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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 261459 |
Time | |
Date | 199401 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sea |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : fat |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 4500 |
ASRS Report | 261459 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical conflict : nmac non adherence : clearance other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew faa : investigated |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 150 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
Upon clearance to taxi to runway 16L at sea, we requested intersection 'left' which is approximately halfway down the runway. We were flight air carrier X abag. After holding short of runway 16L at 'left' we both heard 'air carrier X bag cleared for takeoff, turn right heading 130 degrees after 1000 ft, maintain 3000 ft.' I'm not sure, but I believe I also heard in that clearance something pertaining to intersection 'left.' the first officer read back the clearance as we heard it and we departed. At 700 ft the tower asked if we, air carrier X bag, were airborne, and we responded yes. The tower then said fly runway heading, maintain 3000 ft. At this time tower informed us we had taken off without a clearance. It wasn't until after we had reached 3000 ft that we heard anything of air carrier Y ccg over the radio. Shortly after reaching 3000 ft we received another heading and altitude from ATC and continued without further incident. I knew nothing about the proximity of air carrier Y ccg with us until the next day when I called sea TRACON. Tower's contention is that we heard air carrier Y ccg clearance and took off after reading back the clearance with 'air carrier X bag' audible and the rest garbled. Air carrier Y ccg was at the beginning of runway 16L and we were at the 'left' intersection, just about halfway down the runway. From what I know from our point of view as the crew, and from what I have been told by sea TRACON, this incident was clearly caused by miscom over the radio -- perhaps by both us, the crew, and sea tower. A possible deterrent to this situation could be to restrict intersection takeoffs below a certain visibility higher than 1/2 mi with RVR at 1200. Supplemental information from acn 261597: near the end of landing roll, runway 16R, we advised the tower we wished to use taxiway 'north' to exit runway 16R. We were cleared to do so and to cross runway 16L. While on 'north' with the aircraft nose approximately 150 ft from the west edge of runway 16L, an aircraft was observed in its takeoff roll as it passed in front of our aircraft. Subsequent discussion with the tower supervisor (telephone) revealed that a takeoff clearance for an aircraft departing runway 16L was acknowledged by 2 separate trips and that their simultaneous response blanked each other out. One began its roll from the end of runway 16L, the other from an intersection of runway 16L. The tower's efforts to correct the situation were not successful and both aircraft did takeoff on runway 16L at nearly the same time. I am of the opinion that the tower operator issued a proper clearance to one of the 2 and that ground separation between he and I was adequate. I am also of the opinion that the policy of allowing intersectional as well as full length takeoffs from the same runway during periods of reduced visibility (CAT ii in this case) should be reviewed. This practice is questionable, in that combined with radio confusion, exposes everyone involved to a dangerous situation. In VFR conditions chances are improved because of the 'eyeball factor.'
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: COMMUTER ACR AT INTXN OF TXWY L AND RWY 16 TOOK TKOF CLRNC FOR COMPANY ACFT AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY. BOTH ACFT TOOK OFF AND ERRANT ACFT HAD GND NMAC WITH A WDB AT TXWY N AND RWY 16L.
Narrative: UPON CLRNC TO TAXI TO RWY 16L AT SEA, WE REQUESTED INTXN 'L' WHICH IS APPROX HALFWAY DOWN THE RWY. WE WERE FLT ACR X ABAG. AFTER HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 16L AT 'L' WE BOTH HEARD 'ACR X BAG CLRED FOR TKOF, TURN R HDG 130 DEGS AFTER 1000 FT, MAINTAIN 3000 FT.' I'M NOT SURE, BUT I BELIEVE I ALSO HEARD IN THAT CLRNC SOMETHING PERTAINING TO INTXN 'L.' THE FO READ BACK THE CLRNC AS WE HEARD IT AND WE DEPARTED. AT 700 FT THE TWR ASKED IF WE, ACR X BAG, WERE AIRBORNE, AND WE RESPONDED YES. THE TWR THEN SAID FLY RWY HDG, MAINTAIN 3000 FT. AT THIS TIME TWR INFORMED US WE HAD TAKEN OFF WITHOUT A CLRNC. IT WASN'T UNTIL AFTER WE HAD REACHED 3000 FT THAT WE HEARD ANYTHING OF ACR Y CCG OVER THE RADIO. SHORTLY AFTER REACHING 3000 FT WE RECEIVED ANOTHER HDG AND ALT FROM ATC AND CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE PROX OF ACR Y CCG WITH US UNTIL THE NEXT DAY WHEN I CALLED SEA TRACON. TWR'S CONTENTION IS THAT WE HEARD ACR Y CCG CLRNC AND TOOK OFF AFTER READING BACK THE CLRNC WITH 'ACR X BAG' AUDIBLE AND THE REST GARBLED. ACR Y CCG WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF RWY 16L AND WE WERE AT THE 'L' INTXN, JUST ABOUT HALFWAY DOWN THE RWY. FROM WHAT I KNOW FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AS THE CREW, AND FROM WHAT I HAVE BEEN TOLD BY SEA TRACON, THIS INCIDENT WAS CLRLY CAUSED BY MISCOM OVER THE RADIO -- PERHAPS BY BOTH US, THE CREW, AND SEA TWR. A POSSIBLE DETERRENT TO THIS SIT COULD BE TO RESTRICT INTXN TKOFS BELOW A CERTAIN VISIBILITY HIGHER THAN 1/2 MI WITH RVR AT 1200. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 261597: NEAR THE END OF LNDG ROLL, RWY 16R, WE ADVISED THE TWR WE WISHED TO USE TXWY 'N' TO EXIT RWY 16R. WE WERE CLRED TO DO SO AND TO CROSS RWY 16L. WHILE ON 'N' WITH THE ACFT NOSE APPROX 150 FT FROM THE W EDGE OF RWY 16L, AN ACFT WAS OBSERVED IN ITS TKOF ROLL AS IT PASSED IN FRONT OF OUR ACFT. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE TWR SUPVR (TELEPHONE) REVEALED THAT A TKOF CLRNC FOR AN ACFT DEPARTING RWY 16L WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY 2 SEPARATE TRIPS AND THAT THEIR SIMULTANEOUS RESPONSE BLANKED EACH OTHER OUT. ONE BEGAN ITS ROLL FROM THE END OF RWY 16L, THE OTHER FROM AN INTXN OF RWY 16L. THE TWR'S EFFORTS TO CORRECT THE SIT WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL AND BOTH ACFT DID TKOF ON RWY 16L AT NEARLY THE SAME TIME. I AM OF THE OPINION THAT THE TWR OPERATOR ISSUED A PROPER CLRNC TO ONE OF THE 2 AND THAT GND SEPARATION BTWN HE AND I WAS ADEQUATE. I AM ALSO OF THE OPINION THAT THE POLICY OF ALLOWING INTERSECTIONAL AS WELL AS FULL LENGTH TKOFS FROM THE SAME RWY DURING PERIODS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY (CAT II IN THIS CASE) SHOULD BE REVIEWED. THIS PRACTICE IS QUESTIONABLE, IN THAT COMBINED WITH RADIO CONFUSION, EXPOSES EVERYONE INVOLVED TO A DANGEROUS SIT. IN VFR CONDITIONS CHANCES ARE IMPROVED BECAUSE OF THE 'EYEBALL FACTOR.'
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.