Narrative:

I was the first officer (PNF) on a scheduled flight from ind to cle on the morning of jul/xx/93. In his pre takeoff briefing, the captain requested that I set takeoff power to 100 percent torque. Just 3 or 4 seconds into the takeoff roll and still well below the V1 go/no-go decision speed, the captain aborted the takeoff. He did this because a warning bell and the red light on the engine temperature gauge sounded and lit. The captain immediately brought the power lever to flight idle and turned off the runway. (The warning will sound when the temperature exceeds 816 degrees C, which is the maximum temperature that may be sustained for 5 mins during the takeoff phase of flight. The maximum continuous operating temperature is 800 degrees C. The temperature may be tolerated between 816 degrees C and 850 degrees C for 20 seconds and still be considered within limits.) in our case, however, the temperature was between 816 degrees C and 850 degrees C for only 2 or 3 seconds and did not exceed 850 degrees C. The captain was returning to the gate when he decided to contact system control, which monitors company flight operations. He contacted maintenance control, part of system control, to determine whether we could continue the flight if we were certain we could keep the engine operations within limits. The captain was confident this was possible by setting takeoff torque at a reduced power setting of 90 percent, which is a company- established procedure for extending engine life when the operating environment and aircraft takeoff weight permit. This power setting was also verified by consulting the aircraft performance manual. Maintenance approved the reduced power takeoff and the flight departed legally without further incident. The crew also felt that safety was not compromised and that it was in the best interests of company safety policy to get the aircraft expeditiously to its main base for a maintenance chkout. The crew later learned that maintenance control changed its mind about having the flight continue instead of having it return to the gate. The crew can appreciate that maintenance control, in its reflection on the occurrence, has developed concerns and second thoughts about having released the flight. The crew still feels that it operated the flight safely, however, it recommends for the future that crews return to the gate to allow for more time for more extensive consultations with all company parties concerned before allowing the continued operation of a revenue flight. Supplemental information from acn 247170: upon reaching cleveland I let line maintenance know that T6 on right engine was higher than it normally ran. They asked me to write a discrepancy in logbook and I did so. I still felt safety of flight was not compromised but will return to gate next time and consult with more than just 1 party for decision making process. I put too much faith in maintenance control decision making process. I recommend that the first flight of day should use 100 percent torque to help spot engine problems. Maintenance took aircraft off line and took it to the hangar for maintenance. I don't know if we had an engine change for sure but it never would have been spotted as a bad engine if reduced power takeoffs had been used all day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN MLG ACR ACFT ABORTED TKOF DUE TO A HIGH ENG TEMP WARNING ON 1 OF THE 2 ENGS.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO (PNF) ON A SCHEDULED FLT FROM IND TO CLE ON THE MORNING OF JUL/XX/93. IN HIS PRE TKOF BRIEFING, THE CAPT REQUESTED THAT I SET TKOF PWR TO 100 PERCENT TORQUE. JUST 3 OR 4 SECONDS INTO THE TKOF ROLL AND STILL WELL BELOW THE V1 GO/NO-GO DECISION SPD, THE CAPT ABORTED THE TKOF. HE DID THIS BECAUSE A WARNING BELL AND THE RED LIGHT ON THE ENG TEMP GAUGE SOUNDED AND LIT. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT THE PWR LEVER TO FLT IDLE AND TURNED OFF THE RWY. (THE WARNING WILL SOUND WHEN THE TEMP EXCEEDS 816 DEGS C, WHICH IS THE MAX TEMP THAT MAY BE SUSTAINED FOR 5 MINS DURING THE TKOF PHASE OF FLT. THE MAX CONTINUOUS OPERATING TEMP IS 800 DEGS C. THE TEMP MAY BE TOLERATED BTWN 816 DEGS C AND 850 DEGS C FOR 20 SECONDS AND STILL BE CONSIDERED WITHIN LIMITS.) IN OUR CASE, HOWEVER, THE TEMP WAS BTWN 816 DEGS C AND 850 DEGS C FOR ONLY 2 OR 3 SECONDS AND DID NOT EXCEED 850 DEGS C. THE CAPT WAS RETURNING TO THE GATE WHEN HE DECIDED TO CONTACT SYS CTL, WHICH MONITORS COMPANY FLT OPS. HE CONTACTED MAINT CTL, PART OF SYS CTL, TO DETERMINE WHETHER WE COULD CONTINUE THE FLT IF WE WERE CERTAIN WE COULD KEEP THE ENG OPS WITHIN LIMITS. THE CAPT WAS CONFIDENT THIS WAS POSSIBLE BY SETTING TKOF TORQUE AT A REDUCED PWR SETTING OF 90 PERCENT, WHICH IS A COMPANY- ESTABLISHED PROC FOR EXTENDING ENG LIFE WHEN THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND ACFT TKOF WT PERMIT. THIS PWR SETTING WAS ALSO VERIFIED BY CONSULTING THE ACFT PERFORMANCE MANUAL. MAINT APPROVED THE REDUCED PWR TKOF AND THE FLT DEPARTED LEGALLY WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE CREW ALSO FELT THAT SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED AND THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF COMPANY SAFETY POLICY TO GET THE ACFT EXPEDITIOUSLY TO ITS MAIN BASE FOR A MAINT CHKOUT. THE CREW LATER LEARNED THAT MAINT CTL CHANGED ITS MIND ABOUT HAVING THE FLT CONTINUE INSTEAD OF HAVING IT RETURN TO THE GATE. THE CREW CAN APPRECIATE THAT MAINT CTL, IN ITS REFLECTION ON THE OCCURRENCE, HAS DEVELOPED CONCERNS AND SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT HAVING RELEASED THE FLT. THE CREW STILL FEELS THAT IT OPERATED THE FLT SAFELY, HOWEVER, IT RECOMMENDS FOR THE FUTURE THAT CREWS RETURN TO THE GATE TO ALLOW FOR MORE TIME FOR MORE EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL COMPANY PARTIES CONCERNED BEFORE ALLOWING THE CONTINUED OP OF A REVENUE FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 247170: UPON REACHING CLEVELAND I LET LINE MAINT KNOW THAT T6 ON R ENG WAS HIGHER THAN IT NORMALLY RAN. THEY ASKED ME TO WRITE A DISCREPANCY IN LOGBOOK AND I DID SO. I STILL FELT SAFETY OF FLT WAS NOT COMPROMISED BUT WILL RETURN TO GATE NEXT TIME AND CONSULT WITH MORE THAN JUST 1 PARTY FOR DECISION MAKING PROCESS. I PUT TOO MUCH FAITH IN MAINT CTL DECISION MAKING PROCESS. I RECOMMEND THAT THE FIRST FLT OF DAY SHOULD USE 100 PERCENT TORQUE TO HELP SPOT ENG PROBS. MAINT TOOK ACFT OFF LINE AND TOOK IT TO THE HANGAR FOR MAINT. I DON'T KNOW IF WE HAD AN ENG CHANGE FOR SURE BUT IT NEVER WOULD HAVE BEEN SPOTTED AS A BAD ENG IF REDUCED PWR TKOFS HAD BEEN USED ALL DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.