Narrative:

I was the flight engineer on a night cargo flight. As we completed crossing runway 35L, a commuter aircraft took off on the same runway. The aircraft I was in has a cockpit instrument confign which requires the flight engineer to move around more than usual (most of the fleet has a more standard confign) to monitor hydraulics and pneumatics. This same confign necessitates the removal of the flight engineer's headset to reach some of the switches that are manipulated in the taxi checklist. However, the external speakers were on at all times and both tower and ground control communications were audible. Initial taxi instructions were to taxi and hold short at lima 7 and then hold short at lima for inbound off runway 35L. We held short at lima 7, waited for the traffic to clear and were instructed to continue and hold short of runway 35L. The captain called for flaps 18 and the taxi checklist. The flaps were set and the checklist was being done. I heard the copilot acknowledge '...hold short runway 35L, monitor tower...' and then he changed to the tower frequency. I had turned back to my panel and was monitoring my gauges. I did not feel the aircraft moving. I looked back to the front and saw the copilot turn to look out his side window. I looked out as well and realized we were crossing the runway. I also saw landing lights at the far end and was quite surprised when I saw they were moving because I had not heard anyone cleared for takeoff. The copilot was saying '...aircraft on active...he's rolling....' the captain advanced power and cleared the runway. From my position I could see the aircraft on the runway lift off approximately 2000-2200 ft away and make a slight climbing turn to the left. When the departing aircraft reached our position he was no lower than 600 ft above the runway and our aircraft was well clear of the runway. The taxi checklist was completed and the before takeoff checklist. We departed and on arrival at our next stop the captain checked in with den tower. Supplemental information from acn 250733: taxi to runway 35R and to hold short of runway 35L. We were instructed to switch to tower frequency. We started doing our taxi checklist and before I realized we had entered runway 35L. At that time my only course of action was to clear the runway as quickly as possible so I pushed the power up and crossed to the other side. Several things contributed to this incident. First, I had a new first officer who required that more than normal attention be given to the inside of the cockpit during the taxi checklist. Second, the clear for takeoff instructions were given to the small aircraft before we came in the tower frequency, thus preventing us from hearing it and alerting us to the fact that an airplane was taking off on runway 35L. Third, the lighting at that spot (lima 7) is very poor and it surely does not alert the pilot of the approaching runway. Supplemental information from acn 251978: cleared to taxi from cargo ramp den to runway 35R, hold short runway 35L, monitor tower 119.5. During taxi I was performing related system checks and my attention was required in cockpit because I was not familiar with this aircraft confign. Although I had acknowledged the hold short instructions twice and repeated the instructions to the captain, he apparently was not familiar with the airport taxiway and runway layouts. After completing my related system checks I immediately notice we had taxied onto runway 35L and looked to my right. I could see what appeared to be an aircraft at the end of runway 35L approximately 5300 ft to the right of our position. I notified the captain of the aircraft and questioned him as to the clearance to cross runway 35L as I had not communicated with the tower. I questioned the tower about our clearance and he said that we had been cleared. The captain was visibly shaken by his actions and I suggested we delay takeoff. We did so and then continued with flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HVT FRTR HAS RWY INCURSION IN A NIGHT OP WHEN CREW FAILED TO HOLD SHORT AS INSTRUCTED. DEP TFC HAS A CRITICAL GND CONFLICT EVENT WITH FRTR.

