Narrative:

We were cleared from 10M to 80M and to report chico in sight for the visual. Then we saw what we thought was chico and reported it in sight, and was cleared for the visual. After completing the descent checks we tried to bring the runway lights up brighter. But they would not respond. Our first and most important mistake was once we had the airport in sight we thought there was something wrong with the runway light controller and fixed on that problem, instead of confirming the right airport. As we made downwind for runway 13 and turned final with the ILS up but we were getting flags thinking it was tied to the light problem. Thought maybe the airport had a power failure is why the lights wouldn't come up any brighter. I was about to go around when I saw the number 13 on the runway (same as chico) and that's when we landed. Factors: I usually fly mornings and hadn't flown late nights in almost a yr, my body clock is set to mornings. Also I have been fighting the flu the last 2 weeks and had called in sick the first part of that week. The main problem was we fixed on the light problem and spent too much time with it and all of a sudden were at the airport and having to make decisions faster than I would have normally. Next time at night VFR I won't call the airport so quickly, and if having problems with lights or anything else ask center if anyone else was having same problem with that airport. I learned a great lesson on being sucked in on one problem and not being able to get past it to verify it some other way. Supplemental information from acn 260901: we were cleared at pilot's discretion to descend to 4000 ft. I started the approach and descent checklists. During that time I was not in communication with the center frequency. That responsibility was routinely switched to the other pilot while performing these checklists. While performing the checklist items I noticed the captain change the transponder code to 1200. I then made a call to our company station to get the WX and request fuel. After completing the passenger brief in preparation for landing I returned to my normal duties of monitoring the #1 comradio. I noticed that the ILS frequency (which had been standing by) was now in the active position and the VOR was now standing by. The tower frequency was in active and center was standing by. By these observations it was my understanding that captain had canceled IFR and switched both communication and navigation frequencys and we were now on a visual approach. He said we were cleared for the visual and he asked if I saw the airport on the right side of the airplane. (At this point, after being taken out of the loop, I felt that I was relying on captain judgement and experience over this route.) as we turned base, I had the runway lights in sight and that he would probably see them more clearly on final. While on base I commented that I had flags on my navigation and no identify. The captain called for speeds high and I completed the before landing checklist and my normal altitude calls. Within a few seconds the captain said he had the numbers 13 and that this was chico. We proceeded to land. We taxied down the length of the runway checking the condition and length. We discussed performance and he said he would call the company dispatch for that information and approval to depart from colusa to chico. When captain returned he briefed the passenger and sat down in the cockpit. I briefed him on the performance figures that I had estimated. I asked him what dispatch had said and he replied 'that they had talked to the chief pilot' and after reviewing the charts, we were cleared to go. I asked if he wanted me to do a weight and balance and he replied it wasn't necessary. He put the manuals away and called for the before start checklist. Normal procedures were followed to controller in charge. Hindsight being 20/20 there are many things that could have been done differently but under the circumstances I felt as though I had asked all the right questions to elicit the correct response from my captain. His actions did not lead me to believe that we were not at the correct airport and I felt that Y reliance on his judgement was justified. Supplemental information from acn 261535: my employment position is chief pilot for xyz airlines. I wasawakened at PM00 hours on jan/xx/94 by a co-scheduler explaining that a company aircraft had landed at colusa, ca, airport rather than the scheduled destination of chico, ca. I had explained to the scheduler that if the aircraft had the capabilities to depart from colusa airport to do so. I was inattentive due to just waking up from a deep sleep. I recognize the fact that the aircraft possibly should not have been released without a detailed review of performance numbers and further airport environment information. After receiving the afm 1-94 I was determined the acceleration/stop distance was not available but the acceleration/go was adequate. We (the company) have since established a procedure to eliminate the flcs of the responsibility to do their own airport analysis. It is now covered by a computer company with 24 hour service that will eliminate any errors in computations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WRONG ARPT LNDG IN A NIGHT OP. UNAUTH DEP PROC WITHOUT SUBSTANTIATING TKOF DATA. UNAUTH LNDG TKOF, NON TWR ARPT.