Narrative:

In the return portion of the flight from the centerville area north of houston, strong headwinds were encountered. My judgement of how much evidence I had available was based on an average estimate from the handbook, using previous experiences in the airplane; I estimated the airplane would have 4 hours of fuel on board. I relied on these calculations rather than the fuel gauges, because of the notoriously unreliable nature of those instruments in these small airplanes. Consequently, I flew by radisonville and huntsville airports. My other concern was that if I did divert for fuel, there would be none available there, thus leaving me with no possible means of getting back to hooks, but I did not think to use the unicom to check; had I found out there was fueling available, I would have diverted. This is not an 'after-the-fact' thought. Once I had gotten radar contact from houston approach, I asked them for my ground speed and distance to the airport. Their reply was 60 KTS and 21 mi. At this point, I estimated still on 40-50 mins of fuel left. Soon after this, however, nervous about my exact fuel state, I elected to climb another 500 ft from 2500 ft to see if I could pick up on a reported tailwind at that altitude. Unfortunately, there was no noticeable change in ground speed. I waited late to begin my descent, but, when I did, it was a slow descent (300-400 FPM), staying above the VASI glidepath, in the hope that the extra speed would make up for some of the slower progress earlier. I had become acutely aware of our time aloft as night fell, and the fact that the fuel gauges were getting low. However, the first link in the chain had been when I did not check the exact time off the ground, even though I meant to, and so my time calculations were an estimate. I also backed myself into a corner where I had to make hooks airport or crash, because I took the most direct route possible. As it turned out, the airplane did not have 4 hours of endurance but just over 3 and 1/3; however, I was not convinced of that at the time. I also believe that I fell into a 'get homeitis' trap.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT INSTRUCTOR OF SMA TRAINING ACFT INADVERTENTLY RAN OUT OF FUEL AND LANDED OFF ARPT.

Narrative: IN THE RETURN PORTION OF THE FLT FROM THE CENTERVILLE AREA N OF HOUSTON, STRONG HEADWINDS WERE ENCOUNTERED. MY JUDGEMENT OF HOW MUCH EVIDENCE I HAD AVAILABLE WAS BASED ON AN AVERAGE ESTIMATE FROM THE HANDBOOK, USING PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES IN THE AIRPLANE; I ESTIMATED THE AIRPLANE WOULD HAVE 4 HRS OF FUEL ON BOARD. I RELIED ON THESE CALCULATIONS RATHER THAN THE FUEL GAUGES, BECAUSE OF THE NOTORIOUSLY UNRELIABLE NATURE OF THOSE INSTS IN THESE SMALL AIRPLANES. CONSEQUENTLY, I FLEW BY RADISONVILLE AND HUNTSVILLE ARPTS. MY OTHER CONCERN WAS THAT IF I DID DIVERT FOR FUEL, THERE WOULD BE NONE AVAILABLE THERE, THUS LEAVING ME WITH NO POSSIBLE MEANS OF GETTING BACK TO HOOKS, BUT I DID NOT THINK TO USE THE UNICOM TO CHK; HAD I FOUND OUT THERE WAS FUELING AVAILABLE, I WOULD HAVE DIVERTED. THIS IS NOT AN 'AFTER-THE-FACT' THOUGHT. ONCE I HAD GOTTEN RADAR CONTACT FROM HOUSTON APCH, I ASKED THEM FOR MY GND SPD AND DISTANCE TO THE ARPT. THEIR REPLY WAS 60 KTS AND 21 MI. AT THIS POINT, I ESTIMATED STILL ON 40-50 MINS OF FUEL L. SOON AFTER THIS, HOWEVER, NERVOUS ABOUT MY EXACT FUEL STATE, I ELECTED TO CLB ANOTHER 500 FT FROM 2500 FT TO SEE IF I COULD PICK UP ON A RPTED TAILWIND AT THAT ALT. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE WAS NO NOTICEABLE CHANGE IN GND SPD. I WAITED LATE TO BEGIN MY DSCNT, BUT, WHEN I DID, IT WAS A SLOW DSCNT (300-400 FPM), STAYING ABOVE THE VASI GLIDEPATH, IN THE HOPE THAT THE EXTRA SPD WOULD MAKE UP FOR SOME OF THE SLOWER PROGRESS EARLIER. I HAD BECOME ACUTELY AWARE OF OUR TIME ALOFT AS NIGHT FELL, AND THE FACT THAT THE FUEL GAUGES WERE GETTING LOW. HOWEVER, THE FIRST LINK IN THE CHAIN HAD BEEN WHEN I DID NOT CHK THE EXACT TIME OFF THE GND, EVEN THOUGH I MEANT TO, AND SO MY TIME CALCULATIONS WERE AN ESTIMATE. I ALSO BACKED MYSELF INTO A CORNER WHERE I HAD TO MAKE HOOKS ARPT OR CRASH, BECAUSE I TOOK THE MOST DIRECT RTE POSSIBLE. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE AIRPLANE DID NOT HAVE 4 HRS OF ENDURANCE BUT JUST OVER 3 AND 1/3; HOWEVER, I WAS NOT CONVINCED OF THAT AT THE TIME. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT I FELL INTO A 'GET HOMEITIS' TRAP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.