Narrative:

We were behind on the fuel burn and lakes was our fuel re-release point, so we were awaiting a call from the company, either on HF radio or ACARS, for our re-release. The captain had been requesting a climb periodically during the crossing, but higher had been unavailable. As we were approaching lakes, at least 4 separate things were going on at once. The so had just sent a message on ACARS requesting the fuel re-release (we were just getting into ACARS range). The HF SELCAL started to chime, which we were expecting to be our re-release message from the company. The captain, being the PNF, was on the VHF requesting direct to mofat and a climb. The first officer answered the SELCAL on HF, but gander radio would not answer because they were expecting a response from a different call sign, even though they were chiming our SELCAL code. While the captain and the first officer were busy with the radios, the ACARS chime sounded and the so saw that it was the re- release message. He stated that 'we just got the re- release over the ACARS' and started checking the fuel figures. Meanwhile, the HF SELCAL continued to chime, occupying the first officer. The so heard yul center, on the VHF, telling the captain '...unable request.' the captain asked 'unable which part?' but center never responded. Gander was still not responding to the first officer's repeated callbacks. The captain checked the re-release message to see if he concurred, considering our lower than expected fuel state. In the midst of all this, we got the INS alert light for waypoint passage at lakes. Here is where it broke down. Sometime during all this activity, the captain had changed the #1 and #2 INS's to go direct to mofat after lakes. When we did the waypoint passing procedure, the first officer asked 'what's the mi to go?' the so responded '66 mi to hinge.' the captain said that we were cleared direct to mofat. So we checked the mofat coordinates and mi to go. The SELCAL chimes were still going off and the first officer was still distracted trying to answer, the captain was busy sending his concurrence for the re-release and the so was copying the fuel figures and INS latitudes/longitudes on the fuel score. Approximately 2 mins past lakes, during which all crew members were occupied with their various tasks, yul center asked our heading. The captain answered and center told us to turn 30 degrees right for hinge. At this point there was obvious confusion as to our clearance. We turned direct hinge and proceeded as originally filed. Obviously we got overloaded and it directly caused our error. Yul center seemed to be unusually unresponsive and terse during the entire time we were in their sector and this was also a direct contributing factor. Had they responded when the captain asked '...unable which part,' the error would have been avoided. Also, considering the distance at which the direct course to mofat passes abeam hinges, it doesn't seem likely that we were more than 10 mi off course to hinge when center turned us. We were TCASII equipped and no other aircraft were detected. We were in IMC conditions, and center frequency was not busy. Center advised us that they were filing a 'gross navigational error' report, which seems consistent with center's attitude at the time. Aviate, navigation, communicate. This axiom is to be done in order, not all at once, to be effective. Mistakes are always going to be part of any human endeavor. The margin of safety is at its greatest when the pilots and controllers work together with the attitude of support. I do not feel that support existed with the controllers on this occasion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB ON ATLANTIC RTE HAS NAV ERROR. HDG TRACK POS DEV.

