Narrative:

Due to overstaffing of advanced widebody transport, pilot proficiency is marginal. (I was on my 3RD trip in an 88-day period. The captain was coming off vacation.) (4TH leg in the right seat, 2 lndgs.) captain insisted FMS not be programmed for anticipated clrncs and navaids not be tuned in advance. 'This is to prevent the FMS from flying a route not yet cleared for.' he said the civet 3 profile descent was not in the database. (I checked ahead of time -- it was.) on the descent, controller asked for 'best forward speed' and when cleared for the profile, civit 3, I set the first 'at or above' of 14000 ft in the altitude window of the flight control panel. The captain reset 10000 ft and said something to me about, 'trusting the FMS to fly the profile accurately.' while I was programming the FMS, tuning and identing navaids, talking with ATC, etc, I looked up to see the aircraft passing through 12000 ft prior to the 'at or above' restriction at bremr. I immediately told the captain who, after verifying, initiated a recovery to 12000 ft. Somewhere during this time, center also requested we slow, while the captain did deploy the speed brakes. The aircraft, in the descent, was slowing at a rate of only 1-2 KTS/second. I mentioned this to the captain who said the aircraft 'slowed better with speed brakes than flaps.' (I'm not sure why he would make that assertion.) approach cancelled our approach clearance and asked us our speed. (It was evident that we had not complied with their 'reduce speed' request in a timely enough fashion to suit them.) leaving the programming of the FMS till the last min takes the programming pilot out of the 'monitoring' loop when it is critical that he be in the loop. Setting an altitude below the 'at or above' ht is 'asking' for a 'bust.' short of 'overriding' the captain and taking physical control of the aircraft, I'm not sure I could have done anything differently to prevent this (an option that is much more present in my mind, especially with this particular captain). The layover was short and the second day required an XA00 am 'wake up.' it is probable that this was a causal factor. Minimal experience/proficiency level pilots should not be teamed up on '2 pilot' airplanes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC PROFICIENCY IN DOUBT WITH QUESTIONABLE FLC COMPOSITION ON ADVANCED COCKPIT WDB.

Narrative: DUE TO OVERSTAFFING OF ADVANCED WDB, PLT PROFICIENCY IS MARGINAL. (I WAS ON MY 3RD TRIP IN AN 88-DAY PERIOD. THE CAPT WAS COMING OFF VACATION.) (4TH LEG IN THE R SEAT, 2 LNDGS.) CAPT INSISTED FMS NOT BE PROGRAMMED FOR ANTICIPATED CLRNCS AND NAVAIDS NOT BE TUNED IN ADVANCE. 'THIS IS TO PREVENT THE FMS FROM FLYING A RTE NOT YET CLRED FOR.' HE SAID THE CIVET 3 PROFILE DSCNT WAS NOT IN THE DATABASE. (I CHKED AHEAD OF TIME -- IT WAS.) ON THE DSCNT, CTLR ASKED FOR 'BEST FORWARD SPD' AND WHEN CLRED FOR THE PROFILE, CIVIT 3, I SET THE FIRST 'AT OR ABOVE' OF 14000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FLT CTL PANEL. THE CAPT RESET 10000 FT AND SAID SOMETHING TO ME ABOUT, 'TRUSTING THE FMS TO FLY THE PROFILE ACCURATELY.' WHILE I WAS PROGRAMMING THE FMS, TUNING AND IDENTING NAVAIDS, TALKING WITH ATC, ETC, I LOOKED UP TO SEE THE ACFT PASSING THROUGH 12000 FT PRIOR TO THE 'AT OR ABOVE' RESTRICTION AT BREMR. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE CAPT WHO, AFTER VERIFYING, INITIATED A RECOVERY TO 12000 FT. SOMEWHERE DURING THIS TIME, CTR ALSO REQUESTED WE SLOW, WHILE THE CAPT DID DEPLOY THE SPD BRAKES. THE ACFT, IN THE DSCNT, WAS SLOWING AT A RATE OF ONLY 1-2 KTS/SECOND. I MENTIONED THIS TO THE CAPT WHO SAID THE ACFT 'SLOWED BETTER WITH SPD BRAKES THAN FLAPS.' (I'M NOT SURE WHY HE WOULD MAKE THAT ASSERTION.) APCH CANCELLED OUR APCH CLRNC AND ASKED US OUR SPD. (IT WAS EVIDENT THAT WE HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH THEIR 'REDUCE SPD' REQUEST IN A TIMELY ENOUGH FASHION TO SUIT THEM.) LEAVING THE PROGRAMMING OF THE FMS TILL THE LAST MIN TAKES THE PROGRAMMING PLT OUT OF THE 'MONITORING' LOOP WHEN IT IS CRITICAL THAT HE BE IN THE LOOP. SETTING AN ALT BELOW THE 'AT OR ABOVE' HT IS 'ASKING' FOR A 'BUST.' SHORT OF 'OVERRIDING' THE CAPT AND TAKING PHYSICAL CTL OF THE ACFT, I'M NOT SURE I COULD HAVE DONE ANYTHING DIFFERENTLY TO PREVENT THIS (AN OPTION THAT IS MUCH MORE PRESENT IN MY MIND, ESPECIALLY WITH THIS PARTICULAR CAPT). THE LAYOVER WAS SHORT AND THE SECOND DAY REQUIRED AN XA00 AM 'WAKE UP.' IT IS PROBABLE THAT THIS WAS A CAUSAL FACTOR. MINIMAL EXPERIENCE/PROFICIENCY LEVEL PLTS SHOULD NOT BE TEAMED UP ON '2 PLT' AIRPLANES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.