37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 224323 |
Time | |
Date | 199210 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : irw airport : okc |
State Reference | OK |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 33000 msl bound upper : 33400 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zkc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude cruise other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | observation : company check pilot oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 50 |
ASRS Report | 224323 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : overshoot non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : returned to intended course or assigned course |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
While functioning in the copilot position during a new captain chkout, the new captain did not hear my callout, '100 ft to go' during level-off at 33000 ft. He was preoccupied with the mach airspeed which had just had attention drawn to it by a comment from the flight engineer. I made a hand gesture and verbal command as we passed through the intended level-off altitude. The aircraft climb was arrested by 33400 ft by making a firm but gradual pushover to return to assigned altitude. Flight attendants were up performing in flight service so the aggressiveness of the flight path correction was kept to a reasonable level. No inquiry or comment was made by ATC during the deviation. TCASII was not operative at the time, so any traffic conflict which may have occurred was not noted. The new captain had been previously flying as first officer on an aircraft type which had altitude capture as part of its flight guidance system. His reliance upon this system to handle altitude capture was still present during his chkout in this equipment type which does not have this feature. As a company evaluator on this equipment type, we witness continued problems with crewmen upgrading from first officer on highly automated equipment to captain on minimally automated equipment. Much of a pilot's basic instrument flying skills are degraded or lost due to increased reliance upon the automation to do their thinking and instrument flying. It deeply concerns me that there is so much emphasis to utilize this automation most of the time much to the degradation of the pilots' basic flying skills. I spend more of my time teaching very basic instrument flying skills to those leaving highly advanced automated aircraft than teaching specific procedures applicable to the pilots' transition to the new aircraft. My concern is further heightened by the reality that pilots relying upon the automation for the majority of their flying are ill- prepared to cope with the demands of flying the aircraft should these advanced system fail under instrument emergency conditions.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR LGT CREW OVERSHOT ITS ALT ON LEVEL-OFF FROM A CLB.
Narrative: WHILE FUNCTIONING IN THE COPLT POS DURING A NEW CAPT CHKOUT, THE NEW CAPT DID NOT HEAR MY CALLOUT, '100 FT TO GO' DURING LEVEL-OFF AT 33000 FT. HE WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE MACH AIRSPD WHICH HAD JUST HAD ATTN DRAWN TO IT BY A COMMENT FROM THE FE. I MADE A HAND GESTURE AND VERBAL COMMAND AS WE PASSED THROUGH THE INTENDED LEVEL-OFF ALT. THE ACFT CLB WAS ARRESTED BY 33400 FT BY MAKING A FIRM BUT GRADUAL PUSHOVER TO RETURN TO ASSIGNED ALT. FLT ATTENDANTS WERE UP PERFORMING IN FLT SVC SO THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF THE FLT PATH CORRECTION WAS KEPT TO A REASONABLE LEVEL. NO INQUIRY OR COMMENT WAS MADE BY ATC DURING THE DEV. TCASII WAS NOT OPERATIVE AT THE TIME, SO ANY TFC CONFLICT WHICH MAY HAVE OCCURRED WAS NOT NOTED. THE NEW CAPT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY FLYING AS FO ON AN ACFT TYPE WHICH HAD ALT CAPTURE AS PART OF ITS FLT GUIDANCE SYS. HIS RELIANCE UPON THIS SYS TO HANDLE ALT CAPTURE WAS STILL PRESENT DURING HIS CHKOUT IN THIS EQUIP TYPE WHICH DOES NOT HAVE THIS FEATURE. AS A COMPANY EVALUATOR ON THIS EQUIP TYPE, WE WITNESS CONTINUED PROBLEMS WITH CREWMEN UPGRADING FROM FO ON HIGHLY AUTOMATED EQUIP TO CAPT ON MINIMALLY AUTOMATED EQUIP. MUCH OF A PLT'S BASIC INST FLYING SKILLS ARE DEGRADED OR LOST DUE TO INCREASED RELIANCE UPON THE AUTOMATION TO DO THEIR THINKING AND INST FLYING. IT DEEPLY CONCERNS ME THAT THERE IS SO MUCH EMPHASIS TO UTILIZE THIS AUTOMATION MOST OF THE TIME MUCH TO THE DEGRADATION OF THE PLTS' BASIC FLYING SKILLS. I SPEND MORE OF MY TIME TEACHING VERY BASIC INST FLYING SKILLS TO THOSE LEAVING HIGHLY ADVANCED AUTOMATED ACFT THAN TEACHING SPECIFIC PROCS APPLICABLE TO THE PLTS' TRANSITION TO THE NEW ACFT. MY CONCERN IS FURTHER HEIGHTENED BY THE REALITY THAT PLTS RELYING UPON THE AUTOMATION FOR THE MAJORITY OF THEIR FLYING ARE ILL- PREPARED TO COPE WITH THE DEMANDS OF FLYING THE ACFT SHOULD THESE ADVANCED SYS FAIL UNDER INST EMER CONDITIONS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.