Narrative: WE WERE BEHIND ON THE FUEL BURN AND LAKES WAS OUR FUEL RE-RELEASE POINT, SO WE WERE AWAITING A CALL FROM THE COMPANY, EITHER ON HF RADIO OR ACARS, FOR OUR RE-RELEASE. THE CAPT HAD BEEN REQUESTING A CLB PERIODICALLY DURING THE XING, BUT HIGHER HAD BEEN UNAVAILABLE. AS WE WERE APCHING LAKES, AT LEAST 4 SEPARATE THINGS WERE GOING ON AT ONCE. THE SO HAD JUST SENT A MESSAGE ON ACARS REQUESTING THE FUEL RE-RELEASE (WE WERE JUST GETTING INTO ACARS RANGE). THE HF SELCAL STARTED TO CHIME, WHICH WE WERE EXPECTING TO BE OUR RE-RELEASE MESSAGE FROM THE COMPANY. THE CAPT, BEING THE PNF, WAS ON THE VHF REQUESTING DIRECT TO MOFAT AND A CLB. THE FO ANSWERED THE SELCAL ON HF, BUT GANDER RADIO WOULD NOT ANSWER BECAUSE THEY WERE EXPECTING A RESPONSE FROM A DIFFERENT CALL SIGN, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE CHIMING OUR SELCAL CODE. WHILE THE CAPT AND THE FO WERE BUSY WITH THE RADIOS, THE ACARS CHIME SOUNDED AND THE SO SAW THAT IT WAS THE RE- RELEASE MESSAGE. HE STATED THAT 'WE JUST GOT THE RE- RELEASE OVER THE ACARS' AND STARTED CHKING THE FUEL FIGURES. MEANWHILE, THE HF SELCAL CONTINUED TO CHIME, OCCUPYING THE FO. THE SO HEARD YUL CTR, ON THE VHF, TELLING THE CAPT '...UNABLE REQUEST.' THE CAPT ASKED 'UNABLE WHICH PART?' BUT CTR NEVER RESPONDED. GANDER WAS STILL NOT RESPONDING TO THE FO'S REPEATED CALLBACKS. THE CAPT CHKED THE RE-RELEASE MESSAGE TO SEE IF HE CONCURRED, CONSIDERING OUR LOWER THAN EXPECTED FUEL STATE. IN THE MIDST OF ALL THIS, WE GOT THE INS ALERT LIGHT FOR WAYPOINT PASSAGE AT LAKES. HERE IS WHERE IT BROKE DOWN. SOMETIME DURING ALL THIS ACTIVITY, THE CAPT HAD CHANGED THE #1 AND #2 INS'S TO GO DIRECT TO MOFAT AFTER LAKES. WHEN WE DID THE WAYPOINT PASSING PROC, THE FO ASKED 'WHAT'S THE MI TO GO?' THE SO RESPONDED '66 MI TO HINGE.' THE CAPT SAID THAT WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO MOFAT. SO WE CHKED THE MOFAT COORDINATES AND MI TO GO. THE SELCAL CHIMES WERE STILL GOING OFF AND THE FO WAS STILL DISTRACTED TRYING TO ANSWER, THE CAPT WAS BUSY SENDING HIS CONCURRENCE FOR THE RE-RELEASE AND THE SO WAS COPYING THE FUEL FIGURES AND INS LATITUDES/LONGITUDES ON THE FUEL SCORE. APPROX 2 MINS PAST LAKES, DURING WHICH ALL CREW MEMBERS WERE OCCUPIED WITH THEIR VARIOUS TASKS, YUL CTR ASKED OUR HDG. THE CAPT ANSWERED AND CTR TOLD US TO TURN 30 DEGS R FOR HINGE. AT THIS POINT THERE WAS OBVIOUS CONFUSION AS TO OUR CLRNC. WE TURNED DIRECT HINGE AND PROCEEDED AS ORIGINALLY FILED. OBVIOUSLY WE GOT OVERLOADED AND IT DIRECTLY CAUSED OUR ERROR. YUL CTR SEEMED TO BE UNUSUALLY UNRESPONSIVE AND TERSE DURING THE ENTIRE TIME WE WERE IN THEIR SECTOR AND THIS WAS ALSO A DIRECT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. HAD THEY RESPONDED WHEN THE CAPT ASKED '...UNABLE WHICH PART,' THE ERROR WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. ALSO, CONSIDERING THE DISTANCE AT WHICH THE DIRECT COURSE TO MOFAT PASSES ABEAM HINGES, IT DOESN'T SEEM LIKELY THAT WE WERE MORE THAN 10 MI OFF COURSE TO HINGE WHEN CTR TURNED US. WE WERE TCASII EQUIPPED AND NO OTHER ACFT WERE DETECTED. WE WERE IN IMC CONDITIONS, AND CTR FREQ WAS NOT BUSY. CTR ADVISED US THAT THEY WERE FILING A 'GROSS NAVIGATIONAL ERROR' RPT, WHICH SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH CTR'S ATTITUDE AT THE TIME. AVIATE, NAV, COMMUNICATE. THIS AXIOM IS TO BE DONE IN ORDER, NOT ALL AT ONCE, TO BE EFFECTIVE. MISTAKES ARE ALWAYS GOING TO BE PART OF ANY HUMAN ENDEAVOR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS AT ITS GREATEST WHEN THE PLTS AND CTLRS WORK TOGETHER WITH THE ATTITUDE OF SUPPORT. I DO NOT FEEL THAT SUPPORT EXISTED WITH THE CTLRS ON THIS OCCASION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.