Narrative:

Stall warning (i.e., stick shaker) activated during our flap/slat retraction after takeoff (from flaps '1' to flaps 'up'). Corrective action was taken according to cockpit operating manual (C.O.M.) procedures. Initially, we overlooked an important note in our procedures manual that would have saved time in clearing up this ultimately-to-be-proven erroneous warning. Had we 3 pilots more slowly discussed the cockpit indications, we would have been directed to the appropriate procedure and the incident would have been cleaned up in a more timely manner. There was no compromise in safety but 'haste made waste' -- in terms of time. A normal approach and landing was made. Maintenance personnel replaced a faulty stall warning transducer. The flight then continued without further incident. Moral: 'fly the airplane, do not hurry, properly identify the problem, read every word of the corrective procedure, follow it to the letter to its completion. Supplemental information from acn 215294: during the clean-up portion of the climb (going from flaps '1' to flaps 'up,' airspeed approximately 230 KTS) the stick shaker for the stall warning system activated and the outboard slats automatic extended. We dumped approximately 13000 pounds of fuel to obtain landing weight. Initially, the crew overlooked an important note in our procedures manual that would have saved time in clearing up the problem. Supplemental information from acn 214950: the 'slats not in agreement' portion of the checklist was performed and when the slat reset light would not extinguish, the procedure was restarted again from the beginning. We then determined that the stall warning system had failed, causing the autoslats to extend. The stall warning computer was replaced and the flight continued. At the end of the day, we thoroughly reviewed our performance and the crew coordination, checklist management, and situational awareness involved in handling an unusual situation or problem.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A WDB CREW HAD A STALL WARNING ON TKOF. THEY COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEM UNTIL THEY HAD TO DUMP FUEL, THEN RETURN AND LAND.

Narrative: STALL WARNING (I.E., STICK SHAKER) ACTIVATED DURING OUR FLAP/SLAT RETRACTION AFTER TKOF (FROM FLAPS '1' TO FLAPS 'UP'). CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN ACCORDING TO COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL (C.O.M.) PROCS. INITIALLY, WE OVERLOOKED AN IMPORTANT NOTE IN OUR PROCS MANUAL THAT WOULD HAVE SAVED TIME IN CLRING UP THIS ULTIMATELY-TO-BE-PROVEN ERRONEOUS WARNING. HAD WE 3 PLTS MORE SLOWLY DISCUSSED THE COCKPIT INDICATIONS, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO THE APPROPRIATE PROC AND THE INCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN CLEANED UP IN A MORE TIMELY MANNER. THERE WAS NO COMPROMISE IN SAFETY BUT 'HASTE MADE WASTE' -- IN TERMS OF TIME. A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WAS MADE. MAINT PERSONNEL REPLACED A FAULTY STALL WARNING TRANSDUCER. THE FLT THEN CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. MORAL: 'FLY THE AIRPLANE, DO NOT HURRY, PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE PROBLEM, READ EVERY WORD OF THE CORRECTIVE PROC, FOLLOW IT TO THE LETTER TO ITS COMPLETION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 215294: DURING THE CLEAN-UP PORTION OF THE CLB (GOING FROM FLAPS '1' TO FLAPS 'UP,' AIRSPD APPROX 230 KTS) THE STICK SHAKER FOR THE STALL WARNING SYS ACTIVATED AND THE OUTBOARD SLATS AUTO EXTENDED. WE DUMPED APPROX 13000 POUNDS OF FUEL TO OBTAIN LNDG WT. INITIALLY, THE CREW OVERLOOKED AN IMPORTANT NOTE IN OUR PROCS MANUAL THAT WOULD HAVE SAVED TIME IN CLRING UP THE PROBLEM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 214950: THE 'SLATS NOT IN AGREEMENT' PORTION OF THE CHKLIST WAS PERFORMED AND WHEN THE SLAT RESET LIGHT WOULD NOT EXTINGUISH, THE PROC WAS RESTARTED AGAIN FROM THE BEGINNING. WE THEN DETERMINED THAT THE STALL WARNING SYS HAD FAILED, CAUSING THE AUTOSLATS TO EXTEND. THE STALL WARNING COMPUTER WAS REPLACED AND THE FLT CONTINUED. AT THE END OF THE DAY, WE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED OUR PERFORMANCE AND THE CREW COORD, CHKLIST MGMNT, AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS INVOLVED IN HANDLING AN UNUSUAL SITUATION OR PROBLEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.