Narrative:

The flight into 06A (tuskgee airport) was of a practice training measure. Both myself and a friend are currently undergoing CFI training. We were practicing various takeoff and landing types. During one of the takeoffs we believed we encountered a wind shear. The aircraft being flown was an small aircraft. While performing a short field takeoff, I experienced a sudden decrease in altitude immediately after retracting the gear on climb out. I am aware of the drag characteristics of this aircraft while the gear are in transit. The gear drop about 2 ft in transit. We had a positive rate of climb and at a ht of about 30 ft the gear were retracted. As soon as the gear started in transit the aircraft lost about 20-25 ft even while maintaining a vx climb attitude. Once the aircraft descent was arrested, the aircraft was accelerated in ground effect until an airspeed of 80-85 KIAS was reached. Once reaching this airspeed, a high performance climbing turn to crosswind was established. 2 people on the ground said takeoff was said to look like aerobatic flight. Under no instance was the aircraft in an abnormal condition considering the flight situation and none of the bank/pitch angles were exceeded. During the takeoff, the altitude loss became a major concern. Both myself and the other pilot got that 'sick sinking feeling' about the situation at hand. Once recovery was maintained, the only thing that I could think about was gaining airspeed and altitude. The people on the ground told me that they perceived it to be much worse. Cockpit conversation about the situation distracted me during takeoff and climb out. There are a few key elements that affected the situation: 1) encounter with a frightening situation that affected judgement and perception, 2) cockpit conversation that distracted me from the recovery/climb out procedure. I believe that the situation could have been handled better if total attention were given to the problem at hand. Fear should be controled and minimized as much as possible. Strict adherence to the manufacturers operating procedures will also provide the best possible performance on the most part and further reduce any problems like the situation just described. Supplemental information from acn 245570: I noticed that the pilot retracted the landing gear at an altitude of about 30 ft AGL. The retraction seemed a little early although we did have a positive rate of climb. The wind had picked up some as the gusts and turbulence seemed stronger than they had been on the previous takeoff which I had performed. Next, the aircraft began to settle back towards the runway with the stall warning horn indicating an imminent stall. The pilot lowered the nose of the aircraft slightly and then proceeded to stop the aircraft's descent between 5 and 10 ft above the runway. By re- entering ground effect and accelerating until we had enough airspeed to attain a positive rate of climb, the pilot was able to prevent contact with the runway in a gear up confign.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA HAS LOSS OF ACFT CTL ON TKOF. POSSIBLE WIND SHEAR.

Narrative: THE FLT INTO 06A (TUSKGEE ARPT) WAS OF A PRACTICE TRAINING MEASURE. BOTH MYSELF AND A FRIEND ARE CURRENTLY UNDERGOING CFI TRAINING. WE WERE PRACTICING VARIOUS TKOF AND LNDG TYPES. DURING ONE OF THE TKOFS WE BELIEVED WE ENCOUNTERED A WIND SHEAR. THE ACFT BEING FLOWN WAS AN SMA. WHILE PERFORMING A SHORT FIELD TKOF, I EXPERIENCED A SUDDEN DECREASE IN ALT IMMEDIATELY AFTER RETRACTING THE GEAR ON CLBOUT. I AM AWARE OF THE DRAG CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS ACFT WHILE THE GEAR ARE IN TRANSIT. THE GEAR DROP ABOUT 2 FT IN TRANSIT. WE HAD A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB AND AT A HT OF ABOUT 30 FT THE GEAR WERE RETRACTED. AS SOON AS THE GEAR STARTED IN TRANSIT THE ACFT LOST ABOUT 20-25 FT EVEN WHILE MAINTAINING A VX CLB ATTITUDE. ONCE THE ACFT DSCNT WAS ARRESTED, THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATED IN GND EFFECT UNTIL AN AIRSPD OF 80-85 KIAS WAS REACHED. ONCE REACHING THIS AIRSPD, A HIGH PERFORMANCE CLBING TURN TO XWIND WAS ESTABLISHED. 2 PEOPLE ON THE GND SAID TKOF WAS SAID TO LOOK LIKE AEROBATIC FLT. UNDER NO INSTANCE WAS THE ACFT IN AN ABNORMAL CONDITION CONSIDERING THE FLT SIT AND NONE OF THE BANK/PITCH ANGLES WERE EXCEEDED. DURING THE TKOF, THE ALT LOSS BECAME A MAJOR CONCERN. BOTH MYSELF AND THE OTHER PLT GOT THAT 'SICK SINKING FEELING' ABOUT THE SIT AT HAND. ONCE RECOVERY WAS MAINTAINED, THE ONLY THING THAT I COULD THINK ABOUT WAS GAINING AIRSPD AND ALT. THE PEOPLE ON THE GND TOLD ME THAT THEY PERCEIVED IT TO BE MUCH WORSE. COCKPIT CONVERSATION ABOUT THE SIT DISTRACTED ME DURING TKOF AND CLBOUT. THERE ARE A FEW KEY ELEMENTS THAT AFFECTED THE SIT: 1) ENCOUNTER WITH A FRIGHTENING SIT THAT AFFECTED JUDGEMENT AND PERCEPTION, 2) COCKPIT CONVERSATION THAT DISTRACTED ME FROM THE RECOVERY/CLBOUT PROC. I BELIEVE THAT THE SIT COULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED BETTER IF TOTAL ATTN WERE GIVEN TO THE PROB AT HAND. FEAR SHOULD BE CTLED AND MINIMIZED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE MANUFACTURERS OPERATING PROCS WILL ALSO PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE PERFORMANCE ON THE MOST PART AND FURTHER REDUCE ANY PROBS LIKE THE SIT JUST DESCRIBED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 245570: I NOTICED THAT THE PLT RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR AT AN ALT OF ABOUT 30 FT AGL. THE RETRACTION SEEMED A LITTLE EARLY ALTHOUGH WE DID HAVE A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB. THE WIND HAD PICKED UP SOME AS THE GUSTS AND TURB SEEMED STRONGER THAN THEY HAD BEEN ON THE PREVIOUS TKOF WHICH I HAD PERFORMED. NEXT, THE ACFT BEGAN TO SETTLE BACK TOWARDS THE RWY WITH THE STALL WARNING HORN INDICATING AN IMMINENT STALL. THE PLT LOWERED THE NOSE OF THE ACFT SLIGHTLY AND THEN PROCEEDED TO STOP THE ACFT'S DSCNT BTWN 5 AND 10 FT ABOVE THE RWY. BY RE- ENTERING GND EFFECT AND ACCELERATING UNTIL WE HAD ENOUGH AIRSPD TO ATTAIN A POSITIVE RATE OF CLB, THE PLT WAS ABLE TO PREVENT CONTACT WITH THE RWY IN A GEAR UP CONFIGN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.