Narrative:

Following an uneventful IFR flight from goose bay, canada, (cyyr) in an older model light transport in which I was first officer, we (the captain and I) pushed ourselves into a position in which we had to declare 'min fuel' and eventually a 'low fuel emergency.' the problem began with an overly ambitious computer generated flight plan which showed a flight time close to, but within, our aircraft capabilities. We had noted an increased fuel consumption on previous flts compared to these computer generated (commercial company) flight plans. En route, we were assigned lower altitudes (FL280 instead of 390) than were called for to meet the projected fuel burn. We also encountered lower gndspds than predicted (lower altitude plus stronger headwinds than forecast). These factors and a longer-than-planned routing combined to give us an actual time en route 35 mins longer than planned and a fuel burn approximately 1500 pounds greater than planned. Approaching bdl, we called 'min fuel.' we were radar vectored on a longer downwind than we would have liked and told we were #3 for the airport. I was the PF. The captain handled the radio. On base and final we encountered heavy rain. On a 2 mi final we both 'GS failure' flags on our HSI's and elected to continue the localizer only approach. At the localizer only MDA, we could not see the airport and executed the missed approach. The captain took the controls and declared a low fuel emergency to ATC. I then did the radio and requested a tight low altitude pattern including a turn inside the OM. The GS failed again at the 2 mi point. This time, using the GPS to confirm our erratic localizer signal we were eventually able to see the runway centerline lights and make a long landing. We landed with approximately 400 pounds of fuel on board; enough for another 10 mins at best. Contributing factors to our decision not to divert earlier in the flight included reported ceiling and visibility well above actual conditions, having my parents waiting at the airport, and worrying about customs service requirements for prior notification. Never again will I participate in a flight where we leave ourselves so few options when things go wrong.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LTT FLC HAS LOWER ALT ASSIGNED, HEADWINDS, FUEL CONSUMPTION GREATER THAN PLANNED, NAV EQUIP FAILS ON APCH, MISSED APCH, DECLARE LOW FUEL EMER, REQUEST TIGHT PATTERN. LAND WITH 10 MINS FUEL.

Narrative: FOLLOWING AN UNEVENTFUL IFR FLT FROM GOOSE BAY, CANADA, (CYYR) IN AN OLDER MODEL LTT IN WHICH I WAS FO, WE (THE CAPT AND I) PUSHED OURSELVES INTO A POS IN WHICH WE HAD TO DECLARE 'MIN FUEL' AND EVENTUALLY A 'LOW FUEL EMER.' THE PROBLEM BEGAN WITH AN OVERLY AMBITIOUS COMPUTER GENERATED FLT PLAN WHICH SHOWED A FLT TIME CLOSE TO, BUT WITHIN, OUR ACFT CAPABILITIES. WE HAD NOTED AN INCREASED FUEL CONSUMPTION ON PREVIOUS FLTS COMPARED TO THESE COMPUTER GENERATED (COMMERCIAL COMPANY) FLT PLANS. ENRTE, WE WERE ASSIGNED LOWER ALTS (FL280 INSTEAD OF 390) THAN WERE CALLED FOR TO MEET THE PROJECTED FUEL BURN. WE ALSO ENCOUNTERED LOWER GNDSPDS THAN PREDICTED (LOWER ALT PLUS STRONGER HEADWINDS THAN FORECAST). THESE FACTORS AND A LONGER-THAN-PLANNED ROUTING COMBINED TO GIVE US AN ACTUAL TIME ENRTE 35 MINS LONGER THAN PLANNED AND A FUEL BURN APPROX 1500 POUNDS GREATER THAN PLANNED. APCHING BDL, WE CALLED 'MIN FUEL.' WE WERE RADAR VECTORED ON A LONGER DOWNWIND THAN WE WOULD HAVE LIKED AND TOLD WE WERE #3 FOR THE ARPT. I WAS THE PF. THE CAPT HANDLED THE RADIO. ON BASE AND FINAL WE ENCOUNTERED HVY RAIN. ON A 2 MI FINAL WE BOTH 'GS FAILURE' FLAGS ON OUR HSI'S AND ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE LOC ONLY APCH. AT THE LOC ONLY MDA, WE COULD NOT SEE THE ARPT AND EXECUTED THE MISSED APCH. THE CAPT TOOK THE CTLS AND DECLARED A LOW FUEL EMER TO ATC. I THEN DID THE RADIO AND REQUESTED A TIGHT LOW ALT PATTERN INCLUDING A TURN INSIDE THE OM. THE GS FAILED AGAIN AT THE 2 MI POINT. THIS TIME, USING THE GPS TO CONFIRM OUR ERRATIC LOC SIGNAL WE WERE EVENTUALLY ABLE TO SEE THE RWY CTRLINE LIGHTS AND MAKE A LONG LNDG. WE LANDED WITH APPROX 400 POUNDS OF FUEL ON BOARD; ENOUGH FOR ANOTHER 10 MINS AT BEST. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO OUR DECISION NOT TO DIVERT EARLIER IN THE FLT INCLUDED RPTED CEILING AND VISIBILITY WELL ABOVE ACTUAL CONDITIONS, HAVING MY PARENTS WAITING AT THE ARPT, AND WORRYING ABOUT CUSTOMS SVC REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION. NEVER AGAIN WILL I PARTICIPATE IN A FLT WHERE WE LEAVE OURSELVES SO FEW OPTIONS WHEN THINGS GO WRONG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.