircraft to the right to avoid a fence and stayed out of the trees with success. Upon coming to a complete stop the student and I emerged from the aircraft unscratched. After making sure we were fine, I re-entered the aircraft to shut off the master switch. I am not sure what caused the power failure on the left engine. The surface temperature and dew point were within 2 degrees at that time and we were at 4000 ft, which could promote carburetor ice. We now know the right engine had catastrophic failure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR PREPARING STUDENT FOR MULTI-ENG CHKRIDE HAS PROBLEM WITH L ENG WHICH IS FEATHERED AS HE MANEUVERS TOWARD ARPT. R ENG FAILS, EMER LNDG.

Narrative: I HAD SCHEDULED A ROUTINE TRAINING FLT WITH A MULTI-ENG STUDENT TO PREPARE HIM FOR HIS MULTI-ENG PRIVATE PLT CHKRIDE TO FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FLT. WE PREFLTED THE PLANE, RECEIVED ATIS, PERFORMED THE NECESSARY GND CHKS, AND DEPARTED THE ARPT WITH STAGE II RADAR SVC NE TO 4000 FT. AFTER THE INITIAL LEVEL-OFF AND THE CLEAN STALL TO THE HORN, WE DID SIMULATED ENG FAILURES, PULLING BACK THE R THROTTLE EACH TIME KNOWING THAT WE WOULD BE ADVANCING THIS THROTTLE FOR THE UPCOMING DEMONSTRATIONS TO TRY AND BAL THE WORKLOAD ON THE ENGS. NOW, FOLLOWING THE SHORELINE SBOUND, WE PROCEEDED WITH THE VMC DEMONSTRATION, WINDMILLING THE L ENG AND ADVANCING THE THROTTLE OF THE R. WE THEN PERFORMED THE DRAG DEMONSTRATION. DURING THE ENTIRE MANEUVER THE R ENG IS AT FULL PWR. UPON COMPLETION THE STUDENT BEGAN THE RECOVERY PROC. AFTER A SHORT WHILE HE THEN BROUGHT THE THROTTLES TOGETHER AT ABOUT 22 INCHES MANIFOLD PRESSURE. IT WAS AT THIS POINT WE FELT AN UNFAMILIAR SHAKING. I TOOK THE CTLS AND FELT NO PWR FROM THE L ENG. I HAD TO USE SUFFICIENT R RUDDER AND R BANK TO MAINTAIN CTL AND TURNED R TOWARDS CAMERON COUNTY ARPT, SW OF OUR POS. I ADVANCED THE MIXTURE, PROPS AND THE L THROTTLE. KNOWING WE WERE PROBABLY 4 TO 5 MI FROM THE ARPT AND AT 4000 FT I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO DSND. I DID ADVANCE THE L THROTTLE AS PER PROC AND TO VERIFY THE LOSS OF PWR. AFTER ADVANCING THE THROTTLE, I CHKED THE FUEL SELECTORS 'ON' AND THE ELECTRIC FUEL PUMPS 'ON' AND TRIED A FEW DIFFERENT MIXTURE AND THROTTLE SETTINGS WITH NO CHANGE. WITH THE L THROTTLE ADVANCED AGAIN I ASKED THE STUDENT TO NOTE THE MANIFOLD PRESSURE INDICATIONS. APPROX 25 INCHES ON THE R AND ABOUT 12 INCHES ON THE L. HE VERIFIED THEM. I THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE L PROP WAS WINDMILLING AND HE VERIFIED THE SAME. I THEN CALLED VALLEY APCH AS WE WERE STAGE II. VALLEY APCH RESPONDED AND I CANCELLED STAGE II WITH CAMERON COUNTY IN SIGHT FROM WHERE WE WERE ON THE L DOWNWIND LEG FOR RWY 13. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO CHANGE TO ADVISORY FREQ AND DID SO. SHORTLY AFTER THE L ENG FEATHERED I FELT A LOSS OF PWR ON THE R SIDE. THE ENG BEGAN TO WINDMILL AND FEATHERED AUTOMATICALLY. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE STUDENT TO PRESS THE STARTER FOR THE R SIDE. HE DID SO AS HE PUT THE FEATHER RESTART CHKLIST IN HIS LAP AND VERIFIED THE STEPS. I WORKED THE THROTTLE OF THE R ENG. AFTER THE LOSS OF PWR ON THE R I TRIED TO CONCENTRATE ON GLIDE. AT FIRST, I THOUGHT WE MIGHT MAKE IT TO THE RWY, BUT AS WE NEVER DEMONSTRATE SUCH A SETUP I WAS NOT SURE HOW FAR WE WOULD GLIDE. VERY QUICKLY WE KNEW WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE IT TO THE RWY. I INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO TIGHTEN HIS SEAT BELT AS I DID. WE SELECTED A ROAD AT THE APCH END, AND I VERY SHORTLY REALIZED WE WERE NOT GOING TO MAKE THE ROAD. NOTING MY AIRSPD I KNEW WE WERE COMMITTED TO A SMALL CLRING AHEAD, I BANKED THE ACFT TO THE R TO AVOID A FENCE AND STAYED OUT OF THE TREES WITH SUCCESS. UPON COMING TO A COMPLETE STOP THE STUDENT AND I EMERGED FROM THE ACFT UNSCRATCHED. AFTER MAKING SURE WE WERE FINE, I RE-ENTERED THE ACFT TO SHUT OFF THE MASTER SWITCH. I AM NOT SURE WHAT CAUSED THE PWR FAILURE ON THE L ENG. THE SURFACE TEMP AND DEW POINT WERE WITHIN 2 DEGS AT THAT TIME AND WE WERE AT 4000 FT, WHICH COULD PROMOTE CARB ICE. WE NOW KNOW THE R ENG HAD CATASTROPHIC FAILURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.