Narrative:

After landing in widebody transport 1, the captain was taxiing the aircraft to a hardstand parking spot at ord. While taxiing on the inner taxiway, a company widebody transport 2 began a very slow pushback off of gate X. As we approached the area of gate X, the captain slowed the aircraft to approximately 5 KTS. I attempted to get a visual response from the pushback crew to ensure wingtip clearance, but received none. The widebody transport 2 continued to push. Once I no longer had visual contact with the widebody transport 2's left wingtip, the captain stopped our aircraft, which was barely moving (1-2 KTS), and parked the brakes. Our aircraft was on the center of the taxiway when it was struck by widebody transport 2's left winglet. During subsequent discussion, it was my understanding that it is legal and correct for an aircraft to extend over into a taxiway as long as the gear is not on the taxiway (i.e., no clearance from ground control is required as long as the gear remains on the ramp). The obvious solution to prevent this type of incident from happening again would be to require clearance from ground control anytime any part of an aircraft extends onto a taxiway, even if the aircraft isn't technically 'on' the taxiway. Supplemental information from acn 216609: during the inquiry meeting, it was noted that the initial portion of the pushback is angled toward the inner taxiway, then a turn must be made in order to push the aircraft into the alleyway. It was also brought out that the tug driver could not start his turn toward the alleyway until the nose of the widebody transport 2 had cleared the jet bridge. The tug driver also stated that he had started his turn before he saw the stop signal. This being the case, he and/or his guide mane had to have been looking at the nose of the widebody transport 2 when the initial stop signal was given. All signals were being given visually because the tug driver was not wearing a headset at the time. Another fact that must be pointed out is the increased distance the left wingtip travels during a turn. It is my belief that this took place between the time the wingtip of the widebody transport 2 passed abeam the cockpit window and the time contact was made.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 WDBS, BELONGING TO THE SAME ACR, BRUSHED THEIR WINGTIPS WHEN 1 PUSHED BACK INTO ANOTHER. THE RPTING ACFT WAS TAXIING AND WAS ON THE CTRLINE OF THE TAXIWAY, THE OTHER WAS BEING PUSHED BACK FOLLOWING COMPANY PROCS.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG IN WDB 1, THE CAPT WAS TAXIING THE ACFT TO A HARDSTAND PARKING SPOT AT ORD. WHILE TAXIING ON THE INNER TAXIWAY, A COMPANY WDB 2 BEGAN A VERY SLOW PUSHBACK OFF OF GATE X. AS WE APCHED THE AREA OF GATE X, THE CAPT SLOWED THE ACFT TO APPROX 5 KTS. I ATTEMPTED TO GET A VISUAL RESPONSE FROM THE PUSHBACK CREW TO ENSURE WINGTIP CLRNC, BUT RECEIVED NONE. THE WDB 2 CONTINUED TO PUSH. ONCE I NO LONGER HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE WDB 2'S L WINGTIP, THE CAPT STOPPED OUR ACFT, WHICH WAS BARELY MOVING (1-2 KTS), AND PARKED THE BRAKES. OUR ACFT WAS ON THE CTR OF THE TAXIWAY WHEN IT WAS STRUCK BY WDB 2'S L WINGLET. DURING SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS LEGAL AND CORRECT FOR AN ACFT TO EXTEND OVER INTO A TAXIWAY AS LONG AS THE GEAR IS NOT ON THE TAXIWAY (I.E., NO CLRNC FROM GND CTL IS REQUIRED AS LONG AS THE GEAR REMAINS ON THE RAMP). THE OBVIOUS SOLUTION TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN WOULD BE TO REQUIRE CLRNC FROM GND CTL ANYTIME ANY PART OF AN ACFT EXTENDS ONTO A TAXIWAY, EVEN IF THE ACFT ISN'T TECHNICALLY 'ON' THE TAXIWAY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 216609: DURING THE INQUIRY MEETING, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE PUSHBACK IS ANGLED TOWARD THE INNER TAXIWAY, THEN A TURN MUST BE MADE IN ORDER TO PUSH THE ACFT INTO THE ALLEYWAY. IT WAS ALSO BROUGHT OUT THAT THE TUG DRIVER COULD NOT START HIS TURN TOWARD THE ALLEYWAY UNTIL THE NOSE OF THE WDB 2 HAD CLRED THE JET BRIDGE. THE TUG DRIVER ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD STARTED HIS TURN BEFORE HE SAW THE STOP SIGNAL. THIS BEING THE CASE, HE AND/OR HIS GUIDE MANE HAD TO HAVE BEEN LOOKING AT THE NOSE OF THE WDB 2 WHEN THE INITIAL STOP SIGNAL WAS GIVEN. ALL SIGNALS WERE BEING GIVEN VISUALLY BECAUSE THE TUG DRIVER WAS NOT WEARING A HEADSET AT THE TIME. ANOTHER FACT THAT MUST BE POINTED OUT IS THE INCREASED DISTANCE THE L WINGTIP TRAVELS DURING A TURN. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THIS TOOK PLACE BTWN THE TIME THE WINGTIP OF THE WDB 2 PASSED ABEAM THE COCKPIT WINDOW AND THE TIME CONTACT WAS MADE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.