Narrative:

I was briefing the crew on the fact that the new ATIS temperature confined with our radio close-out weight would permit a takeoff with 10 degrees of flaps, maximum power on runway 1R if the delay on 28L became excessive (runway 28R was closed). While I was talking, I thought I heard 'my flight, position and hold -- be prepared for an immediate takeoff.' we saw that the widebody transport was clearing the runway and that the medium large transport on approach was far enough out to be consistent with this clearance. The first officer acknowledged with 'roger' as I taxied onto the runway, whereupon the tower issued go around instructions to the medium large transport. The clearance had been for another aircraft to take position on 1R and to be prepared for an immediate takeoff. It seems to be a case of my 'hearing' what I expected to hear rather than what had been actually transmitted. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting captain, a long time friend of this analyst, assumes full responsibility for this incident, with some mitigating circumstances. The copilot on this incident does not believe in complete readbacks of clrncs as that 'tends to clutter the frequency.' he just said 'roger' to the clearance, which was for someone else. The engineer was completely out of the loop finishing his preflight duties, and the captain was making a pre-departure PA. The only person fully in the communication coop, the first officer, fouled it up. The reporting captain is a long time crusader. He believes that aviation safety would be improved by improving the quality of the sound transmissions sent and received over the ATC channels. Another crusade he is mounting is taxiway markings and naming. He believes that there should be an attempt to standardize naming at airports, and that ground controllers, who only know 1 airport, might show a little tolerance with those who operate out of many. His final crusade (for the time being) is slippery runway paint markings and rubber deposits in abort situations. Supplemental information from acn 217504: I did not hear the entire text of the call, but 'assumed' by the way the captain responded that he did. When we were initially taxiing into position, there did indeed seem to be enough room. I acknowledged the call with a simple 'roger' rather than the full call sign. Supplemental information from acn 217505: since we were anticipating a clearance, the captain and first officer may have thought they heard what we were expecting to hear, and the first officer said 'roger' and the captain taxied onto the runway. Although as a flight engineer, I try to 'stay in the loop,' I got involved in completing the pre- takeoff checklist and did not pay attention to the clearance.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A WDB ACR, ANTICIPATING TKOF CLRNC, MISUNDERSTOOD A 'POS AND HOLD' CLRNC FOR ANOTHER ACFT AS THEIR OWN. ANOTHER ACFT HAD TO MAKE A GAR.

Narrative: I WAS BRIEFING THE CREW ON THE FACT THAT THE NEW ATIS TEMP CONFINED WITH OUR RADIO CLOSE-OUT WT WOULD PERMIT A TKOF WITH 10 DEGS OF FLAPS, MAX PWR ON RWY 1R IF THE DELAY ON 28L BECAME EXCESSIVE (RWY 28R WAS CLOSED). WHILE I WAS TALKING, I THOUGHT I HEARD 'MY FLT, POS AND HOLD -- BE PREPARED FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF.' WE SAW THAT THE WDB WAS CLRING THE RWY AND THAT THE MLG ON APCH WAS FAR ENOUGH OUT TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS CLRNC. THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED WITH 'ROGER' AS I TAXIED ONTO THE RWY, WHEREUPON THE TWR ISSUED GAR INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MLG. THE CLRNC HAD BEEN FOR ANOTHER ACFT TO TAKE POS ON 1R AND TO BE PREPARED FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. IT SEEMS TO BE A CASE OF MY 'HEARING' WHAT I EXPECTED TO HEAR RATHER THAN WHAT HAD BEEN ACTUALLY XMITTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING CAPT, A LONG TIME FRIEND OF THIS ANALYST, ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS INCIDENT, WITH SOME MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. THE COPLT ON THIS INCIDENT DOES NOT BELIEVE IN COMPLETE READBACKS OF CLRNCS AS THAT 'TENDS TO CLUTTER THE FREQ.' HE JUST SAID 'ROGER' TO THE CLRNC, WHICH WAS FOR SOMEONE ELSE. THE ENGINEER WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE LOOP FINISHING HIS PREFLT DUTIES, AND THE CAPT WAS MAKING A PRE-DEP PA. THE ONLY PERSON FULLY IN THE COM COOP, THE FO, FOULED IT UP. THE RPTING CAPT IS A LONG TIME CRUSADER. HE BELIEVES THAT AVIATION SAFETY WOULD BE IMPROVED BY IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE SOUND TRANSMISSIONS SENT AND RECEIVED OVER THE ATC CHANNELS. ANOTHER CRUSADE HE IS MOUNTING IS TAXIWAY MARKINGS AND NAMING. HE BELIEVES THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO STANDARDIZE NAMING AT ARPTS, AND THAT GND CTLRS, WHO ONLY KNOW 1 ARPT, MIGHT SHOW A LITTLE TOLERANCE WITH THOSE WHO OPERATE OUT OF MANY. HIS FINAL CRUSADE (FOR THE TIME BEING) IS SLIPPERY RWY PAINT MARKINGS AND RUBBER DEPOSITS IN ABORT SITUATIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 217504: I DID NOT HEAR THE ENTIRE TEXT OF THE CALL, BUT 'ASSUMED' BY THE WAY THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT HE DID. WHEN WE WERE INITIALLY TAXIING INTO POS, THERE DID INDEED SEEM TO BE ENOUGH ROOM. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CALL WITH A SIMPLE 'ROGER' RATHER THAN THE FULL CALL SIGN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 217505: SINCE WE WERE ANTICIPATING A CLRNC, THE CAPT AND FO MAY HAVE THOUGHT THEY HEARD WHAT WE WERE EXPECTING TO HEAR, AND THE FO SAID 'ROGER' AND THE CAPT TAXIED ONTO THE RWY. ALTHOUGH AS A FLT ENGINEER, I TRY TO 'STAY IN THE LOOP,' I GOT INVOLVED IN COMPLETING THE PRE- TKOF CHKLIST AND DID NOT PAY ATTN TO THE CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.