Narrative:

I approached the cha airport from the northwest on an IFR flight plan. Ceiling and visibility were unlimited at my altitude of 5000 ft, but I noticed patches of ground fog and haze as I looked down into the valley where chattanooga and the airport are located. The sun was low and in my eyes when I looked to the left. I accepted the visual approach to runway 20. The approach controller called out the airport at my 1 O'clock position. I saw what I thought was the airport in that general direction and told the approach controller that I had the airport in sight. He turned me over to the tower. I had the localizer frequency for the ILS 20 approach tuned in. As I set up my approach for the 'runway,' I noticed that the localizer never came in. I asked the tower how far off the localizer centerline I was about at the same time I realized my 'runway' was a big, long railroad switching yard. The tower informed me how far off I was. When I turned in the correct direction, I was set up perfectly for runway 15. The tower said that runway 15 was available, and I landed on it without incident. I have flown into cha several times, but never so early with the sun in my eyes. When I saw some patches of ground fog, I should have been especially sure that I saw the right runway before I told the controller that I had the field in sight. It was good that I had the localizer tuned in even though I was making a visual approach. That gave me the first notice of my problem. Rather than waiting another min to see if the needle moved, I should have used my LORAN, which I also had tuned to the airport, to give me a bearing to the field. I was just sure that long stretch of white was the runway, and I wasn't going to let my instruments tell me different. I was never in any danger of a landing accident. I generally don't land if there are box cars on the 'runway.' but if the airport had been busy, I would have really messed up the flow of traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RAILROAD YARD IDENTED AS ARPT AND PLT STARTS APCH TO WRONG FACILITY.

Narrative: I APCHED THE CHA ARPT FROM THE NW ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. CEILING AND VISIBILITY WERE UNLIMITED AT MY ALT OF 5000 FT, BUT I NOTICED PATCHES OF GND FOG AND HAZE AS I LOOKED DOWN INTO THE VALLEY WHERE CHATTANOOGA AND THE ARPT ARE LOCATED. THE SUN WAS LOW AND IN MY EYES WHEN I LOOKED TO THE L. I ACCEPTED THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 20. THE APCH CTLR CALLED OUT THE ARPT AT MY 1 O'CLOCK POS. I SAW WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE ARPT IN THAT GENERAL DIRECTION AND TOLD THE APCH CTLR THAT I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. HE TURNED ME OVER TO THE TWR. I HAD THE LOC FREQ FOR THE ILS 20 APCH TUNED IN. AS I SET UP MY APCH FOR THE 'RWY,' I NOTICED THAT THE LOC NEVER CAME IN. I ASKED THE TWR HOW FAR OFF THE LOC CTRLINE I WAS ABOUT AT THE SAME TIME I REALIZED MY 'RWY' WAS A BIG, LONG RAILROAD SWITCHING YARD. THE TWR INFORMED ME HOW FAR OFF I WAS. WHEN I TURNED IN THE CORRECT DIRECTION, I WAS SET UP PERFECTLY FOR RWY 15. THE TWR SAID THAT RWY 15 WAS AVAILABLE, AND I LANDED ON IT WITHOUT INCIDENT. I HAVE FLOWN INTO CHA SEVERAL TIMES, BUT NEVER SO EARLY WITH THE SUN IN MY EYES. WHEN I SAW SOME PATCHES OF GND FOG, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY SURE THAT I SAW THE RIGHT RWY BEFORE I TOLD THE CTLR THAT I HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. IT WAS GOOD THAT I HAD THE LOC TUNED IN EVEN THOUGH I WAS MAKING A VISUAL APCH. THAT GAVE ME THE FIRST NOTICE OF MY PROB. RATHER THAN WAITING ANOTHER MIN TO SEE IF THE NEEDLE MOVED, I SHOULD HAVE USED MY LORAN, WHICH I ALSO HAD TUNED TO THE ARPT, TO GIVE ME A BEARING TO THE FIELD. I WAS JUST SURE THAT LONG STRETCH OF WHITE WAS THE RWY, AND I WASN'T GOING TO LET MY INSTS TELL ME DIFFERENT. I WAS NEVER IN ANY DANGER OF A LNDG ACCIDENT. I GENERALLY DON'T LAND IF THERE ARE BOX CARS ON THE 'RWY.' BUT IF THE ARPT HAD BEEN BUSY, I WOULD HAVE REALLY MESSED UP THE FLOW OF TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.