Narrative:

During this cross country flight, my intention was to practice the skills involved in pilotage. I had positive landmark verification of my position until approximately 30 NM northeast of tuscaloosa (tcl). At this time, I called tcl, informed them of my position, and stated my intention to land. I was told by tcl to continue and report my position again when 5 NM northeast. I continued on my previous heading until I felt that I should have arrived at tcl and looked at the VOR course indicator. I had been monitoring the 30 degree radial of the tcl VOR while inbound to tcl and it had indicated that I was west of the radial. When I next looked at it, it was indicating that I was east of the radial. At this time I convinced myself that the turbulence that I had experienced over (what I later learned was) tuscaloosa lake had confused me and allowed me to somehow get off course. I began correcting my course to the west to bring myself back in line with the radial. After flying for approximately 10 mins, I realized that I was lost. At this time, the area that I was over consisted of a uniform covering of trees. After looking around for a few mins I saw a clearing in the trees to the wsw, assumed that the clearing was tcl, and altered my course to go to the clearing. When approximately 10 NM east of the clearing I called tcl to inform them of my position and intentions. I did not receive a response and assumed that they were busy. I continued toward the clearing and noticed that the runway alignment was not what I expected it to be for tcl. From my altitude, I could not see one of the runways and the runways that I could see made it appear that I was approaching tcl from the southeast. My misident of the runways was aided by pilot workload as I was descending from 3000 ft to pattern altitude, attempting to contact tcl, and scanning the area for a control tower. I had heard tcl traffic on the radio as recently as 10 mins previously and, from those xmissions, I had the impression that there were airplanes in the pattern performing touch-and-goes. When I observed the traffic in the pattern that I was maneuvering to enter, there were 2 aircraft. At this time I decided that my transmitter must be inoperative and decided to land and determine what my problems were. I looked for a tower on the field with the intention of looking for light signals and did not see one from my location. I then observed the aircraft in the traffic pattern, timed my entry to be at midfield entering at a 45 degree angle to the downwind leg between the other 2 aircraft and made an uneventful approach. When on final approach, I noticed the arresting wire across the end of the runway at approximately the same time that a jet passed me on the right. At this point I was sure that I was at the wrong field but felt that it was best to land and determine exactly where I was. I made several mistakes during this incident. At least one is related to the WX. On all previous cross country flts, the WX had been bad (either on east leading or trailing edge of a front. Winds aloft on one trip were an unforecast 40 KTS). During these flts, I had to maintain a high degree of vigilance to maintain my intended course. I had also given a great deal of thought to contingency plans on these trips. All previous navigational exercises had been completed exceptionally well (normally within plus or minus 1 NM of intended ground track). During the trip of this incident, there were virtually no winds aloft and I was not expecting any trouble. Another major error in judgement was my consistent pattern of interpreting observations of both the terrain and my VOR course indicator as 'I'm just a little off, I'll be back on course soon.' my interpretation should have been, 'something's not right here, stop and find out exactly what's going on.' an additional problem had been my lack of recent VOR practice which was probably partially responsible for attempting to read the 'back' side of the VOR. The aircraft that I was flying on that day had several minor avionics write-ups in the past, although none were active on the day of my flight. This was a factor in my incorrect assumption that I had experienced a transmitter failure when I was not receiving a response from my calls to tcl.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SPI BECOMES LOST ON XCOUNTRY FLT, LANDS AT NAVY BASE.

