Narrative:

On feb/sat/93 in aircraft light transport the captain and myself conducted a flight from hya to bos. I was designated flying pilot on this leg. The flight was normal and conducted without incident until the last portion of the landing roll on runway 33L in bos. Upon the landing rollout the aircraft began to vibrate, shudder, and decelerate abnormally. At approximately 60-40 KTS the aircraft began to veer to the right. Asymmetrical braking and reverse thrust on the left side was necessary to maintain the aircraft under control and close to the centerline. Our primary concern was to ensure the safety of all passenger and to exit the runway and determine the cause. I was able to turn the aircraft off the runway on to taxi golf using primary left braking and power. At this point, the aircraft had an unwillingness to roll, so to prevent any further damage to the aircraft, the taxi was halted prior to the hold short line on taxiway golf. As a result, the runway (33L) was closed for approximately 30 mins. 2 tires blew on the right side and 1 on the left. On sat morning, this flight originated in ack at approximately XY00 am. A full preflight inspection was completed by me and the captain. No discrepancies or irregularities were noted. The flight was conducted without incident to hya. In hya WX conditions were 3/4 visibility in blowing snow and temperatures were sub-zero with the wind chill factor. Again, no discrepancies or irregularities were noted. Our takeoff was initiated out of hya on runway 06. The mid-section of 06 had light cover of blowing snow -- snow drifts. The flight was conducted without incident until the last portion of the landing rollout in bos on 33L. At no time did the crew operate with brakes or brake deice heat on for either takeoff or lndgs. Brake deice heat is not to be used on takeoff or lndgs. Through an in-house investigation this is what was determined. On takeoff (runway 06 in hya) finger drifts were encountered. Brakes were used on taxi out which made the units warm. When the snow contacted the warm brakes, moisture formed on the brake units which froze in-flight with the aid of cold temperatures that day. Brake deice heat normally is used after the landing gear is extended prior to landing. In this case it was not. Bos WX was clear skies with 15 mi visibility and 20 degrees plus temperature. On landing, the brake units on the landing gear was frozen resulting in blown tires at touchdown. To prevent this from happening in the future: more apparent knowledge of using brake deice heat. Considering all factors and phases of ice/snow encountered during a flight. If brake deice was used, this incident could have very well been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NEAR LOSS OF ACFT CTL ON LNDG PROC ROLLOUT. BRAKING ACTION DIFFERENTIAL REQUIRED.

Narrative: ON FEB/SAT/93 IN ACFT LTT THE CAPT AND MYSELF CONDUCTED A FLT FROM HYA TO BOS. I WAS DESIGNATED FLYING PLT ON THIS LEG. THE FLT WAS NORMAL AND CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT UNTIL THE LAST PORTION OF THE LNDG ROLL ON RWY 33L IN BOS. UPON THE LNDG ROLLOUT THE ACFT BEGAN TO VIBRATE, SHUDDER, AND DECELERATE ABNORMALLY. AT APPROX 60-40 KTS THE ACFT BEGAN TO VEER TO THE R. ASYMMETRICAL BRAKING AND REVERSE THRUST ON THE L SIDE WAS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE ACFT UNDER CTL AND CLOSE TO THE CTRLINE. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN WAS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF ALL PAX AND TO EXIT THE RWY AND DETERMINE THE CAUSE. I WAS ABLE TO TURN THE ACFT OFF THE RWY ON TO TAXI GOLF USING PRIMARY L BRAKING AND PWR. AT THIS POINT, THE ACFT HAD AN UNWILLINGNESS TO ROLL, SO TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER DAMAGE TO THE ACFT, THE TAXI WAS HALTED PRIOR TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE ON TXWY GOLF. AS A RESULT, THE RWY (33L) WAS CLOSED FOR APPROX 30 MINS. 2 TIRES BLEW ON THE R SIDE AND 1 ON THE L. ON SAT MORNING, THIS FLT ORIGINATED IN ACK AT APPROX XY00 AM. A FULL PREFLT INSPECTION WAS COMPLETED BY ME AND THE CAPT. NO DISCREPANCIES OR IRREGULARITIES WERE NOTED. THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT TO HYA. IN HYA WX CONDITIONS WERE 3/4 VISIBILITY IN BLOWING SNOW AND TEMPS WERE SUB-ZERO WITH THE WIND CHILL FACTOR. AGAIN, NO DISCREPANCIES OR IRREGULARITIES WERE NOTED. OUR TKOF WAS INITIATED OUT OF HYA ON RWY 06. THE MID-SECTION OF 06 HAD LIGHT COVER OF BLOWING SNOW -- SNOW DRIFTS. THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT UNTIL THE LAST PORTION OF THE LNDG ROLLOUT IN BOS ON 33L. AT NO TIME DID THE CREW OPERATE WITH BRAKES OR BRAKE DEICE HEAT ON FOR EITHER TKOF OR LNDGS. BRAKE DEICE HEAT IS NOT TO BE USED ON TKOF OR LNDGS. THROUGH AN IN-HOUSE INVESTIGATION THIS IS WHAT WAS DETERMINED. ON TKOF (RWY 06 IN HYA) FINGER DRIFTS WERE ENCOUNTERED. BRAKES WERE USED ON TAXI OUT WHICH MADE THE UNITS WARM. WHEN THE SNOW CONTACTED THE WARM BRAKES, MOISTURE FORMED ON THE BRAKE UNITS WHICH FROZE INFLT WITH THE AID OF COLD TEMPS THAT DAY. BRAKE DEICE HEAT NORMALLY IS USED AFTER THE LNDG GEAR IS EXTENDED PRIOR TO LNDG. IN THIS CASE IT WAS NOT. BOS WX WAS CLR SKIES WITH 15 MI VISIBILITY AND 20 DEGS PLUS TEMP. ON LNDG, THE BRAKE UNITS ON THE LNDG GEAR WAS FROZEN RESULTING IN BLOWN TIRES AT TOUCHDOWN. TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE: MORE APPARENT KNOWLEDGE OF USING BRAKE DEICE HEAT. CONSIDERING ALL FACTORS AND PHASES OF ICE/SNOW ENCOUNTERED DURING A FLT. IF BRAKE DEICE WAS USED, THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE VERY WELL BEEN AVOIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.