Narrative:

Following deicing at the gate, ground control was informed that due to heavy aircraft weight, we could not use the departure runway, thus another runway was requested. Taxi clearance was given to runway 4R. All txwys and runway were covered with snow and ice. In my opinion, the captain was 'not in the loop' mentally from the surfaces. 1/2 way to the runway he said he wasn't sure what route ground control wanted us to take. I requested a repeat of the taxi clearance clearing us to hold short of runway 4R at the ILS hold line on bravo. We were unable to find the ILS hold line as it was covered with ice and snow. Advised to hold short but expect to depart shortly and 'be ready to expedite.' the taxiway we were on was slippery and unlighted. Overall lighting and surface braking was poor. Shortly we received 'position and hold on runway 4R.' I acknowledged the clearance and pointed out the runway threshold to the captain as I was still somewhat concerned about his awareness. I set about configuring the aircraft for takeoff and doing the checklists. When I looked up I saw the captain had not turned down the runway but was headed straight ahead toward an unpaved area. I yelled for him to turn left, he responded with a sharp pull on the nose steering and differential braking. We hit solid ice and the 302000 pound aircraft began skidding sideways. At this point, tower cleared us for takeoff and said 'expedite, aircraft inside the marker for your runway.' I replied we were having difficulty lining up due to ice and poor braking. The tower directed the inbound aircraft to go around thus relieving my concerns about a collision. In the meantime, the captain began trying to move the aircraft with power, nosewheel steering and brakes. I again advised him he was very close to the edge of the taxiway. He turned anyway and we slipped across solid white ice and were able to make a 270 degree turn to line up for takeoff. Fortunately we did not get stuck and were able to warn the tower and inbound aircraft of our problems. I have no idea why he missed lining up the aircraft. He had us pointed at the boondocks when I yelled to turn. There were no lights or run-up areas where he had us pointed. Secondly, 'expedite' ATC clrncs have no place in low visibility, slippery, wet, ice environments. I also question the issuing of taxi clrncs on poorly treated, seldom used sections of the airport. The entire airport was a mess. The captain claimed he never heard me tell him he was approaching the runway, and he said he mistook the right side of the runway for the left side edge. That to me was a real stretch of the imagination. I was nearly overloaded by my own duties, tasks, clrncs WX and concern with the captain's apparent unfocused and confused state. I now take nothing for granted -- not even the most obvious. The 2 man crew works ok most of the time, but can very easily be overwhelmed and cockpit teamwork vanish if one part of the team isn't there.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POSSIBLE RWY EXCURSION AFTER LOSS OF ACFT CTL IN TAXIING TFC EVENT. FO RPTR HINTS AT PIC'S FLC PROFICIENCY IN DOUBT.

Narrative: FOLLOWING DEICING AT THE GATE, GND CTL WAS INFORMED THAT DUE TO HVY ACFT WT, WE COULD NOT USE THE DEP RWY, THUS ANOTHER RWY WAS REQUESTED. TAXI CLRNC WAS GIVEN TO RWY 4R. ALL TXWYS AND RWY WERE COVERED WITH SNOW AND ICE. IN MY OPINION, THE CAPT WAS 'NOT IN THE LOOP' MENTALLY FROM THE SURFACES. 1/2 WAY TO THE RWY HE SAID HE WASN'T SURE WHAT RTE GND CTL WANTED US TO TAKE. I REQUESTED A REPEAT OF THE TAXI CLRNC CLRING US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4R AT THE ILS HOLD LINE ON BRAVO. WE WERE UNABLE TO FIND THE ILS HOLD LINE AS IT WAS COVERED WITH ICE AND SNOW. ADVISED TO HOLD SHORT BUT EXPECT TO DEPART SHORTLY AND 'BE READY TO EXPEDITE.' THE TXWY WE WERE ON WAS SLIPPERY AND UNLIGHTED. OVERALL LIGHTING AND SURFACE BRAKING WAS POOR. SHORTLY WE RECEIVED 'POS AND HOLD ON RWY 4R.' I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND POINTED OUT THE RWY THRESHOLD TO THE CAPT AS I WAS STILL SOMEWHAT CONCERNED ABOUT HIS AWARENESS. I SET ABOUT CONFIGURING THE ACFT FOR TKOF AND DOING THE CHKLISTS. WHEN I LOOKED UP I SAW THE CAPT HAD NOT TURNED DOWN THE RWY BUT WAS HEADED STRAIGHT AHEAD TOWARD AN UNPAVED AREA. I YELLED FOR HIM TO TURN L, HE RESPONDED WITH A SHARP PULL ON THE NOSE STEERING AND DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING. WE HIT SOLID ICE AND THE 302000 POUND ACFT BEGAN SKIDDING SIDEWAYS. AT THIS POINT, TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF AND SAID 'EXPEDITE, ACFT INSIDE THE MARKER FOR YOUR RWY.' I REPLIED WE WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY LINING UP DUE TO ICE AND POOR BRAKING. THE TWR DIRECTED THE INBOUND ACFT TO GAR THUS RELIEVING MY CONCERNS ABOUT A COLLISION. IN THE MEANTIME, THE CAPT BEGAN TRYING TO MOVE THE ACFT WITH PWR, NOSEWHEEL STEERING AND BRAKES. I AGAIN ADVISED HIM HE WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF THE TXWY. HE TURNED ANYWAY AND WE SLIPPED ACROSS SOLID WHITE ICE AND WERE ABLE TO MAKE A 270 DEG TURN TO LINE UP FOR TKOF. FORTUNATELY WE DID NOT GET STUCK AND WERE ABLE TO WARN THE TWR AND INBOUND ACFT OF OUR PROBS. I HAVE NO IDEA WHY HE MISSED LINING UP THE ACFT. HE HAD US POINTED AT THE BOONDOCKS WHEN I YELLED TO TURN. THERE WERE NO LIGHTS OR RUN-UP AREAS WHERE HE HAD US POINTED. SECONDLY, 'EXPEDITE' ATC CLRNCS HAVE NO PLACE IN LOW VISIBILITY, SLIPPERY, WET, ICE ENVIRONMENTS. I ALSO QUESTION THE ISSUING OF TAXI CLRNCS ON POORLY TREATED, SELDOM USED SECTIONS OF THE ARPT. THE ENTIRE ARPT WAS A MESS. THE CAPT CLAIMED HE NEVER HEARD ME TELL HIM HE WAS APCHING THE RWY, AND HE SAID HE MISTOOK THE R SIDE OF THE RWY FOR THE L SIDE EDGE. THAT TO ME WAS A REAL STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION. I WAS NEARLY OVERLOADED BY MY OWN DUTIES, TASKS, CLRNCS WX AND CONCERN WITH THE CAPT'S APPARENT UNFOCUSED AND CONFUSED STATE. I NOW TAKE NOTHING FOR GRANTED -- NOT EVEN THE MOST OBVIOUS. THE 2 MAN CREW WORKS OK MOST OF THE TIME, BUT CAN VERY EASILY BE OVERWHELMED AND COCKPIT TEAMWORK VANISH IF ONE PART OF THE TEAM ISN'T THERE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.