Narrative:

Nearing mia, the ATIS changed 3 times, mainly due to shifting winds, and we were finally assigned the ILS 27R. The last ATIS received prior to landing reported ceiling 3000 ft, visibility 1/2 heavy rainshowers, wind 270/12 with a thunderstorm to the north of the field. We followed a commuter turboprop and an air carrier jet on the ILS 27R. On tower frequency, the turboprop reported a 'smooth ride all the way down,' and air carrier reported that 'the rain started 2 mi out, not a bad ride.' at one point the tower reported RVR on 9L as 4000 ft with no RVR available for 27R. On our approach, we sighted the lead- in lights about 2 mi out in light to moderate rain. At CAT 1 decision ht, the landing zone and centerline light were visible with moderate rain obscuring visibility to about 1/2 mi, maybe a bit less. At about 20 to 30 ft radio altitude, the aircraft started a right drift with a simultaneous loss of 20 KTS, followed almost immediately by a total loss of visibility in heavy rain. I initiated a go around, pushing the throttles full forward while the captain grabbed the yoke with me to pull the nose up. We felt the main gear touch down relatively smoothly for 2 seconds. The remainder of the go around was uneventful, but we ended up on about a 290 degree heading. The most dangerous point was when we had the main gear on the runway with 0 forward visibility. Also, with the right drift and post go around heading of 290 degrees, we must have been perilously close to the right edge of the runway. I don't believe we violated any FARS or exercised poor judgement. A situation with no rain on a 2 mi final and heavy rain at the filed might have convinced us to delay our approach, but the favorable PIREP from an aircraft 3 mi ahead sounded good. The shaft of heavy rain was obscured to us by the surrounding moderate rain -- both visually and on the radar screen. We were simply unlucky enough to meet the heavy rain shaft, downburst, and rapid wind shift right in our flare. I also feel that the captain was a bit unassertive prior to the approach by not clearly defining his 'personal' parameters as to when to initiate a go around. Based on the information available , I think most airline pilots would have followed the same course we did. If I had been 1 or 2 seconds quicker by initiating the go around at the instant I noticed the right drift, we possibly could have avoided touching down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT TOUCHED DOWN DURING A GAR IN HVY RAIN AND WINDSHEAR.

Narrative: NEARING MIA, THE ATIS CHANGED 3 TIMES, MAINLY DUE TO SHIFTING WINDS, AND WE WERE FINALLY ASSIGNED THE ILS 27R. THE LAST ATIS RECEIVED PRIOR TO LNDG RPTED CEILING 3000 FT, VISIBILITY 1/2 HVY RAINSHOWERS, WIND 270/12 WITH A TSTM TO THE N OF THE FIELD. WE FOLLOWED A COMMUTER TURBOPROP AND AN ACR JET ON THE ILS 27R. ON TWR FREQ, THE TURBOPROP RPTED A 'SMOOTH RIDE ALL THE WAY DOWN,' AND ACR RPTED THAT 'THE RAIN STARTED 2 MI OUT, NOT A BAD RIDE.' AT ONE POINT THE TWR RPTED RVR ON 9L AS 4000 FT WITH NO RVR AVAILABLE FOR 27R. ON OUR APCH, WE SIGHTED THE LEAD- IN LIGHTS ABOUT 2 MI OUT IN LIGHT TO MODERATE RAIN. AT CAT 1 DECISION HT, THE LNDG ZONE AND CTRLINE LIGHT WERE VISIBLE WITH MODERATE RAIN OBSCURING VISIBILITY TO ABOUT 1/2 MI, MAYBE A BIT LESS. AT ABOUT 20 TO 30 FT RADIO ALT, THE ACFT STARTED A R DRIFT WITH A SIMULTANEOUS LOSS OF 20 KTS, FOLLOWED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY A TOTAL LOSS OF VISIBILITY IN HVY RAIN. I INITIATED A GAR, PUSHING THE THROTTLES FULL FORWARD WHILE THE CAPT GRABBED THE YOKE WITH ME TO PULL THE NOSE UP. WE FELT THE MAIN GEAR TOUCH DOWN RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY FOR 2 SECONDS. THE REMAINDER OF THE GAR WAS UNEVENTFUL, BUT WE ENDED UP ON ABOUT A 290 DEG HDG. THE MOST DANGEROUS POINT WAS WHEN WE HAD THE MAIN GEAR ON THE RWY WITH 0 FORWARD VISIBILITY. ALSO, WITH THE R DRIFT AND POST GAR HDG OF 290 DEGS, WE MUST HAVE BEEN PERILOUSLY CLOSE TO THE R EDGE OF THE RWY. I DON'T BELIEVE WE VIOLATED ANY FARS OR EXERCISED POOR JUDGEMENT. A SIT WITH NO RAIN ON A 2 MI FINAL AND HVY RAIN AT THE FILED MIGHT HAVE CONVINCED US TO DELAY OUR APCH, BUT THE FAVORABLE PIREP FROM AN ACFT 3 MI AHEAD SOUNDED GOOD. THE SHAFT OF HVY RAIN WAS OBSCURED TO US BY THE SURROUNDING MODERATE RAIN -- BOTH VISUALLY AND ON THE RADAR SCREEN. WE WERE SIMPLY UNLUCKY ENOUGH TO MEET THE HVY RAIN SHAFT, DOWNBURST, AND RAPID WIND SHIFT R IN OUR FLARE. I ALSO FEEL THAT THE CAPT WAS A BIT UNASSERTIVE PRIOR TO THE APCH BY NOT CLRLY DEFINING HIS 'PERSONAL' PARAMETERS AS TO WHEN TO INITIATE A GAR. BASED ON THE INFO AVAILABLE , I THINK MOST AIRLINE PLTS WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THE SAME COURSE WE DID. IF I HAD BEEN 1 OR 2 SECONDS QUICKER BY INITIATING THE GAR AT THE INSTANT I NOTICED THE R DRIFT, WE POSSIBLY COULD HAVE AVOIDED TOUCHING DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.