Narrative:

We were cleared to position and hold on runway 09L at mia, and while we held in position 2 small aircraft were cleared to takeoff in front of us from a downfield taxiway. The second airplane, an small aircraft, became airborne and began a slow climb. We were then cleared for 'immediate takeoff' due landing traffic. We had the small aircraft in sight and, although he had not started turning, he had been cleared on a 060 degree heading. With our aircraft accelerating rapidly and going through 80 KIAS, the small aircraft had started his turn and the departure path was clear. At that time, however, the small aircraft leveled his wings and with a left crosswind was slowly being blown back to the runway centerline. In just a couple of seconds we reached our vr speed of 141 KIAS and began rotation to takeoff, but the small aircraft was now very close to the extended centerline of runway 9L and was bouncing due to turbulence over the field, horizontal flight track was uncertain. The nose wheel was off the ground and the mains were becoming airborne but the small aircraft was now less than 2000 ft downtrack and only 200 ft in altitude, moving towards the centerline, an abort was essential to avoid a possible collision, or at the least, a near miss. The abort was initiated at approximately 143 KIAS with the aircraft just becoming airborne. Runway 9L at mia is 10500 long and because of the long runway our aircraft was stopped with approximately 2000 ft remaining. I feel this very dangerous situation came about because of a local controller trying to do too much. Traffic volume in mia this time during the day is heavy and everyone tries to maintain a 'can do' attitude. Factors that contributed to this occurrence were: the tremendous difference in performance/airspeed between the small aircraft and an large transport. Just prior to abort our closure on the small aircraft was approximately 50 KTS. The failure of the small aircraft pilot to execute the 060 degree turn. The small aircraft association has a very strong lobby in this country and they fight very hard to have the right to use these major airports. This incident demonstrates why this is a problem for pilots and controllers alike. As for my part, I assumed that both the small aircraft pilot and the controller were doing their jobs as everyone almost always does, I almost held on to this belief too long.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT HAD TO MAKE A HIGHSPD ABORT TO AVOID AN SMA THAT DID NOT FOLLOW ITS TKOF INSTRUCTIONS.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 09L AT MIA, AND WHILE WE HELD IN POS 2 SMALL ACFT WERE CLRED TO TKOF IN FRONT OF US FROM A DOWNFIELD TXWY. THE SECOND AIRPLANE, AN SMA, BECAME AIRBORNE AND BEGAN A SLOW CLB. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR 'IMMEDIATE TKOF' DUE LNDG TFC. WE HAD THE SMA IN SIGHT AND, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT STARTED TURNING, HE HAD BEEN CLRED ON A 060 DEG HDG. WITH OUR ACFT ACCELERATING RAPIDLY AND GOING THROUGH 80 KIAS, THE SMA HAD STARTED HIS TURN AND THE DEP PATH WAS CLR. AT THAT TIME, HOWEVER, THE SMA LEVELED HIS WINGS AND WITH A L XWIND WAS SLOWLY BEING BLOWN BACK TO THE RWY CTRLINE. IN JUST A COUPLE OF SECONDS WE REACHED OUR VR SPD OF 141 KIAS AND BEGAN ROTATION TO TKOF, BUT THE SMA WAS NOW VERY CLOSE TO THE EXTENDED CTRLINE OF RWY 9L AND WAS BOUNCING DUE TO TURB OVER THE FIELD, HORIZ FLT TRACK WAS UNCERTAIN. THE NOSE WHEEL WAS OFF THE GND AND THE MAINS WERE BECOMING AIRBORNE BUT THE SMA WAS NOW LESS THAN 2000 FT DOWNTRACK AND ONLY 200 FT IN ALT, MOVING TOWARDS THE CTRLINE, AN ABORT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID A POSSIBLE COLLISION, OR AT THE LEAST, A NEAR MISS. THE ABORT WAS INITIATED AT APPROX 143 KIAS WITH THE ACFT JUST BECOMING AIRBORNE. RWY 9L AT MIA IS 10500 LONG AND BECAUSE OF THE LONG RWY OUR ACFT WAS STOPPED WITH APPROX 2000 FT REMAINING. I FEEL THIS VERY DANGEROUS SIT CAME ABOUT BECAUSE OF A LCL CTLR TRYING TO DO TOO MUCH. TFC VOLUME IN MIA THIS TIME DURING THE DAY IS HVY AND EVERYONE TRIES TO MAINTAIN A 'CAN DO' ATTITUDE. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE WERE: THE TREMENDOUS DIFFERENCE IN PERFORMANCE/AIRSPD BTWN THE SMA AND AN LGT. JUST PRIOR TO ABORT OUR CLOSURE ON THE SMA WAS APPROX 50 KTS. THE FAILURE OF THE SMA PLT TO EXECUTE THE 060 DEG TURN. THE SMA ASSOCIATION HAS A VERY STRONG LOBBY IN THIS COUNTRY AND THEY FIGHT VERY HARD TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE THESE MAJOR ARPTS. THIS INCIDENT DEMONSTRATES WHY THIS IS A PROB FOR PLTS AND CTLRS ALIKE. AS FOR MY PART, I ASSUMED THAT BOTH THE SMA PLT AND THE CTLR WERE DOING THEIR JOBS AS EVERYONE ALMOST ALWAYS DOES, I ALMOST HELD ON TO THIS BELIEF TOO LONG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.