Narrative:

This event occurred in a 3-PERSON crew, stretched aircraft on takeoff from ord on runway 32L from the T1 intersection. The ATIS prior to taxi was: M17 overcast 3 r-f 46 degrees F/46 degrees F, wind 360/14 and altimeter 29.83 inches. The takeoff performance was completed with planned flaps at 15 degrees and maximum EPR thrust. The taxi was long, 36 mins, due to extensive traffic awaiting for takeoff. The taxi was completed with all 3 engines operating and all fuel tanks balanced within limits. During taxi we received a new ATIS with a temperature of 47 degrees F being the only change. We also received our final takeoff weights via ACARS with a takeoff gross weight of 158900 pounds, 0 fuel weight of 130500 pounds and the percent mean aerodynamic cord center of gravity of 17.3 percent for 141 total souls on board. The performance, weight and balance, airspeed and trim calculations were all revised and properly set by all crew members. Hence, the before takeoff checklist was properly completed. It was the captain's leg and he performed the takeoff. We were cleared for takeoff and I resumed my duties of monitoring the engine instruments. There were no irregularities. The first officer made all the appropriate takeoff calls. During rotation while the main landing gear was still on the ground, I heard a bang noise from the rear of the aircraft and saw that the tail skid amber light was illuminated, indicating a possible tail skid strike. Once we were completely airborne and past the initial critical phase of flight, both I and the first officer informed the captain of the light. The tower now reported the wind at 040 degrees/17 KTS. There were no other irregularities with any of the aircraft's system. Passing 10000 ft the first officer and I completed the appropriate irregular checklist while the captain was flying the aircraft. Following that, we contacted the company maintenance center which would inform the destination station for an inspection. The landing at the original destination was uneventful. There was significant damage done to the tail skid and the aircraft was taken OTS. I believe that the rotation was done quicker than the recommended rate and that the crosswind corrections were applied too early. The reduction in visibility might have had an effect on recognition of the horizon. Personally, I expected that a more aggressive rotation was needed to cause a tail skid contact. To hopefully be able to avoid this from occurring in the future, I reviewed the takeoff techniques in the flight manual. As a flight engineer I will now be more alert to follow the 'front' crew with all checklist and performance procedures even though this was not a factor for this particular incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT HAS TAIL SKID STRIKE ON TKOF.

Narrative: THIS EVENT OCCURRED IN A 3-PERSON CREW, STRETCHED ACFT ON TKOF FROM ORD ON RWY 32L FROM THE T1 INTXN. THE ATIS PRIOR TO TAXI WAS: M17 OVCST 3 R-F 46 DEGS F/46 DEGS F, WIND 360/14 AND ALTIMETER 29.83 INCHES. THE TKOF PERFORMANCE WAS COMPLETED WITH PLANNED FLAPS AT 15 DEGS AND MAX EPR THRUST. THE TAXI WAS LONG, 36 MINS, DUE TO EXTENSIVE TFC AWAITING FOR TKOF. THE TAXI WAS COMPLETED WITH ALL 3 ENGS OPERATING AND ALL FUEL TANKS BALANCED WITHIN LIMITS. DURING TAXI WE RECEIVED A NEW ATIS WITH A TEMP OF 47 DEGS F BEING THE ONLY CHANGE. WE ALSO RECEIVED OUR FINAL TKOF WTS VIA ACARS WITH A TKOF GROSS WT OF 158900 LBS, 0 FUEL WT OF 130500 LBS AND THE PERCENT MEAN AERODYNAMIC CORD CTR OF GRAVITY OF 17.3 PERCENT FOR 141 TOTAL SOULS ON BOARD. THE PERFORMANCE, WT AND BAL, AIRSPD AND TRIM CALCULATIONS WERE ALL REVISED AND PROPERLY SET BY ALL CREW MEMBERS. HENCE, THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS PROPERLY COMPLETED. IT WAS THE CAPT'S LEG AND HE PERFORMED THE TKOF. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND I RESUMED MY DUTIES OF MONITORING THE ENG INSTS. THERE WERE NO IRREGULARITIES. THE FO MADE ALL THE APPROPRIATE TKOF CALLS. DURING ROTATION WHILE THE MAIN LNDG GEAR WAS STILL ON THE GND, I HEARD A BANG NOISE FROM THE REAR OF THE ACFT AND SAW THAT THE TAIL SKID AMBER LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED, INDICATING A POSSIBLE TAIL SKID STRIKE. ONCE WE WERE COMPLETELY AIRBORNE AND PAST THE INITIAL CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT, BOTH I AND THE FO INFORMED THE CAPT OF THE LIGHT. THE TWR NOW RPTED THE WIND AT 040 DEGS/17 KTS. THERE WERE NO OTHER IRREGULARITIES WITH ANY OF THE ACFT'S SYS. PASSING 10000 FT THE FO AND I COMPLETED THE APPROPRIATE IRREGULAR CHKLIST WHILE THE CAPT WAS FLYING THE ACFT. FOLLOWING THAT, WE CONTACTED THE COMPANY MAINT CTR WHICH WOULD INFORM THE DEST STATION FOR AN INSPECTION. THE LNDG AT THE ORIGINAL DEST WAS UNEVENTFUL. THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE DONE TO THE TAIL SKID AND THE ACFT WAS TAKEN OTS. I BELIEVE THAT THE ROTATION WAS DONE QUICKER THAN THE RECOMMENDED RATE AND THAT THE XWIND CORRECTIONS WERE APPLIED TOO EARLY. THE REDUCTION IN VISIBILITY MIGHT HAVE HAD AN EFFECT ON RECOGNITION OF THE HORIZON. PERSONALLY, I EXPECTED THAT A MORE AGGRESSIVE ROTATION WAS NEEDED TO CAUSE A TAIL SKID CONTACT. TO HOPEFULLY BE ABLE TO AVOID THIS FROM OCCURRING IN THE FUTURE, I REVIEWED THE TKOF TECHNIQUES IN THE FLT MANUAL. AS A FE I WILL NOW BE MORE ALERT TO FOLLOW THE 'FRONT' CREW WITH ALL CHKLIST AND PERFORMANCE PROCS EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS NOT A FACTOR FOR THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.