Narrative:

In level flight direct mkg, first officer flying, TCASII issued an RA. I turned on exterior lights as I asked first officer to follow RA commands, as I did not initially see traffic. I reported to ATC that I was vacating my altitude for an RA from TCASII. He gave me current position and altitude of other aircraft which I had in sight by that time. We probably did not climb more than 450 ft. I actually do not feel a conflict ever existed. I do feel the other aircraft was climbing at a high rate of climb and that is what triggered my RA. I have contacted our company safety department to try and get the training department to stress shallow rates of climb and descent in our last 1000 ft prior to an assigned altitude. This has always been in aim but many ex military pilots have never even read aim and the rest of us haven't seen it in yrs because it is not available to us. I would like to see our training department spend more time teaching descent planning, especially eastbound. With this they could also re-teach climb and descent rates. Currently the FAA feels that teaching nothing but cockpit resource management will solve all the problems. I really hope that soon someone realizes that you have to review instrument procedures, communications, non radar procedures and many others. Since cockpit resource management, my job has become tougher because we have given up teaching other very important material to make room for the over-kill amount of cockpit resource management. Cockpit resource management isn't that tough to understand and use but it is no good without both pilots having good, current procedures review.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG CLBS 450 FT ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT BECAUSE OF A TCASII RA.

Narrative: IN LEVEL FLT DIRECT MKG, FO FLYING, TCASII ISSUED AN RA. I TURNED ON EXTERIOR LIGHTS AS I ASKED FO TO FOLLOW RA COMMANDS, AS I DID NOT INITIALLY SEE TFC. I RPTED TO ATC THAT I WAS VACATING MY ALT FOR AN RA FROM TCASII. HE GAVE ME CURRENT POS AND ALT OF OTHER ACFT WHICH I HAD IN SIGHT BY THAT TIME. WE PROBABLY DID NOT CLB MORE THAN 450 FT. I ACTUALLY DO NOT FEEL A CONFLICT EVER EXISTED. I DO FEEL THE OTHER ACFT WAS CLBING AT A HIGH RATE OF CLB AND THAT IS WHAT TRIGGERED MY RA. I HAVE CONTACTED OUR COMPANY SAFETY DEPT TO TRY AND GET THE TRAINING DEPT TO STRESS SHALLOW RATES OF CLB AND DSCNT IN OUR LAST 1000 FT PRIOR TO AN ASSIGNED ALT. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN IN AIM BUT MANY EX MIL PLTS HAVE NEVER EVEN READ AIM AND THE REST OF US HAVEN'T SEEN IT IN YRS BECAUSE IT IS NOT AVAILABLE TO US. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE OUR TRAINING DEPT SPEND MORE TIME TEACHING DSCNT PLANNING, ESPECIALLY EBOUND. WITH THIS THEY COULD ALSO RE-TEACH CLB AND DSCNT RATES. CURRENTLY THE FAA FEELS THAT TEACHING NOTHING BUT COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT WILL SOLVE ALL THE PROBS. I REALLY HOPE THAT SOON SOMEONE REALIZES THAT YOU HAVE TO REVIEW INST PROCS, COMS, NON RADAR PROCS AND MANY OTHERS. SINCE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT, MY JOB HAS BECOME TOUGHER BECAUSE WE HAVE GIVEN UP TEACHING OTHER VERY IMPORTANT MATERIAL TO MAKE ROOM FOR THE OVER-KILL AMOUNT OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT. COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT ISN'T THAT TOUGH TO UNDERSTAND AND USE BUT IT IS NO GOOD WITHOUT BOTH PLTS HAVING GOOD, CURRENT PROCS REVIEW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.