37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 241776 |
Time | |
Date | 199305 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : cae |
State Reference | SC |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 2300 msl bound upper : 2300 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : cae |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear |
Flight Phase | cruise other other other |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 105 flight time total : 1950 flight time type : 25 |
ASRS Report | 241776 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : local |
Qualification | controller : non radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : far other anomaly other other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | atc equipment other atc equipment : unspecified other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
The problem arose when a note of an oil pressure drop from the middle of the green to the bottom and then a slight drop again to the top of the yellow. This was unusual for this aircraft. After the indication of oil pressure loss, an immediate decision was made to secure the aircraft to the nearest suitable airport. From the position noted on the chart by pilotage a turn was made towards either columbia metropolitan or columbia owens downtown. Due to the downtown area being between the aircraft and the airport a decision was made to go direct to cae metropolitan so if in the event an engine failure did occur, a more suitable site for either an emergency landing or precautionary landing could be made. The decision was to go direct to cae metropolitan which was also closer. After making this decision a fix on the airport was attempted visually which was difficult due to haze. After what was thought to be the airport a fix of the position was attempted by using pilotage and a VOR radial from the chesterfield VOR. A 'from' indication was noted with a 235 degree radial was secured. Also a radial was then established from the cae VOR was established which was 354 degree from. A cross- radial fix was secured and a position was established which indicated a position just inside the arsa. An attempt was then to secure approach control, but was difficult when I reached for an approach plate that was located behind the pilot seats. The first one I located was not the correct one and the second plate was the one I needed for the region. During this time I was still monitoring engine performance and still looking for a potential emergency landing site if needed. This was done while going direct to cae metropolitan. It was then noted that it was too late for approach and the tower was then contacted for landing instructions. At this time the oil pressure had stabilized just below the green. Ground speed was about 110 mph and TAS was around 116 mph. A precautionary emergency landing was then made at cae metropolitan without event. Tower indicated that I was in an arsa and I acknowledged that I understood his statement. Tower then told me to standby for a phone number. I taxied clear of the active and secured the aircraft. A phone number was never issued from the tower while taxiing or at ramp. After contacting tower it was noted that I had penetrated the air traffic area from his radar fix established by transponder code issued. Contributing factors of this situation were: 1) low oil pressure reading and subsequent decision to divert to an airport that was never in the flight plan. 2) haze. 3) not familiar with the area, airport frequencys, landmarks. 4) a reluctancy to use the arsa when it was noted that arsa airspace penetration occurred. If I would have had another airport closer other than the 2 noted, I would have diverted to that other airport(south). Judgement in the above situation in my opinion was prudent and did demonstrate proper decision making. The actions to secure ATC contact was the corrective actions taken when it was noted that arsa penetration had occurred.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PLT OF AN SMA SEL ACFT PENETRATED AN ARSA AND ATA AIRSPACE PRIOR TO ESTABLISHING COMS DUE TO 'HDG' FOR THE NEAREST ARPT AFTER LOSING ENG OIL PRESSURE.
Narrative: THE PROB AROSE WHEN A NOTE OF AN OIL PRESSURE DROP FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE GREEN TO THE BOTTOM AND THEN A SLIGHT DROP AGAIN TO THE TOP OF THE YELLOW. THIS WAS UNUSUAL FOR THIS ACFT. AFTER THE INDICATION OF OIL PRESSURE LOSS, AN IMMEDIATE DECISION WAS MADE TO SECURE THE ACFT TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. FROM THE POS NOTED ON THE CHART BY PILOTAGE A TURN WAS MADE TOWARDS EITHER COLUMBIA METRO OR COLUMBIA OWENS DOWNTOWN. DUE TO THE DOWNTOWN AREA BEING BTWN THE ACFT AND THE ARPT A DECISION WAS MADE TO GO DIRECT TO CAE METRO SO IF IN THE EVENT AN ENG FAILURE DID OCCUR, A MORE SUITABLE SITE FOR EITHER AN EMER LNDG OR PRECAUTIONARY LNDG COULD BE MADE. THE DECISION WAS TO GO DIRECT TO CAE METRO WHICH WAS ALSO CLOSER. AFTER MAKING THIS DECISION A FIX ON THE ARPT WAS ATTEMPTED VISUALLY WHICH WAS DIFFICULT DUE TO HAZE. AFTER WHAT WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE ARPT A FIX OF THE POS WAS ATTEMPTED BY USING PILOTAGE AND A VOR RADIAL FROM THE CHESTERFIELD VOR. A 'FROM' INDICATION WAS NOTED WITH A 235 DEG RADIAL WAS SECURED. ALSO A RADIAL WAS THEN ESTABLISHED FROM THE CAE VOR WAS ESTABLISHED WHICH WAS 354 DEG FROM. A CROSS- RADIAL FIX WAS SECURED AND A POS WAS ESTABLISHED WHICH INDICATED A POS JUST INSIDE THE ARSA. AN ATTEMPT WAS THEN TO SECURE APCH CTL, BUT WAS DIFFICULT WHEN I REACHED FOR AN APCH PLATE THAT WAS LOCATED BEHIND THE PLT SEATS. THE FIRST ONE I LOCATED WAS NOT THE CORRECT ONE AND THE SECOND PLATE WAS THE ONE I NEEDED FOR THE REGION. DURING THIS TIME I WAS STILL MONITORING ENG PERFORMANCE AND STILL LOOKING FOR A POTENTIAL EMER LNDG SITE IF NEEDED. THIS WAS DONE WHILE GOING DIRECT TO CAE METRO. IT WAS THEN NOTED THAT IT WAS TOO LATE FOR APCH AND THE TWR WAS THEN CONTACTED FOR LNDG INSTRUCTIONS. AT THIS TIME THE OIL PRESSURE HAD STABILIZED JUST BELOW THE GREEN. GND SPD WAS ABOUT 110 MPH AND TAS WAS AROUND 116 MPH. A PRECAUTIONARY EMER LNDG WAS THEN MADE AT CAE METRO WITHOUT EVENT. TWR INDICATED THAT I WAS IN AN ARSA AND I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT I UNDERSTOOD HIS STATEMENT. TWR THEN TOLD ME TO STANDBY FOR A PHONE NUMBER. I TAXIED CLR OF THE ACTIVE AND SECURED THE ACFT. A PHONE NUMBER WAS NEVER ISSUED FROM THE TWR WHILE TAXIING OR AT RAMP. AFTER CONTACTING TWR IT WAS NOTED THAT I HAD PENETRATED THE ATA FROM HIS RADAR FIX ESTABLISHED BY XPONDER CODE ISSUED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF THIS SIT WERE: 1) LOW OIL PRESSURE READING AND SUBSEQUENT DECISION TO DIVERT TO AN ARPT THAT WAS NEVER IN THE FLT PLAN. 2) HAZE. 3) NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE AREA, ARPT FREQS, LANDMARKS. 4) A RELUCTANCY TO USE THE ARSA WHEN IT WAS NOTED THAT ARSA AIRSPACE PENETRATION OCCURRED. IF I WOULD HAVE HAD ANOTHER ARPT CLOSER OTHER THAN THE 2 NOTED, I WOULD HAVE DIVERTED TO THAT OTHER ARPT(S). JUDGEMENT IN THE ABOVE SIT IN MY OPINION WAS PRUDENT AND DID DEMONSTRATE PROPER DECISION MAKING. THE ACTIONS TO SECURE ATC CONTACT WAS THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN WHEN IT WAS NOTED THAT ARSA PENETRATION HAD OCCURRED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.