Narrative:

I was descending the airplane into clear VFR conditions and we visually acquired the airport at 8 mi to our northwest. We were cleared for the visual approach and handed over to new orleans lakefront tower (new). Tower cleared us to land and called helicopter traffic at our 1 O'clock position. As we continued our descent, looking for the traffic and configuring our airplane to land, I was a bit fast for our flap confign (prior to their deployment). I traded some of the airspeed for altitude as the PNF visually idented the helicopter. Tower again called the helicopter's position at our 11 O'clock position at 800 ft AGL at 1/4 mi from the airport and said that he would be landing on the west ramp. As we added full flaps and gear on the 2 mi final the airplane was high on the VASI for runway 36L, but our rapid descent rate at the reduced power setting was setting the airplane down to the GS course in a timely manner. Now on a 2 mi final, we both saw the helicopter at 800 ft AGL coming in from our left and approaching our aircraft's flight path in a straight line vector. He was positioned apparently to be in conflict with our landing. I asked the PNF to verify where the helicopter was heading. We were closing rapidly, and the tower frequency was congested with other xmissions. The PNF suggested a go around. After one last brief assessment of the situation, I determined that the conflict was inevitable and proceeded the go around procedure. I was irate that the conflict was permitted by ATC and that they seemed unaware of the situation that had unfolded in the 5-10 second period. After our go around, we landed on runway 36L and saw that the helicopter had landed on the ramp just left of the landing threshold. We both perceived that the conflict was real and demanded immediate evasive action. The spacing, timeliness and speed differences of the aircraft made the procedure a safety hazard.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BTWN CORP LTT AND HELI.

Narrative: I WAS DSNDING THE AIRPLANE INTO CLR VFR CONDITIONS AND WE VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE ARPT AT 8 MI TO OUR NW. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH AND HANDED OVER TO NEW ORLEANS LAKEFRONT TWR (NEW). TWR CLRED US TO LAND AND CALLED HELI TFC AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS. AS WE CONTINUED OUR DSCNT, LOOKING FOR THE TFC AND CONFIGURING OUR AIRPLANE TO LAND, I WAS A BIT FAST FOR OUR FLAP CONFIGN (PRIOR TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT). I TRADED SOME OF THE AIRSPD FOR ALT AS THE PNF VISUALLY IDENTED THE HELI. TWR AGAIN CALLED THE HELI'S POS AT OUR 11 O'CLOCK POS AT 800 FT AGL AT 1/4 MI FROM THE ARPT AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE LNDG ON THE W RAMP. AS WE ADDED FULL FLAPS AND GEAR ON THE 2 MI FINAL THE AIRPLANE WAS HIGH ON THE VASI FOR RWY 36L, BUT OUR RAPID DSCNT RATE AT THE REDUCED PWR SETTING WAS SETTING THE AIRPLANE DOWN TO THE GS COURSE IN A TIMELY MANNER. NOW ON A 2 MI FINAL, WE BOTH SAW THE HELI AT 800 FT AGL COMING IN FROM OUR L AND APCHING OUR ACFT'S FLT PATH IN A STRAIGHT LINE VECTOR. HE WAS POSITIONED APPARENTLY TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH OUR LNDG. I ASKED THE PNF TO VERIFY WHERE THE HELI WAS HDG. WE WERE CLOSING RAPIDLY, AND THE TWR FREQ WAS CONGESTED WITH OTHER XMISSIONS. THE PNF SUGGESTED A GAR. AFTER ONE LAST BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE SIT, I DETERMINED THAT THE CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE AND PROCEEDED THE GAR PROC. I WAS IRATE THAT THE CONFLICT WAS PERMITTED BY ATC AND THAT THEY SEEMED UNAWARE OF THE SIT THAT HAD UNFOLDED IN THE 5-10 SECOND PERIOD. AFTER OUR GAR, WE LANDED ON RWY 36L AND SAW THAT THE HELI HAD LANDED ON THE RAMP JUST L OF THE LNDG THRESHOLD. WE BOTH PERCEIVED THAT THE CONFLICT WAS REAL AND DEMANDED IMMEDIATE EVASIVE ACTION. THE SPACING, TIMELINESS AND SPD DIFFERENCES OF THE ACFT MADE THE PROC A SAFETY HAZARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.