Narrative:

On apr/fri/94, our company dispatched a falcon 20 to sparta, tn to pick up cargo. The flight to sparta (srb) was a part 91 flight (no cargo on board) to a 5003 ft runway. The computed landing distance for the aircraft was 2450 ft dry runway, 2820 ft for wet runway. Thunderstorms and rain were forecast for the area. Heavy rain was present just prior to our aircraft landing, and the crew was in contact with unicom during the approach. Upon touchdown, the aircraft began to decelerate normally, then about 1/2 way down the runway, the aircraft stopped decelerating and overran the runway at the end, damaging the landing gear and nose area. Subsequent investigation by our company revealed that an identical incident in a jet aircraft had happened in the past. The airport manager reported to me that it had rained harder than he had ever seen it before, but this information, along with the advisory about possible standing water on the runway, was not transmitted to the pilot, who treated the situation as a normal wet runway. My conclusion is that, although this runway was perfectly legal in all aspects for dispatching an aircraft to, there is a major difference between a black top 5000 ft country runway, and a 5000 ft concrete, grooved, engineered big city runway when they are wet. There should be a way to NOTAM wet runway performance for different types and locations of runways to alert pilots to possible braking performance problems. Our company will be more alert to this problem in the future. Supplemental information from acn 268872: the aircraft decelerated to a point, then seemed to reach an equilibrium speed with minimal further deceleration. Flight crew was aware of wet runway conditions but was not aware of the amount of previous rainfall and type of drainage system (or lack thereof) incorporated into the runway system. Runway drainage and slope did not look engineered in a way conducive to properly drain the runway and runway environment. Airport manager attested after the incident that there was indeed a good chance that there may have been up to 2 inches of standing water in some places on the runway, yet the flight crew was uninformed. Supplemental information from acn 268873: we had received the AWOS-3 WX for the airport. The unicom operator read back the field conditions and the WX was above minimums. Initial indications of the landing deceleration seemed normal. The runway was wet and moderate rain was occurring. The captain was controling the rollout with maximum braking and steering. At approximately midpoint of the runway, it was apparent we were hydroplaning on a contaminated runway and our speed was insufficient to exercise an option of going around. When it seemed imminent were going to overrun, I applied maximum braking on the brakes from my seat, which did not seem to have an effect. I believe the runway design and the saturated turf surrounding the runway prevented proper drainage.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ATX FALCON 20 HYDROPLANED OFF THE END OF A RWY.

Narrative: ON APR/FRI/94, OUR COMPANY DISPATCHED A FALCON 20 TO SPARTA, TN TO PICK UP CARGO. THE FLT TO SPARTA (SRB) WAS A PART 91 FLT (NO CARGO ON BOARD) TO A 5003 FT RWY. THE COMPUTED LNDG DISTANCE FOR THE ACFT WAS 2450 FT DRY RWY, 2820 FT FOR WET RWY. TSTMS AND RAIN WERE FORECAST FOR THE AREA. HVY RAIN WAS PRESENT JUST PRIOR TO OUR ACFT LNDG, AND THE CREW WAS IN CONTACT WITH UNICOM DURING THE APCH. UPON TOUCHDOWN, THE ACFT BEGAN TO DECELERATE NORMALLY, THEN ABOUT 1/2 WAY DOWN THE RWY, THE ACFT STOPPED DECELERATING AND OVERRAN THE RWY AT THE END, DAMAGING THE LNDG GEAR AND NOSE AREA. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION BY OUR COMPANY REVEALED THAT AN IDENTICAL INCIDENT IN A JET ACFT HAD HAPPENED IN THE PAST. THE ARPT MGR RPTED TO ME THAT IT HAD RAINED HARDER THAN HE HAD EVER SEEN IT BEFORE, BUT THIS INFO, ALONG WITH THE ADVISORY ABOUT POSSIBLE STANDING WATER ON THE RWY, WAS NOT XMITTED TO THE PLT, WHO TREATED THE SIT AS A NORMAL WET RWY. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS RWY WAS PERFECTLY LEGAL IN ALL ASPECTS FOR DISPATCHING AN ACFT TO, THERE IS A MAJOR DIFFERENCE BTWN A BLACK TOP 5000 FT COUNTRY RWY, AND A 5000 FT CONCRETE, GROOVED, ENGINEERED BIG CITY RWY WHEN THEY ARE WET. THERE SHOULD BE A WAY TO NOTAM WET RWY PERFORMANCE FOR DIFFERENT TYPES AND LOCATIONS OF RWYS TO ALERT PLTS TO POSSIBLE BRAKING PERFORMANCE PROBS. OUR COMPANY WILL BE MORE ALERT TO THIS PROB IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 268872: THE ACFT DECELERATED TO A POINT, THEN SEEMED TO REACH AN EQUILIBRIUM SPD WITH MINIMAL FURTHER DECELERATION. FLC WAS AWARE OF WET RWY CONDITIONS BUT WAS NOT AWARE OF THE AMOUNT OF PREVIOUS RAINFALL AND TYPE OF DRAINAGE SYS (OR LACK THEREOF) INCORPORATED INTO THE RWY SYS. RWY DRAINAGE AND SLOPE DID NOT LOOK ENGINEERED IN A WAY CONDUCIVE TO PROPERLY DRAIN THE RWY AND RWY ENVIRONMENT. ARPT MGR ATTESTED AFTER THE INCIDENT THAT THERE WAS INDEED A GOOD CHANCE THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN UP TO 2 INCHES OF STANDING WATER IN SOME PLACES ON THE RWY, YET THE FLC WAS UNINFORMED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 268873: WE HAD RECEIVED THE AWOS-3 WX FOR THE ARPT. THE UNICOM OPERATOR READ BACK THE FIELD CONDITIONS AND THE WX WAS ABOVE MINIMUMS. INITIAL INDICATIONS OF THE LNDG DECELERATION SEEMED NORMAL. THE RWY WAS WET AND MODERATE RAIN WAS OCCURRING. THE CAPT WAS CTLING THE ROLLOUT WITH MAX BRAKING AND STEERING. AT APPROX MIDPOINT OF THE RWY, IT WAS APPARENT WE WERE HYDROPLANING ON A CONTAMINATED RWY AND OUR SPD WAS INSUFFICIENT TO EXERCISE AN OPTION OF GOING AROUND. WHEN IT SEEMED IMMINENT WERE GOING TO OVERRUN, I APPLIED MAX BRAKING ON THE BRAKES FROM MY SEAT, WHICH DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE AN EFFECT. I BELIEVE THE RWY DESIGN AND THE SATURATED TURF SURROUNDING THE RWY PREVENTED PROPER DRAINAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.