Narrative:

On a flight from sfo to nrt we received a full route clearance from clearance from clearance delivery. This route differed from the pacots route we thought was filed by our dispatch. The route sfo clearance delivery issued did not reach anchorage center who expected us to be on the pacots route. Luckily, anc center had us in radar contact near spy and determined we were not on the route he assumed. The potential for a traffic conflict existed if anc center had not discovered the discrepancy. Satellite communications would greatly enhance safety over the ocean in non radar environments. Direct communication with ATC controlling authority/authorized would eliminate many ambiguities on routing, clearance, speeds, and altitudes which are the basics of aircraft separation and enhanced safety. When flight planning at sfo crew discovered difference in ICAO plan and pacots plan track echo in which we were filed. #2 track echo, showed nopac route: spy shuey R341 oford R580 oneil. Our flight plan #1 showed spy G469 pippa G469 oneil. Dispatcher was contacted and he sent flight plan #2 to sfo operations which was in accordance with pacots track echo. We threw flight plan #1 in the trash and worked with plan #2. When in the aircraft, clearance delivery gave us a full route read out of a clearance that was #1 spy G469 pippa G469 oneil R580 oatis etc. A clearance void time of XX13Z called for an expedited departure. After departure we called dispatch to advise of change. We jointly decided to leave our route as per the one given us by clearance delivery. Dispatch advised that he would confirm the route with ATC. (#1, the ICAO plan) en route, after spy anchorage center advised us that we were 40 mi south of course. Anchorage showed our route to be spy shuey R341 oford R580 oneil (#2). He then approved our routing spy G469 pippa G469 oneil but it could have been a separation problem if he had not seen us on radar. The anchorage controller researched the problem and showed ATC received a company teletype routing spy G469 oneil at XX34Z. ATC then received a teletype from company at XX13Z which showed flight plan remarks 'will refile by correct pacot echo routing over shuey.' the ATC computer response was 'flight plan rejected due to common call sign.' the controller commented that the original flight plan should have been canceled and refiled, or amended, but not both. We assumed oceanic control preferred the route we were given since we got a full route read out. This assumption was reenforced after takeoff when our dispatcher advised us that he would confirm the routing with ATC. Callback conversation with acn 261922 reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated that the crew had turned in this incident to the chief pilot and their director of flight safety for review. As of this date, the air carrier has not heard back from ATC and the reporter feels that ATC is 'ducking' the issue. It was also felt that the air carrier dispatch office was, to some level, guilty of a certain amount of improper coordination or procedures in the flight plan filing. Not canceling the first flight plan. The air carrier is instituting some safeguards in their procedures to prevent any repeat incidents of this nature.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT PLAN HANDLING PROC SETS UP ACR WDB FLT FOR A HDG TRACK POS DEV IN AN OVERWATER OP.

Narrative: ON A FLT FROM SFO TO NRT WE RECEIVED A FULL RTE CLRNC FROM CLRNC FROM CLRNC DELIVERY. THIS RTE DIFFERED FROM THE PACOTS RTE WE THOUGHT WAS FILED BY OUR DISPATCH. THE RTE SFO CLRNC DELIVERY ISSUED DID NOT REACH ANCHORAGE CTR WHO EXPECTED US TO BE ON THE PACOTS RTE. LUCKILY, ANC CTR HAD US IN RADAR CONTACT NEAR SPY AND DETERMINED WE WERE NOT ON THE RTE HE ASSUMED. THE POTENTIAL FOR A TFC CONFLICT EXISTED IF ANC CTR HAD NOT DISCOVERED THE DISCREPANCY. SATELLITE COMS WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE SAFETY OVER THE OCEAN IN NON RADAR ENVIRONMENTS. DIRECT COM WITH ATC CONTROLLING AUTH WOULD ELIMINATE MANY AMBIGUITIES ON ROUTING, CLRNC, SPDS, AND ALTS WHICH ARE THE BASICS OF ACFT SEPARATION AND ENHANCED SAFETY. WHEN FLT PLANNING AT SFO CREW DISCOVERED DIFFERENCE IN ICAO PLAN AND PACOTS PLAN TRACK ECHO IN WHICH WE WERE FILED. #2 TRACK ECHO, SHOWED NOPAC RTE: SPY SHUEY R341 OFORD R580 ONEIL. OUR FLT PLAN #1 SHOWED SPY G469 PIPPA G469 ONEIL. DISPATCHER WAS CONTACTED AND HE SENT FLT PLAN #2 TO SFO OPS WHICH WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PACOTS TRACK ECHO. WE THREW FLT PLAN #1 IN THE TRASH AND WORKED WITH PLAN #2. WHEN IN THE ACFT, CLRNC DELIVERY GAVE US A FULL RTE READ OUT OF A CLRNC THAT WAS #1 SPY G469 PIPPA G469 ONEIL R580 OATIS ETC. A CLRNC VOID TIME OF XX13Z CALLED FOR AN EXPEDITED DEP. AFTER DEP WE CALLED DISPATCH TO ADVISE OF CHANGE. WE JOINTLY DECIDED TO LEAVE OUR RTE AS PER THE ONE GIVEN US BY CLRNC DELIVERY. DISPATCH ADVISED THAT HE WOULD CONFIRM THE RTE WITH ATC. (#1, THE ICAO PLAN) ENRTE, AFTER SPY ANCHORAGE CTR ADVISED US THAT WE WERE 40 MI S OF COURSE. ANCHORAGE SHOWED OUR RTE TO BE SPY SHUEY R341 OFORD R580 ONEIL (#2). HE THEN APPROVED OUR ROUTING SPY G469 PIPPA G469 ONEIL BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN A SEPARATION PROB IF HE HAD NOT SEEN US ON RADAR. THE ANCHORAGE CTLR RESEARCHED THE PROB AND SHOWED ATC RECEIVED A COMPANY TELETYPE ROUTING SPY G469 ONEIL AT XX34Z. ATC THEN RECEIVED A TELETYPE FROM COMPANY AT XX13Z WHICH SHOWED FLT PLAN REMARKS 'WILL REFILE BY CORRECT PACOT ECHO ROUTING OVER SHUEY.' THE ATC COMPUTER RESPONSE WAS 'FLT PLAN REJECTED DUE TO COMMON CALL SIGN.' THE CTLR COMMENTED THAT THE ORIGINAL FLT PLAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN CANCELED AND REFILED, OR AMENDED, BUT NOT BOTH. WE ASSUMED OCEANIC CTL PREFERRED THE RTE WE WERE GIVEN SINCE WE GOT A FULL RTE READ OUT. THIS ASSUMPTION WAS REENFORCED AFTER TKOF WHEN OUR DISPATCHER ADVISED US THAT HE WOULD CONFIRM THE ROUTING WITH ATC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH ACN 261922 RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT THE CREW HAD TURNED IN THIS INCIDENT TO THE CHIEF PLT AND THEIR DIRECTOR OF FLT SAFETY FOR REVIEW. AS OF THIS DATE, THE ACR HAS NOT HEARD BACK FROM ATC AND THE RPTR FEELS THAT ATC IS 'DUCKING' THE ISSUE. IT WAS ALSO FELT THAT THE ACR DISPATCH OFFICE WAS, TO SOME LEVEL, GUILTY OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF IMPROPER COORD OR PROCS IN THE FLT PLAN FILING. NOT CANCELING THE FIRST FLT PLAN. THE ACR IS INSTITUTING SOME SAFEGUARDS IN THEIR PROCS TO PREVENT ANY REPEAT INCIDENTS OF THIS NATURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.