Narrative:

While flying the left downwind for runway 16 at pierce county airport, I told my student that I would demonstrate a short field landing for her. She was to do the subsequent takeoffs and lndgs. We appeared to be the only aircraft in the traffic pattern. I saw no others in the pattern, nor did I hear any traffic report on the radio with the exception of a pilot or 2 at a nearby field with the same TA frequency. Flying the approach was standard. The pattern was flown at 1000 AGL on the downwind. I began my power reduction and extended flaps to 10 degrees abeam the runway threshold. I turned base leg and announced my position in the pattern. Base was flown at 65-70 KTS and 20 degrees flaps. I turned 1/2 mi final and announced my position, slowing to 55 KIAS and extending flaps fully to 30 degrees. I still noticed no other aircraft in the pattern, placing my attention on the runway. I touched down within the first 100 ft of runway, lowered the nose and began braking to use as little runway as possible. We came to a stop on the runway just beyond the first taxiway exit, a distance of approximately 500 ft. At this point I prompted my student to reconfigure the airplane for the takeoff. We had been stopped on the runway about 15-20 seconds when I looked out the aft window to see a high winged, single engine (radial) tailwheel airplane coming at us. It appeared to be an small transport. The small transport was on very short final, about to cross the threshold, and at an estimated 20 ft AGL. I realized quickly that if we tried to takeoff we might find him overhead, should he have decided to abort his approach. I also realized that if he planned to land, that we could not safely escape aircraft damage or personal injury if I attempted to takeoff ahead of him. The safest course of action I could see was to taxi off the runway into the grass to avoid catastrophe. So that is what I did. The other pilot concurrently aborted his approach. Considering that he was reckless enough to fly that close to another aircraft on the field, I decided not to confront him after he landed. Rather, we taxied back for takeoff. We waited for his companion (in a third plane) to land, then the small transport landed. Then we took the runway and continued with our practice. The following day I received a message from the pilot of small transport. He wanted to talk to me about the incident. I was anxious to hear his side of the story, so I promptly returned his call. As I had suspected, he had no radio in his aircraft, nor did his companion in the other plane. This explained his misunderstanding of my intentions and partly explained my lack of knowledge of his presence in the pattern. He spoke with a heated voice and allowed me little opportunity for rebuttal. He stated that I should have exited the runway and should have been aware of his position. I had no chance to ask him why his spacing was so close behind as to endanger our lives. I also had no chance to ask why he did not begin his go around prior to the runway threshold. Nor did I get to ask if he considered whether an aircraft ahead of him, stopped on the runway, might be disabled, thus unable to clear the runway. Fortunately, no damage or injury took place. In the future I resolve to do stop-and-goes only at airports where a control tower is operating, so that the possibility of runway incursion with no-radio aircraft is minimized. I just hope that he adjusts his attitude and procedures as well, before he ends up hurting or killing someone.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA STOPS ON THE ACTIVE RWY TO RECONFIGURE THEIR ACFT FOR TKOF FORCING A FOLLOWING ACFT TO GAR. TFC PATTERN TKOF PROC.