Narrative: I WAS THE FE ON A NIGHT CARGO FLT. AS WE COMPLETED XING RWY 35L, A COMMUTER ACFT TOOK OFF ON THE SAME RWY. THE ACFT I WAS IN HAS A COCKPIT INST CONFIGN WHICH REQUIRES THE FE TO MOVE AROUND MORE THAN USUAL (MOST OF THE FLEET HAS A MORE STANDARD CONFIGN) TO MONITOR HYDS AND PNEUMATICS. THIS SAME CONFIGN NECESSITATES THE REMOVAL OF THE FE'S HEADSET TO REACH SOME OF THE SWITCHES THAT ARE MANIPULATED IN THE TAXI CHKLIST. HOWEVER, THE EXTERNAL SPEAKERS WERE ON AT ALL TIMES AND BOTH TWR AND GND CTL COMS WERE AUDIBLE. INITIAL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TAXI AND HOLD SHORT AT LIMA 7 AND THEN HOLD SHORT AT LIMA FOR INBOUND OFF RWY 35L. WE HELD SHORT AT LIMA 7, WAITED FOR THE TFC TO CLR AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35L. THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 18 AND THE TAXI CHKLIST. THE FLAPS WERE SET AND THE CHKLIST WAS BEING DONE. I HEARD THE COPLT ACKNOWLEDGE '...HOLD SHORT RWY 35L, MONITOR TWR...' AND THEN HE CHANGED TO THE TWR FREQ. I HAD TURNED BACK TO MY PANEL AND WAS MONITORING MY GAUGES. I DID NOT FEEL THE ACFT MOVING. I LOOKED BACK TO THE FRONT AND SAW THE COPLT TURN TO LOOK OUT HIS SIDE WINDOW. I LOOKED OUT AS WELL AND REALIZED WE WERE XING THE RWY. I ALSO SAW LNDG LIGHTS AT THE FAR END AND WAS QUITE SURPRISED WHEN I SAW THEY WERE MOVING BECAUSE I HAD NOT HEARD ANYONE CLRED FOR TKOF. THE COPLT WAS SAYING '...ACFT ON ACTIVE...HE'S ROLLING....' THE CAPT ADVANCED PWR AND CLRED THE RWY. FROM MY POS I COULD SEE THE ACFT ON THE RWY LIFT OFF APPROX 2000-2200 FT AWAY AND MAKE A SLIGHT CLBING TURN TO THE L. WHEN THE DEPARTING ACFT REACHED OUR POS HE WAS NO LOWER THAN 600 FT ABOVE THE RWY AND OUR ACFT WAS WELL CLR OF THE RWY. THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. WE DEPARTED AND ON ARR AT OUR NEXT STOP THE CAPT CHKED IN WITH DEN TWR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 250733: TAXI TO RWY 35R AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 35L. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. WE STARTED DOING OUR TAXI CHKLIST AND BEFORE I REALIZED WE HAD ENTERED RWY 35L. AT THAT TIME MY ONLY COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO CLR THE RWY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO I PUSHED THE PWR UP AND CROSSED TO THE OTHER SIDE. SEVERAL THINGS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. FIRST, I HAD A NEW FO WHO REQUIRED THAT MORE THAN NORMAL ATTN BE GIVEN TO THE INSIDE OF THE COCKPIT DURING THE TAXI CHKLIST. SECOND, THE CLR FOR TKOF INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO THE SMALL ACFT BEFORE WE CAME IN THE TWR FREQ, THUS PREVENTING US FROM HEARING IT AND ALERTING US TO THE FACT THAT AN AIRPLANE WAS TAKING OFF ON RWY 35L. THIRD, THE LIGHTING AT THAT SPOT (LIMA 7) IS VERY POOR AND IT SURELY DOES NOT ALERT THE PLT OF THE APCHING RWY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 251978: CLRED TO TAXI FROM CARGO RAMP DEN TO RWY 35R, HOLD SHORT RWY 35L, MONITOR TWR 119.5. DURING TAXI I WAS PERFORMING RELATED SYS CHKS AND MY ATTN WAS REQUIRED IN COCKPIT BECAUSE I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS ACFT CONFIGN. ALTHOUGH I HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS TWICE AND REPEATED THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CAPT, HE APPARENTLY WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT TXWY AND RWY LAYOUTS. AFTER COMPLETING MY RELATED SYS CHKS I IMMEDIATELY NOTICE WE HAD TAXIED ONTO RWY 35L AND LOOKED TO MY R. I COULD SEE WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ACFT AT THE END OF RWY 35L APPROX 5300 FT TO THE R OF OUR POS. I NOTIFIED THE CAPT OF THE ACFT AND QUESTIONED HIM AS TO THE CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 35L AS I HAD NOT COMMUNICATED WITH THE TWR. I QUESTIONED THE TWR ABOUT OUR CLRNC AND HE SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED. THE CAPT WAS VISIBLY SHAKEN BY HIS ACTIONS AND I SUGGESTED WE DELAY TKOF. WE DID SO AND THEN CONTINUED WITH FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.