Narrative:

I was the captain of flight from dfw to cmh on mar/xx/94. Runway 10L at cmh was in use on our arrival (length 6000 ft). Runway 10R (length 10250 ft) was closed. Braking action reported on ATIS was 'good' (tapley reading averaged 75.5 for runway 10L). There were 8 aircraft ahead on approach. The ILS approach to runway 10L was normal and conducted according to company procedures. We broke out and had the approach lights at 700 ft AGL. Maintaining the GS we touched down at about 1200 ft from the approach end of the runway. Medium autobrakes had been selected during the approach. At touchdown I immediately lowered the nose gear and began reversing the engines (EPR 1.60). The autobrakes appeared to be ineffective. I began full deflection manual braking and increased engine reverse EPR. The aircraft decelerated very slowly. Maintaining the centerline the aircraft exited the runway at approximately 10-15 mph. When the aircraft stopped the main landing gear were approximately 40 ft from the end of the runway. We informed the tower of our situation. We determined that an evacuate/evacuation was unnecessary. Vans were sent to the rear of the aircraft and passenger were deplaned in groups of 20 and sent to the terminal.reflecting back on the situation, I believe I should have asked when runway 10R would reopen. Later, I learned that it reopened when our flight was approximately 1 min from landing. The preceding aircraft had reported braking action poor on runway 10L. I elected to continue because our aircraft was 16000 pounds below the maximum allowable for the runway conditions. It was later reported to me that preceding crew to land (from another carrier) had informed our ramp personnel that they had great difficulty getting their aircraft stopped on the runway and the braking action was 'poor to nil.' needless to say better communication would have prevented this situation from developing. I would have elected to use runway 10R if I had known it was open or would open soon. As a footnote, I am a commuter to dfw from california. Counting my commute to dfw I had been at work (or en route to work) for 14 hours and 45 mins. I did not feel any fatigue, however, as I napped on my commute to work. Supplemental information from acn 265415: we were never advised runway 10R was soon to be back in service. I will also state that we never asked the status of runway 10R. We are prohibited from landing with a report of nil braking by company policy. Captain also had flown about 10 1/2 yrs in alaska and had considerable experience in winter operations. That may have caused me to let my guard down because if I were at controls I think I would have felt the landing would have been beyond my capabilities, but I never said anything about not landing. I think poor/lack of communications was the key. Any additional conversation between our crew, our crew to ATC, ATC to us, ATC to previous crews would surely have slowed our approach till we discovered runway was unsuitable. Supplemental information from acn 266034: my concern as a dispatcher is how braking action is reported. I think as we increase flts a possibility of reporting could be changed. When you have 5 flts all landing within 30-45 mins, and you need reports from all stations, it is manageable but is starting to get difficult. I have no better way to report the braking action at present to help us all.