Narrative:

False TCASII at low altitude. Dangerous RA command. We departed sfo runway 10R at XA30 local. We used full power with a light weight (medium large transport aircraft). At 1500 ft TCASII showed a pop-up target at 1 O'clock and 1/2 mi, 700 ft above us. After the TA the TCASII gave us a descend RA. At this time we still had takeoff flaps with a climb rate of 4000 FPM and a pitch attitude of plus 20 degrees. Our first reaction was to look for the target and before we could react the TCASII declared us clear of the target. Our altitude was now about 2300 ft. TCASII still showed a target at 2-3 O'clock and 1/2 mi. TCASII then declared 'traffic' a second time with a climb RA of plus 4000 FPM. This entire event occurred in less than 60 seconds. The problem here was the TCASII volume. TCASII volume was so loud I was unable to communicate with departure control to verify the validity of the TCASII target. This was a dangerous situation. Immediately after takeoff, very high rate of climb (plus 4000 FPM), climbing to a target only 700 ft above us (it would have taken more than 1000 ft of altitude to stop the climb and start a descent putting us in the path of the intruder a second time) finally our communication with departure control was cut because of the loud volume of the TCASII alerts. The confusion factor was very high. As a crew we were very busy with the takeoff profile (we still had the flaps out). The TCASII declared target, descend, monitor vertical speed, clear of traffic, target, climb and clear of traffic all in about 65 seconds. The initial command to descend could have been a very dangerous decision. If this situation had occurred at night, there is a high probability an airplane would descend into the waters of sfo bay. I want to emphasize the volume of the TCASII alert was the most distracting part of this encounter. TCASII volume was part of the certification of the system. Whoever established this decibel level made a hugh mistake. It is creating a dangerous situation and needs to be fixed now!

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF ACR MLG ACFT EXPERIENCED A FALSE TCASII ALERT AND WARNING IN A SHORT TIME RESULTING IN BRIEF EMOTIONAL TRAUMA TO THE PLT.

Narrative: FALSE TCASII AT LOW ALT. DANGEROUS RA COMMAND. WE DEPARTED SFO RWY 10R AT XA30 LCL. WE USED FULL PWR WITH A LIGHT WT (MLG ACFT). AT 1500 FT TCASII SHOWED A POP-UP TARGET AT 1 O'CLOCK AND 1/2 MI, 700 FT ABOVE US. AFTER THE TA THE TCASII GAVE US A DSND RA. AT THIS TIME WE STILL HAD TKOF FLAPS WITH A CLB RATE OF 4000 FPM AND A PITCH ATTITUDE OF PLUS 20 DEGS. OUR FIRST REACTION WAS TO LOOK FOR THE TARGET AND BEFORE WE COULD REACT THE TCASII DECLARED US CLR OF THE TARGET. OUR ALT WAS NOW ABOUT 2300 FT. TCASII STILL SHOWED A TARGET AT 2-3 O'CLOCK AND 1/2 MI. TCASII THEN DECLARED 'TFC' A SECOND TIME WITH A CLB RA OF PLUS 4000 FPM. THIS ENTIRE EVENT OCCURRED IN LESS THAN 60 SECONDS. THE PROBLEM HERE WAS THE TCASII VOLUME. TCASII VOLUME WAS SO LOUD I WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH DEP CTL TO VERIFY THE VALIDITY OF THE TCASII TARGET. THIS WAS A DANGEROUS SITUATION. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF, VERY HIGH RATE OF CLB (PLUS 4000 FPM), CLBING TO A TARGET ONLY 700 FT ABOVE US (IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN MORE THAN 1000 FT OF ALT TO STOP THE CLB AND START A DSCNT PUTTING US IN THE PATH OF THE INTRUDER A SECOND TIME) FINALLY OUR COM WITH DEP CTL WAS CUT BECAUSE OF THE LOUD VOLUME OF THE TCASII ALERTS. THE CONFUSION FACTOR WAS VERY HIGH. AS A CREW WE WERE VERY BUSY WITH THE TKOF PROFILE (WE STILL HAD THE FLAPS OUT). THE TCASII DECLARED TARGET, DSND, MONITOR VERT SPD, CLR OF TFC, TARGET, CLB AND CLR OF TFC ALL IN ABOUT 65 SECONDS. THE INITIAL COMMAND TO DSND COULD HAVE BEEN A VERY DANGEROUS DECISION. IF THIS SITUATION HAD OCCURRED AT NIGHT, THERE IS A HIGH PROBABILITY AN AIRPLANE WOULD DSND INTO THE WATERS OF SFO BAY. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE VOLUME OF THE TCASII ALERT WAS THE MOST DISTRACTING PART OF THIS ENCOUNTER. TCASII VOLUME WAS PART OF THE CERTIFICATION OF THE SYS. WHOEVER ESTABLISHED THIS DECIBEL LEVEL MADE A HUGH MISTAKE. IT IS CREATING A DANGEROUS SITUATION AND NEEDS TO BE FIXED NOW!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.