Narrative:

While working ground control/clearance delivery/flight data (combined) and controller-in-charge position in the tower cabin attendant, I coordinated for, and received, permission for local control position (local control position was conducting OJT instruction to a developmental) to 'proceed northbound on runway 34L' to 'hold short of runway 10.' the vehicle I was communicating with received these instructions. It was the developmental controller who issued the coordination response to me, and later during the initial investigation of the event, we learned that the controller providing OJT instruction did not hear the coordination take place. The vehicle proceeded as instructed and remained short of runway 10 at all times. The MTR X executed an approach and departure over runway 10. At this time I was engaged in other duties including the recording and monitoring of the ATIS. I believe it was at this point the developmental issued instructions to the MTR to enter right downwind runway 34L. I saw the MTR make a right turn departing runway 10 as if on a right crosswind leg for runway 10. Then a single-engine small aircraft called me for taxi instructions, frequency, squawk code. This required 'heads down' time to enter ARTS computer key entries, strip marking. Checking on the vehicle's progress, I saw it maneuvering off of runway 34L and saw the MTR on climb out over the runway (same). The developmental issued a clearance to the MTR to operate on runway 34L without my knowledge and I did not hear him issue those instructions. No one denied an operational error occurred. Sad to say it was the airport manager and control tower chief in the vehicle who first saw the aircraft enter the runway (in the rear view mirror, no less). I believe the following to be contributing factors: 1) low staffing -- 4 people on sick leave. We usually have an extra pair of eyes and ears in the tower cabin attendant, and is required when we have the staffing. This is why I can't understand why the supervisor in charge of the day watch also permitted another ATC to attend a security operations class, of noncritical nature since the class is held every week and is open enrollment. 2) facility communications equipment/icss. I was told that when 2 head sets are plugged into the same jack module, as when OJT instruction takes place, the system can be configured via the controling computer to provide side-tone in the instructor's ear piece. Had this system been configured as such by the personnel having authority to do so, the OJT instructor may have heard, and therefore have been aware, of the coordination between the developmental and ground control.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIL ACFT MAKING AN APCH TO RWY GOES AROUND BECAUSE OF VEHICLE ON RWY.

Narrative: WHILE WORKING GND CTL/CLRNC DELIVERY/FLT DATA (COMBINED) AND CTLR-IN-CHARGE POS IN THE TWR CAB, I COORDINATED FOR, AND RECEIVED, PERMISSION FOR LCL CTL POS (LCL CTL POS WAS CONDUCTING OJT INSTRUCTION TO A DEVELOPMENTAL) TO 'PROCEED NBOUND ON RWY 34L' TO 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 10.' THE VEHICLE I WAS COMMUNICATING WITH RECEIVED THESE INSTRUCTIONS. IT WAS THE DEVELOPMENTAL CTLR WHO ISSUED THE COORD RESPONSE TO ME, AND LATER DURING THE INITIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT, WE LEARNED THAT THE CTLR PROVIDING OJT INSTRUCTION DID NOT HEAR THE COORD TAKE PLACE. THE VEHICLE PROCEEDED AS INSTRUCTED AND REMAINED SHORT OF RWY 10 AT ALL TIMES. THE MTR X EXECUTED AN APCH AND DEP OVER RWY 10. AT THIS TIME I WAS ENGAGED IN OTHER DUTIES INCLUDING THE RECORDING AND MONITORING OF THE ATIS. I BELIEVE IT WAS AT THIS POINT THE DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MTR TO ENTER R DOWNWIND RWY 34L. I SAW THE MTR MAKE A R TURN DEPARTING RWY 10 AS IF ON A R XWIND LEG FOR RWY 10. THEN A SINGLE-ENG SMA CALLED ME FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, FREQ, SQUAWK CODE. THIS REQUIRED 'HEADS DOWN' TIME TO ENTER ARTS COMPUTER KEY ENTRIES, STRIP MARKING. CHKING ON THE VEHICLE'S PROGRESS, I SAW IT MANEUVERING OFF OF RWY 34L AND SAW THE MTR ON CLBOUT OVER THE RWY (SAME). THE DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUED A CLRNC TO THE MTR TO OPERATE ON RWY 34L WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE AND I DID NOT HEAR HIM ISSUE THOSE INSTRUCTIONS. NO ONE DENIED AN OPERROR OCCURRED. SAD TO SAY IT WAS THE ARPT MGR AND CTL TWR CHIEF IN THE VEHICLE WHO FIRST SAW THE ACFT ENTER THE RWY (IN THE REAR VIEW MIRROR, NO LESS). I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING TO BE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) LOW STAFFING -- 4 PEOPLE ON SICK LEAVE. WE USUALLY HAVE AN EXTRA PAIR OF EYES AND EARS IN THE TWR CAB, AND IS REQUIRED WHEN WE HAVE THE STAFFING. THIS IS WHY I CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE SUPVR IN CHARGE OF THE DAY WATCH ALSO PERMITTED ANOTHER ATC TO ATTEND A SECURITY OPS CLASS, OF NONCRITICAL NATURE SINCE THE CLASS IS HELD EVERY WK AND IS OPEN ENROLLMENT. 2) FACILITY COMS EQUIP/ICSS. I WAS TOLD THAT WHEN 2 HEAD SETS ARE PLUGGED INTO THE SAME JACK MODULE, AS WHEN OJT INSTRUCTION TAKES PLACE, THE SYS CAN BE CONFIGURED VIA THE CTLING COMPUTER TO PROVIDE SIDE-TONE IN THE INSTRUCTOR'S EAR PIECE. HAD THIS SYS BEEN CONFIGURED AS SUCH BY THE PERSONNEL HAVING AUTHORITY TO DO SO, THE OJT INSTRUCTOR MAY HAVE HEARD, AND THEREFORE HAVE BEEN AWARE, OF THE COORD BTWN THE DEVELOPMENTAL AND GND CTL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.