Narrative: DURING THIS XCOUNTRY FLT, MY INTENTION WAS TO PRACTICE THE SKILLS INVOLVED IN PILOTAGE. I HAD POSITIVE LANDMARK VERIFICATION OF MY POS UNTIL APPROX 30 NM NE OF TUSCALOOSA (TCL). AT THIS TIME, I CALLED TCL, INFORMED THEM OF MY POS, AND STATED MY INTENTION TO LAND. I WAS TOLD BY TCL TO CONTINUE AND RPT MY POS AGAIN WHEN 5 NM NE. I CONTINUED ON MY PREVIOUS HDG UNTIL I FELT THAT I SHOULD HAVE ARRIVED AT TCL AND LOOKED AT THE VOR COURSE INDICATOR. I HAD BEEN MONITORING THE 30 DEG RADIAL OF THE TCL VOR WHILE INBOUND TO TCL AND IT HAD INDICATED THAT I WAS W OF THE RADIAL. WHEN I NEXT LOOKED AT IT, IT WAS INDICATING THAT I WAS E OF THE RADIAL. AT THIS TIME I CONVINCED MYSELF THAT THE TURB THAT I HAD EXPERIENCED OVER (WHAT I LATER LEARNED WAS) TUSCALOOSA LAKE HAD CONFUSED ME AND ALLOWED ME TO SOMEHOW GET OFF COURSE. I BEGAN CORRECTING MY COURSE TO THE W TO BRING MYSELF BACK IN LINE WITH THE RADIAL. AFTER FLYING FOR APPROX 10 MINS, I REALIZED THAT I WAS LOST. AT THIS TIME, THE AREA THAT I WAS OVER CONSISTED OF A UNIFORM COVERING OF TREES. AFTER LOOKING AROUND FOR A FEW MINS I SAW A CLRING IN THE TREES TO THE WSW, ASSUMED THAT THE CLRING WAS TCL, AND ALTERED MY COURSE TO GO TO THE CLRING. WHEN APPROX 10 NM E OF THE CLRING I CALLED TCL TO INFORM THEM OF MY POS AND INTENTIONS. I DID NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE AND ASSUMED THAT THEY WERE BUSY. I CONTINUED TOWARD THE CLRING AND NOTICED THAT THE RWY ALIGNMENT WAS NOT WHAT I EXPECTED IT TO BE FOR TCL. FROM MY ALT, I COULD NOT SEE ONE OF THE RWYS AND THE RWYS THAT I COULD SEE MADE IT APPEAR THAT I WAS APCHING TCL FROM THE SE. MY MISIDENT OF THE RWYS WAS AIDED BY PLT WORKLOAD AS I WAS DSNDING FROM 3000 FT TO PATTERN ALT, ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT TCL, AND SCANNING THE AREA FOR A CTL TWR. I HAD HEARD TCL TFC ON THE RADIO AS RECENTLY AS 10 MINS PREVIOUSLY AND, FROM THOSE XMISSIONS, I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WERE AIRPLANES IN THE PATTERN PERFORMING TOUCH-AND-GOES. WHEN I OBSERVED THE TFC IN THE PATTERN THAT I WAS MANEUVERING TO ENTER, THERE WERE 2 ACFT. AT THIS TIME I DECIDED THAT MY XMITTER MUST BE INOP AND DECIDED TO LAND AND DETERMINE WHAT MY PROBS WERE. I LOOKED FOR A TWR ON THE FIELD WITH THE INTENTION OF LOOKING FOR LIGHT SIGNALS AND DID NOT SEE ONE FROM MY LOCATION. I THEN OBSERVED THE ACFT IN THE TFC PATTERN, TIMED MY ENTRY TO BE AT MIDFIELD ENTERING AT A 45 DEG ANGLE TO THE DOWNWIND LEG BTWN THE OTHER 2 ACFT AND MADE AN UNEVENTFUL APCH. WHEN ON FINAL APCH, I NOTICED THE ARRESTING WIRE ACROSS THE END OF THE RWY AT APPROX THE SAME TIME THAT A JET PASSED ME ON THE R. AT THIS POINT I WAS SURE THAT I WAS AT THE WRONG FIELD BUT FELT THAT IT WAS BEST TO LAND AND DETERMINE EXACTLY WHERE I WAS. I MADE SEVERAL MISTAKES DURING THIS INCIDENT. AT LEAST ONE IS RELATED TO THE WX. ON ALL PREVIOUS XCOUNTRY FLTS, THE WX HAD BEEN BAD (EITHER ON E LEADING OR TRAILING EDGE OF A FRONT. WINDS ALOFT ON ONE TRIP WERE AN UNFORECAST 40 KTS). DURING THESE FLTS, I HAD TO MAINTAIN A HIGH DEG OF VIGILANCE TO MAINTAIN MY INTENDED COURSE. I HAD ALSO GIVEN A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO CONTINGENCY PLANS ON THESE TRIPS. ALL PREVIOUS NAVIGATIONAL EXERCISES HAD BEEN COMPLETED EXCEPTIONALLY WELL (NORMALLY WITHIN PLUS OR MINUS 1 NM OF INTENDED GND TRACK). DURING THE TRIP OF THIS INCIDENT, THERE WERE VIRTUALLY NO WINDS ALOFT AND I WAS NOT EXPECTING ANY TROUBLE. ANOTHER MAJOR ERROR IN JUDGEMENT WAS MY CONSISTENT PATTERN OF INTERPRETING OBSERVATIONS OF BOTH THE TERRAIN AND MY VOR COURSE INDICATOR AS 'I'M JUST A LITTLE OFF, I'LL BE BACK ON COURSE SOON.' MY INTERP SHOULD HAVE BEEN, 'SOMETHING'S NOT RIGHT HERE, STOP AND FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT'S GOING ON.' AN ADDITIONAL PROB HAD BEEN MY LACK OF RECENT VOR PRACTICE WHICH WAS PROBABLY PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTEMPTING TO READ THE 'BACK' SIDE OF THE VOR. THE ACFT THAT I WAS FLYING ON THAT DAY HAD SEVERAL MINOR AVIONICS WRITE-UPS IN THE PAST, ALTHOUGH NONE WERE ACTIVE ON THE DAY OF MY FLT. THIS WAS A FACTOR IN MY INCORRECT ASSUMPTION THAT I HAD EXPERIENCED A XMITTER FAILURE WHEN I WAS NOT RECEIVING A RESPONSE FROM MY CALLS TO TCL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.