Narrative:

On 12/xx/93, our airlines instituted new checklists for all aircraft which consist of widebody transport's, large transport's, and medium large transport's. The old '3-holer' large transport will be at a later date.) the reasons for this drastic re-writing of the checklists are: (1) to expedite taxi from the gate area by eliminating after start checklist (which is accomplished while stopped) and placing those items on a before takeoff checklist (which is accomplished while moving). (2) to 'standardize' all fleets in order to justify future training program reductions. The result has been a disruption of proven flow patterns and elimination of critical checklist items. This medium large transport crew pushed back from gate at lax, and elected to do as many items on the before takeoff checklist as possible prior to taxi. The ramp controller told us to 'expedite our taxi' because he wanted to push another aircraft back from an adjacent gate. We took our time and did all the items that we could (the rudder check while moving) down to our final manifest numbers. The final weights, trim setting and passenger count were received late from load planning. Tower then cleared us for takeoff, but because of our unfamiliarity with the new checklist and the increased number of additional items after the manifest check, we elected to delay our takeoff. We received takeoff clearance 5 mins later (possibly as 'punishment' for not being ready for takeoff before.) we performed final items on the before takeoff checklist as a 'challenge and response', even though it is to be done by the first officer without the captain verification. We forgot to turn off the APU after takeoff because it is no longer on the checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PUB DEFICIENCY RPTED BY ACR FO IN CHKLIST DESIGN AND SUBSEQUENT CHKLIST USE.

Narrative: ON 12/XX/93, OUR AIRLINES INSTITUTED NEW CHKLISTS FOR ALL ACFT WHICH CONSIST OF WDB'S, LGT'S, AND MLG'S. THE OLD '3-HOLER' LGT WILL BE AT A LATER DATE.) THE REASONS FOR THIS DRASTIC RE-WRITING OF THE CHKLISTS ARE: (1) TO EXPEDITE TAXI FROM THE GATE AREA BY ELIMINATING AFTER START CHKLIST (WHICH IS ACCOMPLISHED WHILE STOPPED) AND PLACING THOSE ITEMS ON A BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST (WHICH IS ACCOMPLISHED WHILE MOVING). (2) TO 'STANDARDIZE' ALL FLEETS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY FUTURE TRAINING PROGRAM REDUCTIONS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN A DISRUPTION OF PROVEN FLOW PATTERNS AND ELIMINATION OF CRITICAL CHKLIST ITEMS. THIS MLG CREW PUSHED BACK FROM GATE AT LAX, AND ELECTED TO DO AS MANY ITEMS ON THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO TAXI. THE RAMP CTLR TOLD US TO 'EXPEDITE OUR TAXI' BECAUSE HE WANTED TO PUSH ANOTHER ACFT BACK FROM AN ADJACENT GATE. WE TOOK OUR TIME AND DID ALL THE ITEMS THAT WE COULD (THE RUDDER CHK WHILE MOVING) DOWN TO OUR FINAL MANIFEST NUMBERS. THE FINAL WTS, TRIM SETTING AND PAX COUNT WERE RECEIVED LATE FROM LOAD PLANNING. TWR THEN CLRED US FOR TKOF, BUT BECAUSE OF OUR UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE NEW CHKLIST AND THE INCREASED NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL ITEMS AFTER THE MANIFEST CHK, WE ELECTED TO DELAY OUR TKOF. WE RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC 5 MINS LATER (POSSIBLY AS 'PUNISHMENT' FOR NOT BEING READY FOR TKOF BEFORE.) WE PERFORMED FINAL ITEMS ON THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AS A 'CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE', EVEN THOUGH IT IS TO BE DONE BY THE FO WITHOUT THE CAPT VERIFICATION. WE FORGOT TO TURN OFF THE APU AFTER TKOF BECAUSE IT IS NO LONGER ON THE CHKLIST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.