Narrative:

Air carrier a, an light transport, 12 mi east of rdu at 4000 ft northbound, was instructed to turn left heading 370 degrees and follow an medium large transport at 11 O'clock, 4 mi inbound, descending out of 3000 ft and was cleared for the visual approach to runway 23R. Air carrier a acknowledged the turn and the clearance. Air carrier B, a widebody transport, 13 mi nne of rdu at 4000 ft, was told to turn right heading 140 degrees base leg. Air carrier a was then told to descend to 2000 ft. Air carrier B was then told about air carrier a, 1 O'clock, 3 mi, now on a dog leg final who he was to follow. Air carrier B said he was looking. At that point I noticed air carrier a had gone through final and I instructed him to turn left heading 210 degrees to the airport. In the same transmission I told him about the widebody transport at 2 O'clock, 3 mi (air carrier a was descending out of 3600 ft at this point). He reported the widebody transport in sight and was instructed to maintain visual separation. Air carrier B was told the light transport had him in sight and was maintaining visual separation and again he said he was looking. I then turned the widebody transport to 090 degrees to follow the light transport and told him to expect vectors across final for spacing. Air carrier B was then offered runway 23L, he denied it. Air carrier B also didn't turn to 090 degrees as instructed. Air carrier B then asked who was the aircraft below him. I told him that was the aircraft maintaining visual from him. I knew at this point air carrier B wasn't paying attention (typical with air carrier widebody transport crews). Air carrier B went across final and was turned back wbound to follow air carrier a. Air carrier B reported him in sight and was instructed to follow and was cleared a visual approach to runway 23R. Air carrier a apologized for the overshoot before going to the tower. Air carrier a had gone through final approximately 2 mi for which there was no cause. I had 2 aircraft on the frequency not paying attention to what they're supposed to be doing. Made a routine, simple, everyday occurrence almost a bad situation. I also believe that too many pilots are looking at their TCASII instead of looking out their window and missing what is actually going on. Supplemental information from acn 251877: I was informing first officer of 12 O'clock traffic when simultaneously, ATC called widebody transport at 3 mi, 12 O'clock (I told ATC we had widebody transport in sight). TCASII TA followed rapidly by TCASII descend RA. First officer complied with RA. We passed approximately 800-1000 ft below widebody transport. Because of all this commotion in cockpit as we approached final course, we overshot final 1-2 mi. Completed visual approach. After talking with ATC supervisor, found out controller was being trained and ATC was having shift change.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 ACFT FAIL TO FOLLOW VECTORS AND A TCASII RA RESULTS.

Narrative: ACR A, AN LTT, 12 MI E OF RDU AT 4000 FT NBOUND, WAS INSTRUCTED TO TURN L HDG 370 DEGS AND FOLLOW AN MLG AT 11 O'CLOCK, 4 MI INBOUND, DSNDING OUT OF 3000 FT AND WAS CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 23R. ACR A ACKNOWLEDGED THE TURN AND THE CLRNC. ACR B, A WDB, 13 MI NNE OF RDU AT 4000 FT, WAS TOLD TO TURN R HDG 140 DEGS BASE LEG. ACR A WAS THEN TOLD TO DSND TO 2000 FT. ACR B WAS THEN TOLD ABOUT ACR A, 1 O'CLOCK, 3 MI, NOW ON A DOG LEG FINAL WHO HE WAS TO FOLLOW. ACR B SAID HE WAS LOOKING. AT THAT POINT I NOTICED ACR A HAD GONE THROUGH FINAL AND I INSTRUCTED HIM TO TURN L HDG 210 DEGS TO THE ARPT. IN THE SAME XMISSION I TOLD HIM ABOUT THE WDB AT 2 O'CLOCK, 3 MI (ACR A WAS DSNDING OUT OF 3600 FT AT THIS POINT). HE RPTED THE WDB IN SIGHT AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. ACR B WAS TOLD THE LTT HAD HIM IN SIGHT AND WAS MAINTAINING VISUAL SEPARATION AND AGAIN HE SAID HE WAS LOOKING. I THEN TURNED THE WDB TO 090 DEGS TO FOLLOW THE LTT AND TOLD HIM TO EXPECT VECTORS ACROSS FINAL FOR SPACING. ACR B WAS THEN OFFERED RWY 23L, HE DENIED IT. ACR B ALSO DIDN'T TURN TO 090 DEGS AS INSTRUCTED. ACR B THEN ASKED WHO WAS THE ACFT BELOW HIM. I TOLD HIM THAT WAS THE ACFT MAINTAINING VISUAL FROM HIM. I KNEW AT THIS POINT ACR B WASN'T PAYING ATTN (TYPICAL WITH ACR WDB CREWS). ACR B WENT ACROSS FINAL AND WAS TURNED BACK WBOUND TO FOLLOW ACR A. ACR B RPTED HIM IN SIGHT AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW AND WAS CLRED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 23R. ACR A APOLOGIZED FOR THE OVERSHOOT BEFORE GOING TO THE TWR. ACR A HAD GONE THROUGH FINAL APPROX 2 MI FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO CAUSE. I HAD 2 ACFT ON THE FREQ NOT PAYING ATTN TO WHAT THEY'RE SUPPOSED TO BE DOING. MADE A ROUTINE, SIMPLE, EVERYDAY OCCURRENCE ALMOST A BAD SIT. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT TOO MANY PLTS ARE LOOKING AT THEIR TCASII INSTEAD OF LOOKING OUT THEIR WINDOW AND MISSING WHAT IS ACTUALLY GOING ON. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 251877: I WAS INFORMING FO OF 12 O'CLOCK TFC WHEN SIMULTANEOUSLY, ATC CALLED WDB AT 3 MI, 12 O'CLOCK (I TOLD ATC WE HAD WDB IN SIGHT). TCASII TA FOLLOWED RAPIDLY BY TCASII DSND RA. FO COMPLIED WITH RA. WE PASSED APPROX 800-1000 FT BELOW WDB. BECAUSE OF ALL THIS COMMOTION IN COCKPIT AS WE APCHED FINAL COURSE, WE OVERSHOT FINAL 1-2 MI. COMPLETED VISUAL APCH. AFTER TALKING WITH ATC SUPVR, FOUND OUT CTLR WAS BEING TRAINED AND ATC WAS HAVING SHIFT CHANGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.