Narrative:

We were on an air ambulance flight on the morning on sep/xx/92. We picked up a team of organ removal surgeons in tpa at AM45 and had flown them to jax to remove a heart from a donor. The WX was clear and forecast to remain the same. We understood from the medical crew the heart has a very short lifetime between removal from the donor to installation in the recipient, so when the recovery team arrived back to the airport in jax it would be necessary to expedite operations as much as possible. Myself and the first officer readied the aircraft for the return leg and then went into the FBO to wait. Shortly before receiving the call from the hospital advising us the medical crew was on their way back to the airport, the fog began to roll into the jax area. Upon arrival of the doctors, the visibility was down to 4000 RVR, and our operations specifications call for min 5000 RVR for departure. I made the determination it was necessary to depart below mins based on the medical emergency. I proceeded to the runway with precision runway markings and centerline lighting, and departed without incident. I felt the decision to depart below mins was the only available to me under the circumstances. If we had waited for improved visibility, the heart would have been ruined, and the receiving patient may have died. I wish I could offer some suggestion as to how this situation could be avoided in the future, but outside of our company not accepting organ transport flts, none comes to mind.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMER MEDICAL SVC FLT TKOF BELOW TKOF WX MINS.

Narrative: WE WERE ON AN AIR AMBULANCE FLT ON THE MORNING ON SEP/XX/92. WE PICKED UP A TEAM OF ORGAN REMOVAL SURGEONS IN TPA AT AM45 AND HAD FLOWN THEM TO JAX TO REMOVE A HEART FROM A DONOR. THE WX WAS CLR AND FORECAST TO REMAIN THE SAME. WE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE MEDICAL CREW THE HEART HAS A VERY SHORT LIFETIME BTWN REMOVAL FROM THE DONOR TO INSTALLATION IN THE RECIPIENT, SO WHEN THE RECOVERY TEAM ARRIVED BACK TO THE ARPT IN JAX IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO EXPEDITE OPS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. MYSELF AND THE FO READIED THE ACFT FOR THE RETURN LEG AND THEN WENT INTO THE FBO TO WAIT. SHORTLY BEFORE RECEIVING THE CALL FROM THE HOSPITAL ADVISING US THE MEDICAL CREW WAS ON THEIR WAY BACK TO THE ARPT, THE FOG BEGAN TO ROLL INTO THE JAX AREA. UPON ARR OF THE DOCTORS, THE VISIBILITY WAS DOWN TO 4000 RVR, AND OUR OPS SPECS CALL FOR MIN 5000 RVR FOR DEP. I MADE THE DETERMINATION IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEPART BELOW MINS BASED ON THE MEDICAL EMER. I PROCEEDED TO THE RWY WITH PRECISION RWY MARKINGS AND CTRLINE LIGHTING, AND DEPARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I FELT THE DECISION TO DEPART BELOW MINS WAS THE ONLY AVAILABLE TO ME UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IF WE HAD WAITED FOR IMPROVED VISIBILITY, THE HEART WOULD HAVE BEEN RUINED, AND THE RECEIVING PATIENT MAY HAVE DIED. I WISH I COULD OFFER SOME SUGGESTION AS TO HOW THIS SITUATION COULD BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE, BUT OUTSIDE OF OUR COMPANY NOT ACCEPTING ORGAN TRANSPORT FLTS, NONE COMES TO MIND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.