37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 266211 |
Time | |
Date | 199403 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : gjt airport : abq |
State Reference | CO |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 11600 agl bound upper : 37000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zdv tower : cmh |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | cruise other other other |
Route In Use | enroute : on vectors enroute airway : zdv |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time total : 14000 |
ASRS Report | 266211 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : declared emergency other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
En route from las vegas to columbus at FL370 over grand junction, co, we experienced some problems. We received 3 consecutive ECAM warning messages of automatic throttle off, engine #2 eiu fault and engine #2 reverser fault. I asked first officer for the QRH. Manuals indicated that we would not have automatic thrust and no #2 engine reverser and that we would not be able to start the airplane after shutdown. I asked first officer to SELCAL phoenix maintenance control and ask for assistance in clearing ECAM warning. As time elapsed, we received another ECAM warning stating #2 engine AC supply warning, followed by air pack #1 fault and air pack #2 fault. I followed ECAM action by resetting pack #1 and #2. This was followed by an air pack #1 and #2 fault. Again, I followed the ECAM action by resetting air pack #1 and #2. About 1 min later, we received pack #1 and #2 fault, along with cabin pressure and excess cabin altitude. At this time we started considering emergency descent to 14000 ft and the request for a lower altitude was made to ZDV. We had reset the packs again, and again received the same faults. Upon receiving faults for the 3RD time along with the cabin pressure ECAM page, I noticed we would not be able to hold cabin pressure. The cabin pressure was climbing at 150 FPM. I told first officer to tell ATC that we are declaring an emergency and are requesting an emergency descent to 14000 ft. ZDV obliged by giving us a heading and a descent to 14000 ft and also advised us the minimum in-flight altitude was 12700 ft. The QRH indicated that if cabin pressure is above 14000 ft, we would have to manually extend the cabin oxygen masks. All through the descent the cabin was never above 13000 ft. No oxygen masks were deployed nor needed to be deployed. We requested vectors to the closest airport which was gunnison, co. However, we had a landing weight problem to consider. As we cruised at 11600 ft, minimum MEA for ZDV, first officer suggested that we fly to abq, NM, which was 90 mi away. My concern was the #2 engine, whether it was going to continue to run and the over weight conditions for landing. The cabin was prepared for emergency landing. Csr's performed their duties and responsibilities. Landing was made in abq with no problems. On taxiing to the gate, I shut down the #2 engine. There was a statement made over the radio by the emergency vehicles that the #2 engine was smoking due to having been shut down. I made 3 PA's to the cabin informing the passenger about our condition and that there was no concern for alarm. I talked to the cabin crew 2 times over the intercom system and also talked to the first csr 2 times reassuring her that everything was all right and to prepare the cabin for emergency landing just to be on the safe side.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR B737 LOST ITS PRESSURIZATION AND SOME ENG CTL FUNCTIONS.
Narrative: ENRTE FROM LAS VEGAS TO COLUMBUS AT FL370 OVER GRAND JUNCTION, CO, WE EXPERIENCED SOME PROBS. WE RECEIVED 3 CONSECUTIVE ECAM WARNING MESSAGES OF AUTO THROTTLE OFF, ENG #2 EIU FAULT AND ENG #2 REVERSER FAULT. I ASKED FO FOR THE QRH. MANUALS INDICATED THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE AUTO THRUST AND NO #2 ENG REVERSER AND THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO START THE AIRPLANE AFTER SHUTDOWN. I ASKED FO TO SELCAL PHOENIX MAINT CTL AND ASK FOR ASSISTANCE IN CLRING ECAM WARNING. AS TIME ELAPSED, WE RECEIVED ANOTHER ECAM WARNING STATING #2 ENG AC SUPPLY WARNING, FOLLOWED BY AIR PACK #1 FAULT AND AIR PACK #2 FAULT. I FOLLOWED ECAM ACTION BY RESETTING PACK #1 AND #2. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY AN AIR PACK #1 AND #2 FAULT. AGAIN, I FOLLOWED THE ECAM ACTION BY RESETTING AIR PACK #1 AND #2. ABOUT 1 MIN LATER, WE RECEIVED PACK #1 AND #2 FAULT, ALONG WITH CABIN PRESSURE AND EXCESS CABIN ALT. AT THIS TIME WE STARTED CONSIDERING EMER DSCNT TO 14000 FT AND THE REQUEST FOR A LOWER ALT WAS MADE TO ZDV. WE HAD RESET THE PACKS AGAIN, AND AGAIN RECEIVED THE SAME FAULTS. UPON RECEIVING FAULTS FOR THE 3RD TIME ALONG WITH THE CABIN PRESSURE ECAM PAGE, I NOTICED WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD CABIN PRESSURE. THE CABIN PRESSURE WAS CLBING AT 150 FPM. I TOLD FO TO TELL ATC THAT WE ARE DECLARING AN EMER AND ARE REQUESTING AN EMER DSCNT TO 14000 FT. ZDV OBLIGED BY GIVING US A HDG AND A DSCNT TO 14000 FT AND ALSO ADVISED US THE MINIMUM INFLT ALT WAS 12700 FT. THE QRH INDICATED THAT IF CABIN PRESSURE IS ABOVE 14000 FT, WE WOULD HAVE TO MANUALLY EXTEND THE CABIN OXYGEN MASKS. ALL THROUGH THE DSCNT THE CABIN WAS NEVER ABOVE 13000 FT. NO OXYGEN MASKS WERE DEPLOYED NOR NEEDED TO BE DEPLOYED. WE REQUESTED VECTORS TO THE CLOSEST ARPT WHICH WAS GUNNISON, CO. HOWEVER, WE HAD A LNDG WT PROB TO CONSIDER. AS WE CRUISED AT 11600 FT, MINIMUM MEA FOR ZDV, FO SUGGESTED THAT WE FLY TO ABQ, NM, WHICH WAS 90 MI AWAY. MY CONCERN WAS THE #2 ENG, WHETHER IT WAS GOING TO CONTINUE TO RUN AND THE OVER WT CONDITIONS FOR LNDG. THE CABIN WAS PREPARED FOR EMER LNDG. CSR'S PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. LNDG WAS MADE IN ABQ WITH NO PROBS. ON TAXIING TO THE GATE, I SHUT DOWN THE #2 ENG. THERE WAS A STATEMENT MADE OVER THE RADIO BY THE EMER VEHICLES THAT THE #2 ENG WAS SMOKING DUE TO HAVING BEEN SHUT DOWN. I MADE 3 PA'S TO THE CABIN INFORMING THE PAX ABOUT OUR CONDITION AND THAT THERE WAS NO CONCERN FOR ALARM. I TALKED TO THE CABIN CREW 2 TIMES OVER THE INTERCOM SYS AND ALSO TALKED TO THE FIRST CSR 2 TIMES REASSURING HER THAT EVERYTHING WAS ALL RIGHT AND TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR EMER LNDG JUST TO BE ON THE SAFE SIDE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.