Narrative: WHILE FLYING THE L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 16 AT PIERCE COUNTY ARPT, I TOLD MY STUDENT THAT I WOULD DEMONSTRATE A SHORT FIELD LNDG FOR HER. SHE WAS TO DO THE SUBSEQUENT TKOFS AND LNDGS. WE APPEARED TO BE THE ONLY ACFT IN THE TFC PATTERN. I SAW NO OTHERS IN THE PATTERN, NOR DID I HEAR ANY TFC RPT ON THE RADIO WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A PLT OR 2 AT A NEARBY FIELD WITH THE SAME TA FREQ. FLYING THE APCH WAS STANDARD. THE PATTERN WAS FLOWN AT 1000 AGL ON THE DOWNWIND. I BEGAN MY PWR REDUCTION AND EXTENDED FLAPS TO 10 DEGS ABEAM THE RWY THRESHOLD. I TURNED BASE LEG AND ANNOUNCED MY POS IN THE PATTERN. BASE WAS FLOWN AT 65-70 KTS AND 20 DEGS FLAPS. I TURNED 1/2 MI FINAL AND ANNOUNCED MY POS, SLOWING TO 55 KIAS AND EXTENDING FLAPS FULLY TO 30 DEGS. I STILL NOTICED NO OTHER ACFT IN THE PATTERN, PLACING MY ATTN ON THE RWY. I TOUCHED DOWN WITHIN THE FIRST 100 FT OF RWY, LOWERED THE NOSE AND BEGAN BRAKING TO USE AS LITTLE RWY AS POSSIBLE. WE CAME TO A STOP ON THE RWY JUST BEYOND THE FIRST TXWY EXIT, A DISTANCE OF APPROX 500 FT. AT THIS POINT I PROMPTED MY STUDENT TO RECONFIGURE THE AIRPLANE FOR THE TKOF. WE HAD BEEN STOPPED ON THE RWY ABOUT 15-20 SECONDS WHEN I LOOKED OUT THE AFT WINDOW TO SEE A HIGH WINGED, SINGLE ENG (RADIAL) TAILWHEEL AIRPLANE COMING AT US. IT APPEARED TO BE AN SMT. THE SMT WAS ON VERY SHORT FINAL, ABOUT TO CROSS THE THRESHOLD, AND AT AN ESTIMATED 20 FT AGL. I REALIZED QUICKLY THAT IF WE TRIED TO TKOF WE MIGHT FIND HIM OVERHEAD, SHOULD HE HAVE DECIDED TO ABORT HIS APCH. I ALSO REALIZED THAT IF HE PLANNED TO LAND, THAT WE COULD NOT SAFELY ESCAPE ACFT DAMAGE OR PERSONAL INJURY IF I ATTEMPTED TO TKOF AHEAD OF HIM. THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION I COULD SEE WAS TO TAXI OFF THE RWY INTO THE GRASS TO AVOID CATASTROPHE. SO THAT IS WHAT I DID. THE OTHER PLT CONCURRENTLY ABORTED HIS APCH. CONSIDERING THAT HE WAS RECKLESS ENOUGH TO FLY THAT CLOSE TO ANOTHER ACFT ON THE FIELD, I DECIDED NOT TO CONFRONT HIM AFTER HE LANDED. RATHER, WE TAXIED BACK FOR TKOF. WE WAITED FOR HIS COMPANION (IN A THIRD PLANE) TO LAND, THEN THE SMT LANDED. THEN WE TOOK THE RWY AND CONTINUED WITH OUR PRACTICE. THE FOLLOWING DAY I RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE PLT OF SMT. HE WANTED TO TALK TO ME ABOUT THE INCIDENT. I WAS ANXIOUS TO HEAR HIS SIDE OF THE STORY, SO I PROMPTLY RETURNED HIS CALL. AS I HAD SUSPECTED, HE HAD NO RADIO IN HIS ACFT, NOR DID HIS COMPANION IN THE OTHER PLANE. THIS EXPLAINED HIS MISUNDERSTANDING OF MY INTENTIONS AND PARTLY EXPLAINED MY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF HIS PRESENCE IN THE PATTERN. HE SPOKE WITH A HEATED VOICE AND ALLOWED ME LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR REBUTTAL. HE STATED THAT I SHOULD HAVE EXITED THE RWY AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF HIS POS. I HAD NO CHANCE TO ASK HIM WHY HIS SPACING WAS SO CLOSE BEHIND AS TO ENDANGER OUR LIVES. I ALSO HAD NO CHANCE TO ASK WHY HE DID NOT BEGIN HIS GAR PRIOR TO THE RWY THRESHOLD. NOR DID I GET TO ASK IF HE CONSIDERED WHETHER AN ACFT AHEAD OF HIM, STOPPED ON THE RWY, MIGHT BE DISABLED, THUS UNABLE TO CLR THE RWY. FORTUNATELY, NO DAMAGE OR INJURY TOOK PLACE. IN THE FUTURE I RESOLVE TO DO STOP-AND-GOES ONLY AT ARPTS WHERE A CTL TWR IS OPERATING, SO THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF RWY INCURSION WITH NO-RADIO ACFT IS MINIMIZED. I JUST HOPE THAT HE ADJUSTS HIS ATTITUDE AND PROCS AS WELL, BEFORE HE ENDS UP HURTING OR KILLING SOMEONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.