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY EXCURSION. RWY LENGTH REQUIRED. ACFT EVACED ABANDONED.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF FLT FROM DFW TO CMH ON MAR/XX/94. RWY 10L AT CMH WAS IN USE ON OUR ARR (LENGTH 6000 FT). RWY 10R (LENGTH 10250 FT) WAS CLOSED. BRAKING ACTION RPTED ON ATIS WAS 'GOOD' (TAPLEY READING AVERAGED 75.5 FOR RWY 10L). THERE WERE 8 ACFT AHEAD ON APCH. THE ILS APCH TO RWY 10L WAS NORMAL AND CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO COMPANY PROCS. WE BROKE OUT AND HAD THE APCH LIGHTS AT 700 FT AGL. MAINTAINING THE GS WE TOUCHED DOWN AT ABOUT 1200 FT FROM THE APCH END OF THE RWY. MEDIUM AUTOBRAKES HAD BEEN SELECTED DURING THE APCH. AT TOUCHDOWN I IMMEDIATELY LOWERED THE NOSE GEAR AND BEGAN REVERSING THE ENGS (EPR 1.60). THE AUTOBRAKES APPEARED TO BE INEFFECTIVE. I BEGAN FULL DEFLECTION MANUAL BRAKING AND INCREASED ENG REVERSE EPR. THE ACFT DECELERATED VERY SLOWLY. MAINTAINING THE CTRLINE THE ACFT EXITED THE RWY AT APPROX 10-15 MPH. WHEN THE ACFT STOPPED THE MAIN LNDG GEAR WERE APPROX 40 FT FROM THE END OF THE RWY. WE INFORMED THE TWR OF OUR SIT. WE DETERMINED THAT AN EVAC WAS UNNECESSARY. VANS WERE SENT TO THE REAR OF THE ACFT AND PAX WERE DEPLANED IN GROUPS OF 20 AND SENT TO THE TERMINAL.REFLECTING BACK ON THE SIT, I BELIEVE I SHOULD HAVE ASKED WHEN RWY 10R WOULD REOPEN. LATER, I LEARNED THAT IT REOPENED WHEN OUR FLT WAS APPROX 1 MIN FROM LNDG. THE PRECEDING ACFT HAD RPTED BRAKING ACTION POOR ON RWY 10L. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE BECAUSE OUR ACFT WAS 16000 LBS BELOW THE MAX ALLOWABLE FOR THE RWY CONDITIONS. IT WAS LATER RPTED TO ME THAT PRECEDING CREW TO LAND (FROM ANOTHER CARRIER) HAD INFORMED OUR RAMP PERSONNEL THAT THEY HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY GETTING THEIR ACFT STOPPED ON THE RWY AND THE BRAKING ACTION WAS 'POOR TO NIL.' NEEDLESS TO SAY BETTER COM WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS SIT FROM DEVELOPING. I WOULD HAVE ELECTED TO USE RWY 10R IF I HAD KNOWN IT WAS OPEN OR WOULD OPEN SOON. AS A FOOTNOTE, I AM A COMMUTER TO DFW FROM CALIFORNIA. COUNTING MY COMMUTE TO DFW I HAD BEEN AT WORK (OR ENRTE TO WORK) FOR 14 HRS AND 45 MINS. I DID NOT FEEL ANY FATIGUE, HOWEVER, AS I NAPPED ON MY COMMUTE TO WORK. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 265415: WE WERE NEVER ADVISED RWY 10R WAS SOON TO BE BACK IN SVC. I WILL ALSO STATE THAT WE NEVER ASKED THE STATUS OF RWY 10R. WE ARE PROHIBITED FROM LNDG WITH A RPT OF NIL BRAKING BY COMPANY POLICY. CAPT ALSO HAD FLOWN ABOUT 10 1/2 YRS IN ALASKA AND HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN WINTER OPS. THAT MAY HAVE CAUSED ME TO LET MY GUARD DOWN BECAUSE IF I WERE AT CTLS I THINK I WOULD HAVE FELT THE LNDG WOULD HAVE BEEN BEYOND MY CAPABILITIES, BUT I NEVER SAID ANYTHING ABOUT NOT LNDG. I THINK POOR/LACK OF COMS WAS THE KEY. ANY ADDITIONAL CONVERSATION BTWN OUR CREW, OUR CREW TO ATC, ATC TO US, ATC TO PREVIOUS CREWS WOULD SURELY HAVE SLOWED OUR APCH TILL WE DISCOVERED RWY WAS UNSUITABLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 266034: MY CONCERN AS A DISPATCHER IS HOW BRAKING ACTION IS RPTED. I THINK AS WE INCREASE FLTS A POSSIBILITY OF RPTING COULD BE CHANGED. WHEN YOU HAVE 5 FLTS ALL LNDG WITHIN 30-45 MINS, AND YOU NEED RPTS FROM ALL STATIONS, IT IS MANAGEABLE BUT IS STARTING TO GET DIFFICULT. I HAVE NO BETTER WAY TO RPT THE BRAKING ACTION AT PRESENT TO HELP US ALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.