Narrative:

Air carrier X off of jfk checked on the frequency and was climbed to 12000 ft and given a heading of 360 degrees. At the time there were 4 greki's being vectored in trail ahead of him. Cpr Y off teb also filed over greki landing btv was eastbound through a departure gate. I felt I had to take the handoff on this aircraft because the controller working him had no where to go with him. I didn't have a handoff at the time so his speed was not even reduced. On initial contact I gave cpr Y a speed restriction. No reply was given. The transmission was given and the aircraft responded this time sounding real annoyed. Cpr Y was then given a right turn heading 1600 degrees. After a very long delay, the aircraft gave a long drawn out reply, questioning the turn instruction, and cutting out other important xmissions. Air carrier X was given a clearance to climb to 14000 ft and turn right direct greki. After this transmission, I was coordinating on the landline with ZBW several items. The aircraft that was transmitting on the frequency was an air carrier Z checking in. During this coordinating, air carrier X said he had cpr Y in sight but apparently never heard the command to climb to 14000 ft. Air carrier X was then issued a climb to 17000 ft and again a right turn to greki. Again, I was on the landline with another sector at ZBW. At this time the air carrier X said he had the traffic and was going to descend, cpr Y stated he would climb. This was only heard later after listening to the tape. For whatever reason, cpr Y never climbed. Air carrier X did descend to 11000 ft and then started his climb. During this time there was also much frequency congestion as well as everyone stepping on one another. Additional factors were: no traffic management restrictions given to towers, no handoff on the position, only the supervisor intermittently working handoff, pilots not actively listening to the frequency, pilots with delayed readbacks, thereby cutting out xmissions, and making the frequency that much more difficult, coordination that took me off the frequency missing important xmissions. Supplemental information from acn 244841: we started on the teb #2 departure, given 6000 ft for quite a while, then given 11000 ft, radar vectors. Told to slow to 250 KTS, trying to reach carmel, ny, VOR. Many turns were assigned, then climb clearance to 14000 ft. 500 ft before 12000 ft, told to stop at 12000 ft, given northeast heading, then 180 degree heading. We questioned whether she knew where we were going. There was too much chatter on the radio to question. At approximately 10 mi southeast of carmel we saw aircraft at our 10 O'clock position, at a 45 degree intercept to us at 12000 ft also. We heard him say in effect this won't work, apparently he had us on his TCASII. We heard him say we're going down. I watched for a few seconds after I saw him to try and see if he was going up or down. He appeared to be descending so I went up 300 ft. He said he was going down. We missed by approximately 500-600 ft. Since this was all covered by radar vectors, we question the ability of this controller to make the right decisions on separating traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X SAME ALT ASSIGNED HAD LTSS FROM CPR Y. EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: ACR X OFF OF JFK CHKED ON THE FREQ AND WAS CLBED TO 12000 FT AND GIVEN A HDG OF 360 DEGS. AT THE TIME THERE WERE 4 GREKI'S BEING VECTORED IN TRAIL AHEAD OF HIM. CPR Y OFF TEB ALSO FILED OVER GREKI LNDG BTV WAS EBOUND THROUGH A DEP GATE. I FELT I HAD TO TAKE THE HDOF ON THIS ACFT BECAUSE THE CTLR WORKING HIM HAD NO WHERE TO GO WITH HIM. I DIDN'T HAVE A HDOF AT THE TIME SO HIS SPD WAS NOT EVEN REDUCED. ON INITIAL CONTACT I GAVE CPR Y A SPD RESTRICTION. NO REPLY WAS GIVEN. THE XMISSION WAS GIVEN AND THE ACFT RESPONDED THIS TIME SOUNDING REAL ANNOYED. CPR Y WAS THEN GIVEN A R TURN HDG 1600 DEGS. AFTER A VERY LONG DELAY, THE ACFT GAVE A LONG DRAWN OUT REPLY, QUESTIONING THE TURN INSTRUCTION, AND CUTTING OUT OTHER IMPORTANT XMISSIONS. ACR X WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO CLB TO 14000 FT AND TURN R DIRECT GREKI. AFTER THIS XMISSION, I WAS COORDINATING ON THE LANDLINE WITH ZBW SEVERAL ITEMS. THE ACFT THAT WAS XMITTING ON THE FREQ WAS AN ACR Z CHKING IN. DURING THIS COORDINATING, ACR X SAID HE HAD CPR Y IN SIGHT BUT APPARENTLY NEVER HEARD THE COMMAND TO CLB TO 14000 FT. ACR X WAS THEN ISSUED A CLB TO 17000 FT AND AGAIN A R TURN TO GREKI. AGAIN, I WAS ON THE LANDLINE WITH ANOTHER SECTOR AT ZBW. AT THIS TIME THE ACR X SAID HE HAD THE TFC AND WAS GOING TO DSND, CPR Y STATED HE WOULD CLB. THIS WAS ONLY HEARD LATER AFTER LISTENING TO THE TAPE. FOR WHATEVER REASON, CPR Y NEVER CLBED. ACR X DID DSND TO 11000 FT AND THEN STARTED HIS CLB. DURING THIS TIME THERE WAS ALSO MUCH FREQ CONGESTION AS WELL AS EVERYONE STEPPING ON ONE ANOTHER. ADDITIONAL FACTORS WERE: NO TFC MGMNT RESTRICTIONS GIVEN TO TWRS, NO HDOF ON THE POS, ONLY THE SUPVR INTERMITTENTLY WORKING HDOF, PLTS NOT ACTIVELY LISTENING TO THE FREQ, PLTS WITH DELAYED READBACKS, THEREBY CUTTING OUT XMISSIONS, AND MAKING THE FREQ THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, COORD THAT TOOK ME OFF THE FREQ MISSING IMPORTANT XMISSIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 244841: WE STARTED ON THE TEB #2 DEP, GIVEN 6000 FT FOR QUITE A WHILE, THEN GIVEN 11000 FT, RADAR VECTORS. TOLD TO SLOW TO 250 KTS, TRYING TO REACH CARMEL, NY, VOR. MANY TURNS WERE ASSIGNED, THEN CLB CLRNC TO 14000 FT. 500 FT BEFORE 12000 FT, TOLD TO STOP AT 12000 FT, GIVEN NE HDG, THEN 180 DEG HDG. WE QUESTIONED WHETHER SHE KNEW WHERE WE WERE GOING. THERE WAS TOO MUCH CHATTER ON THE RADIO TO QUESTION. AT APPROX 10 MI SE OF CARMEL WE SAW ACFT AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS, AT A 45 DEG INTERCEPT TO US AT 12000 FT ALSO. WE HEARD HIM SAY IN EFFECT THIS WON'T WORK, APPARENTLY HE HAD US ON HIS TCASII. WE HEARD HIM SAY WE'RE GOING DOWN. I WATCHED FOR A FEW SECONDS AFTER I SAW HIM TO TRY AND SEE IF HE WAS GOING UP OR DOWN. HE APPEARED TO BE DSNDING SO I WENT UP 300 FT. HE SAID HE WAS GOING DOWN. WE MISSED BY APPROX 500-600 FT. SINCE THIS WAS ALL COVERED BY RADAR VECTORS, WE QUESTION THE ABILITY OF THIS CTLR TO MAKE THE RIGHT DECISIONS ON SEPARATING TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.