Narrative:

Lga tower was in the middle of changing landing runway to the same runway as takeoff (runway 4, braking action poor to nil, runway 13). We had already passed hold short line #2 for hold short line #1, when tower told us to hold short of hold line #2. We told them we passed it already (the ATIS we had said 'hold short line #1 was in use'). Since we passed line #2, apparently they wanted to get us out before the first ILS runway 4 arrival because we were in the ILS critical area. We were given 'position and hold runway 4.' while in position, I noticed 2 jets taxi across our runway. We were then 'cleared for takeoff, some jet 2 mi final runway 4.' at about 70 KIAS air carrier Y's airbus came into view taxiing across our runway (looking at the airport diagram, they were taxiing right to left on taxiway 'F'). I called 'abort, abort' and the first officer (PF) aborted the takeoff. We came to a full stop abeam taxiway 'D.' during the abort I announced on tower frequency that, 'air carrier X is aborting our takeoff, an air carrier Y airbus is taxiing across the runway. 'There was no immediate response from tower. A few seconds later, the jet on final asked, 'is the runway clear yet?' we were in our turn, clearing the runway, when tower immediately instructed the jet on final to 'go around.' if the visibility was much lower, we may not have been able to stop (i.e., higher speed and less distance to stop), and with possibly no radio call from either (potentially crashed) aircraft on the ground, the landing aircraft could have joined the pile-up with no warning. Since we had passed into the ILS critical area, tower may have been pressured to get us out quickly to avoid making the aircraft on final 'go missed.' I don't know why air carrier Y was on our runway. Either ground told them to cross and didn't coordinate with tower, or air carrier Y was slower than they expected crossing, or air carrier Y was disoriented and crossed unknowingly. Low visibility was definitely a factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORTED. OTHER ACR IN RWY INCURSION.

Narrative: LGA TWR WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF CHANGING LNDG RWY TO THE SAME RWY AS TKOF (RWY 4, BRAKING ACTION POOR TO NIL, RWY 13). WE HAD ALREADY PASSED HOLD SHORT LINE #2 FOR HOLD SHORT LINE #1, WHEN TWR TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT OF HOLD LINE #2. WE TOLD THEM WE PASSED IT ALREADY (THE ATIS WE HAD SAID 'HOLD SHORT LINE #1 WAS IN USE'). SINCE WE PASSED LINE #2, APPARENTLY THEY WANTED TO GET US OUT BEFORE THE FIRST ILS RWY 4 ARR BECAUSE WE WERE IN THE ILS CRITICAL AREA. WE WERE GIVEN 'POS AND HOLD RWY 4.' WHILE IN POS, I NOTICED 2 JETS TAXI ACROSS OUR RWY. WE WERE THEN 'CLRED FOR TKOF, SOME JET 2 MI FINAL RWY 4.' AT ABOUT 70 KIAS ACR Y'S AIRBUS CAME INTO VIEW TAXIING ACROSS OUR RWY (LOOKING AT THE ARPT DIAGRAM, THEY WERE TAXIING R TO L ON TXWY 'F'). I CALLED 'ABORT, ABORT' AND THE FO (PF) ABORTED THE TKOF. WE CAME TO A FULL STOP ABEAM TXWY 'D.' DURING THE ABORT I ANNOUNCED ON TWR FREQ THAT, 'ACR X IS ABORTING OUR TKOF, AN ACR Y AIRBUS IS TAXIING ACROSS THE RWY. 'THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FROM TWR. A FEW SECONDS LATER, THE JET ON FINAL ASKED, 'IS THE RWY CLR YET?' WE WERE IN OUR TURN, CLRING THE RWY, WHEN TWR IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTED THE JET ON FINAL TO 'GAR.' IF THE VISIBILITY WAS MUCH LOWER, WE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO STOP (I.E., HIGHER SPD AND LESS DISTANCE TO STOP), AND WITH POSSIBLY NO RADIO CALL FROM EITHER (POTENTIALLY CRASHED) ACFT ON THE GND, THE LNDG ACFT COULD HAVE JOINED THE PILE-UP WITH NO WARNING. SINCE WE HAD PASSED INTO THE ILS CRITICAL AREA, TWR MAY HAVE BEEN PRESSURED TO GET US OUT QUICKLY TO AVOID MAKING THE ACFT ON FINAL 'GO MISSED.' I DON'T KNOW WHY ACR Y WAS ON OUR RWY. EITHER GND TOLD THEM TO CROSS AND DIDN'T COORDINATE WITH TWR, OR ACR Y WAS SLOWER THAN THEY EXPECTED XING, OR ACR Y WAS DISORIENTED AND CROSSED UNKNOWINGLY. LOW VISIBILITY WAS DEFINITELY A FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.