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FROM 10M TO 80M AND TO RPT CHICO IN SIGHT FOR THE VISUAL. THEN WE SAW WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS CHICO AND RPTED IT IN SIGHT, AND WAS CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. AFTER COMPLETING THE DSCNT CHKS WE TRIED TO BRING THE RWY LIGHTS UP BRIGHTER. BUT THEY WOULD NOT RESPOND. OUR FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT MISTAKE WAS ONCE WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT WE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE RWY LIGHT CTLR AND FIXED ON THAT PROB, INSTEAD OF CONFIRMING THE RIGHT ARPT. AS WE MADE DOWNWIND FOR RWY 13 AND TURNED FINAL WITH THE ILS UP BUT WE WERE GETTING FLAGS THINKING IT WAS TIED TO THE LIGHT PROB. THOUGHT MAYBE THE ARPT HAD A PWR FAILURE IS WHY THE LIGHTS WOULDN'T COME UP ANY BRIGHTER. I WAS ABOUT TO GAR WHEN I SAW THE NUMBER 13 ON THE RWY (SAME AS CHICO) AND THAT'S WHEN WE LANDED. FACTORS: I USUALLY FLY MORNINGS AND HADN'T FLOWN LATE NIGHTS IN ALMOST A YR, MY BODY CLOCK IS SET TO MORNINGS. ALSO I HAVE BEEN FIGHTING THE FLU THE LAST 2 WKS AND HAD CALLED IN SICK THE FIRST PART OF THAT WK. THE MAIN PROB WAS WE FIXED ON THE LIGHT PROB AND SPENT TOO MUCH TIME WITH IT AND ALL OF A SUDDEN WERE AT THE ARPT AND HAVING TO MAKE DECISIONS FASTER THAN I WOULD HAVE NORMALLY. NEXT TIME AT NIGHT VFR I WON'T CALL THE ARPT SO QUICKLY, AND IF HAVING PROBS WITH LIGHTS OR ANYTHING ELSE ASK CTR IF ANYONE ELSE WAS HAVING SAME PROB WITH THAT ARPT. I LEARNED A GREAT LESSON ON BEING SUCKED IN ON ONE PROB AND NOT BEING ABLE TO GET PAST IT TO VERIFY IT SOME OTHER WAY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 260901: WE WERE CLRED AT PLT'S DISCRETION TO DSND TO 4000 FT. I STARTED THE APCH AND DSCNT CHKLISTS. DURING THAT TIME I WAS NOT IN COM WITH THE CTR FREQ. THAT RESPONSIBILITY WAS ROUTINELY SWITCHED TO THE OTHER PLT WHILE PERFORMING THESE CHKLISTS. WHILE PERFORMING THE CHKLIST ITEMS I NOTICED THE CAPT CHANGE THE XPONDER CODE TO 1200. I THEN MADE A CALL TO OUR COMPANY STATION TO GET THE WX AND REQUEST FUEL. AFTER COMPLETING THE PAX BRIEF IN PREPARATION FOR LNDG I RETURNED TO MY NORMAL DUTIES OF MONITORING THE #1 COMRADIO. I NOTICED THAT THE ILS FREQ (WHICH HAD BEEN STANDING BY) WAS NOW IN THE ACTIVE POS AND THE VOR WAS NOW STANDING BY. THE TWR FREQ WAS IN ACTIVE AND CTR WAS STANDING BY. BY THESE OBSERVATIONS IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT CAPT HAD CANCELED IFR AND SWITCHED BOTH COM AND NAV FREQS AND WE WERE NOW ON A VISUAL APCH. HE SAID WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL AND HE ASKED IF I SAW THE ARPT ON THE R SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE. (AT THIS POINT, AFTER BEING TAKEN OUT OF THE LOOP, I FELT THAT I WAS RELYING ON CAPT JUDGEMENT AND EXPERIENCE OVER THIS RTE.) AS WE TURNED BASE, I HAD THE RWY LIGHTS IN SIGHT AND THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY SEE THEM MORE CLRLY ON FINAL. WHILE ON BASE I COMMENTED THAT I HAD FLAGS ON MY NAV AND NO IDENT. THE CAPT CALLED FOR SPDS HIGH AND I COMPLETED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST AND MY NORMAL ALT CALLS. WITHIN A FEW SECONDS THE CAPT SAID HE HAD THE NUMBERS 13 AND THAT THIS WAS CHICO. WE PROCEEDED TO LAND. WE TAXIED DOWN THE LENGTH OF THE RWY CHKING THE CONDITION AND LENGTH. WE DISCUSSED PERFORMANCE AND HE SAID HE WOULD CALL THE COMPANY DISPATCH FOR THAT INFO AND APPROVAL TO DEPART FROM COLUSA TO CHICO. WHEN CAPT RETURNED HE BRIEFED THE PAX AND SAT DOWN IN THE COCKPIT. I BRIEFED HIM ON THE PERFORMANCE FIGURES THAT I HAD ESTIMATED. I ASKED HIM WHAT DISPATCH HAD SAID AND HE REPLIED 'THAT THEY HAD TALKED TO THE CHIEF PLT' AND AFTER REVIEWING THE CHARTS, WE WERE CLRED TO GO. I ASKED IF HE WANTED ME TO DO A WT AND BAL AND HE REPLIED IT WASN'T NECESSARY. HE PUT THE MANUALS AWAY AND CALLED FOR THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. NORMAL PROCS WERE FOLLOWED TO CIC. HINDSIGHT BEING 20/20 THERE ARE MANY THINGS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY BUT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I FELT AS THOUGH I HAD ASKED ALL THE RIGHT QUESTIONS TO ELICIT THE CORRECT RESPONSE FROM MY CAPT. HIS ACTIONS DID NOT LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT WE WERE NOT AT THE CORRECT ARPT AND I FELT THAT Y RELIANCE ON HIS JUDGEMENT WAS JUSTIFIED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 261535: MY EMPLOYMENT POS IS CHIEF PLT FOR XYZ AIRLINES. I WASAWAKENED AT PM00 HRS ON JAN/XX/94 BY A CO-SCHEDULER EXPLAINING THAT A COMPANY ACFT HAD LANDED AT COLUSA, CA, ARPT RATHER THAN THE SCHEDULED DEST OF CHICO, CA. I HAD EXPLAINED TO THE SCHEDULER THAT IF THE ACFT HAD THE CAPABILITIES TO DEPART FROM COLUSA ARPT TO DO SO. I WAS INATTENTIVE DUE TO JUST WAKING UP FROM A DEEP SLEEP. I RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ACFT POSSIBLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RELEASED WITHOUT A DETAILED REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE NUMBERS AND FURTHER ARPT ENVIRONMENT INFO. AFTER RECEIVING THE AFM 1-94 I WAS DETERMINED THE ACCELERATION/STOP DISTANCE WAS NOT AVAILABLE BUT THE ACCELERATION/GO WAS ADEQUATE. WE (THE COMPANY) HAVE SINCE ESTABLISHED A PROC TO ELIMINATE THE FLCS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DO THEIR OWN ARPT ANALYSIS. IT IS NOW COVERED BY A COMPUTER COMPANY WITH 24 HR SVC THAT WILL ELIMINATE ANY ERRORS IN COMPUTATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.