Narrative:

I was working ground control during very inclement winter WX. We were landing runway 35R and departing runway 35L. We then had to switch to runway 35L for lndgs as well as departures so the city could plow snow off of runway 35R. We still had numerous aircraft taxiing back on taxiway zulu. At intersection zulu 1 and south there is an ILS critical area for the runway 35L ILS. We also have restrictions on runway 25 and runway 26R for taxiing aircraft since the final of runway 35L overflies this taxi route. The restriction is for the tail height of the taxiing aircraft, i.e., an large transport cannot taxi on either runway 25 or 26R when aircraft are landing runway 35L due to the ht of it's tail, while an medium large transport could. I was instructed by the cabin attendant coordinator (cc) who was also the traffic management coordinator (tmc) to taxi aircraft through the ILS critical area event though aircraft were conducting ILS approachs with the WX below the 800 ft ceiling and 2 mi visibility as required by the 7110.65H (ATC handbook). I challenged this decision, and was again ordered to do this. I taxied a couple of aircraft as instructed. Again, seeing the danger in this operation, I challenged the use of this procedure, stating that it was against the rules and very dangerous. I refused to put any more aircraft through the ILS critical area while aircraft were inside the OM. The tmc said, 'you only have to worry about this if the aircraft stop in the critical area, that they can taxi through it while aircraft are on final.' he then stated that, 'if you won't do it, I will put someone in there that will.' I evoked article 65 of the natca/FAA contract that deals with a professional difference of opinion with facility management. He immediately had me removed from position. I stated I want to fill out a NASA report and unsatisfactory condition report (ucr). There were 2 area supervisors in the tower cabin attendant at the time having a conversation at the back of the cabin attendant, and not paying attention to what was going on. Even after they heard the commotion, they did nothing to intervene. After I was relieved from position by the tmc, I was told to leave the tower. This, I assume, was to allow me time to fill out the reports. I have elected not to fill out the ucr until after I speak with upper facility management to give them the opportunity to fix the problem locally. This is not an isolated incident. Since the inception of the tmc position in den tower, there have been many questions (which go unanswered) about the role of the tmc and what responsibility they carry. There have been far too many comments from both controllers and lower level management that it is only a matter of time before we have an accident because of all the inexperienced controllers we picked up from the academy and all of the different rules being implemented by different people. It is hard to tell which rules we are operating by on any given day. It all depends on who is running the show.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR CLAIMS THAT THE TMC ORDERED TAXIING ACFT TO CROSS THE ILS CRITICAL AREA WHILE ARRIVING ACFT WERE INSIDE THE FINAL APCH COURSE.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING GND CTL DURING VERY INCLEMENT WINTER WX. WE WERE LNDG RWY 35R AND DEPARTING RWY 35L. WE THEN HAD TO SWITCH TO RWY 35L FOR LNDGS AS WELL AS DEPS SO THE CITY COULD PLOW SNOW OFF OF RWY 35R. WE STILL HAD NUMEROUS ACFT TAXIING BACK ON TXWY ZULU. AT INTXN ZULU 1 AND S THERE IS AN ILS CRITICAL AREA FOR THE RWY 35L ILS. WE ALSO HAVE RESTRICTIONS ON RWY 25 AND RWY 26R FOR TAXIING ACFT SINCE THE FINAL OF RWY 35L OVERFLIES THIS TAXI RTE. THE RESTRICTION IS FOR THE TAIL HEIGHT OF THE TAXIING ACFT, I.E., AN LGT CANNOT TAXI ON EITHER RWY 25 OR 26R WHEN ACFT ARE LNDG RWY 35L DUE TO THE HT OF IT'S TAIL, WHILE AN MLG COULD. I WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE CAB COORDINATOR (CC) WHO WAS ALSO THE TFC MGMNT COORDINATOR (TMC) TO TAXI ACFT THROUGH THE ILS CRITICAL AREA EVENT THOUGH ACFT WERE CONDUCTING ILS APCHS WITH THE WX BELOW THE 800 FT CEILING AND 2 MI VISIBILITY AS REQUIRED BY THE 7110.65H (ATC HANDBOOK). I CHALLENGED THIS DECISION, AND WAS AGAIN ORDERED TO DO THIS. I TAXIED A COUPLE OF ACFT AS INSTRUCTED. AGAIN, SEEING THE DANGER IN THIS OP, I CHALLENGED THE USE OF THIS PROC, STATING THAT IT WAS AGAINST THE RULES AND VERY DANGEROUS. I REFUSED TO PUT ANY MORE ACFT THROUGH THE ILS CRITICAL AREA WHILE ACFT WERE INSIDE THE OM. THE TMC SAID, 'YOU ONLY HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT THIS IF THE ACFT STOP IN THE CRITICAL AREA, THAT THEY CAN TAXI THROUGH IT WHILE ACFT ARE ON FINAL.' HE THEN STATED THAT, 'IF YOU WON'T DO IT, I WILL PUT SOMEONE IN THERE THAT WILL.' I EVOKED ARTICLE 65 OF THE NATCA/FAA CONTRACT THAT DEALS WITH A PROFESSIONAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH FACILITY MGMNT. HE IMMEDIATELY HAD ME REMOVED FROM POS. I STATED I WANT TO FILL OUT A NASA RPT AND UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION RPT (UCR). THERE WERE 2 AREA SUPVRS IN THE TWR CAB AT THE TIME HAVING A CONVERSATION AT THE BACK OF THE CAB, AND NOT PAYING ATTN TO WHAT WAS GOING ON. EVEN AFTER THEY HEARD THE COMMOTION, THEY DID NOTHING TO INTERVENE. AFTER I WAS RELIEVED FROM POS BY THE TMC, I WAS TOLD TO LEAVE THE TWR. THIS, I ASSUME, WAS TO ALLOW ME TIME TO FILL OUT THE RPTS. I HAVE ELECTED NOT TO FILL OUT THE UCR UNTIL AFTER I SPEAK WITH UPPER FACILITY MGMNT TO GIVE THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO FIX THE PROB LOCALLY. THIS IS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT. SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE TMC POS IN DEN TWR, THERE HAVE BEEN MANY QUESTIONS (WHICH GO UNANSWERED) ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE TMC AND WHAT RESPONSIBILITY THEY CARRY. THERE HAVE BEEN FAR TOO MANY COMMENTS FROM BOTH CTLRS AND LOWER LEVEL MGMNT THAT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE WE HAVE AN ACCIDENT BECAUSE OF ALL THE INEXPERIENCED CTLRS WE PICKED UP FROM THE ACADEMY AND ALL OF THE DIFFERENT RULES BEING IMPLEMENTED BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE. IT IS HARD TO TELL WHICH RULES WE ARE OPERATING BY ON ANY GIVEN DAY. IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHO IS RUNNING THE SHOW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.