Narrative:

After reposing from ve 120 to ve 104 the fire warning light on engine #1 illuminated south I was landing. All other indications were normal at that time. Upon landing, fumes were smelled by all present and the aircraft was shut down immediately. Upon examination of the #1 engine cowling, I observed the panel blistered on the exterior of the cowling. I removed the upper cowling where the panel was the most discolored and observed the clamp holding the inboard exhaust stack broken and lying loose on top of the engine. The exhaust stack was not aligned with the engine exhaust. I attempted direct contact with operations via the radio and was unable to contact them, although I could hear them. I raised flight crew in other aircraft on 123.45 and had him relay my problem and location to operations. I informed him of my findings as to the exhaust clamp also. No other communication method was possible at that time due to ve 104 being unmanned and without a telephone or base radio for the customer either. After approximately 10 mins without getting any further response from company, I attempted to re- establish contact with him to learn what action operations wished me to do next. I was unable to contact company at that time. I contacted flight crew in another aircraft on 123.45 and had him relay to operations that I was waiting for guidance as what to do next. He informed me that no decision had been made yet. I then had him relay that, to conserve my battery, I was going to turn off the battery and attempt to recontact operations between XX25 and XX30. At that time, I informed my passenger that I was waiting for instructions from operations due to the severity of the problem and that, if I was told to move the aircraft somewhere else, they would not be going with me. I also informed them the decision might be made to repair it at V3 104, in which case we would be riding a boat. At XX25 I attempted to contact operations and was again unsuccessful. I was also unsuccessful in raising anyone on 123.45. I was able to contact company on the customer FM radio. He called operations at my request and informed me 'I could do whatever I thought I had to do to get the aircraft to where it could be repaired, 'but that 'I should not take any customers with me.' my thought was to get the aircraft to our closest base. By first starting #2 engine followed by #1, using engine #1 to takeoff of the platform and then secure #1 engine and fly to cameron on engine #2 only. After this was accomplished and the takeoff was made, I secured #1 engine and flew the aircraft. The #1 engine was operational for no more than 5 mins at that time. During that 100 percent 5 mins, tot was 760 and N1 began to fluctuate between 100 and 65 percent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH FERRY FLT PERFORMED AFTER ROTARY WINGED TFC EXPERIENCES AN ACFT EQUIP PROB.

Narrative: AFTER REPOSING FROM VE 120 TO VE 104 THE FIRE WARNING LIGHT ON ENG #1 ILLUMINATED S I WAS LNDG. ALL OTHER INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL AT THAT TIME. UPON LNDG, FUMES WERE SMELLED BY ALL PRESENT AND THE ACFT WAS SHUT DOWN IMMEDIATELY. UPON EXAMINATION OF THE #1 ENG COWLING, I OBSERVED THE PANEL BLISTERED ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE COWLING. I REMOVED THE UPPER COWLING WHERE THE PANEL WAS THE MOST DISCOLORED AND OBSERVED THE CLAMP HOLDING THE INBOARD EXHAUST STACK BROKEN AND LYING LOOSE ON TOP OF THE ENG. THE EXHAUST STACK WAS NOT ALIGNED WITH THE ENG EXHAUST. I ATTEMPTED DIRECT CONTACT WITH OPS VIA THE RADIO AND WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT THEM, ALTHOUGH I COULD HEAR THEM. I RAISED FLC IN OTHER ACFT ON 123.45 AND HAD HIM RELAY MY PROB AND LOCATION TO OPS. I INFORMED HIM OF MY FINDINGS AS TO THE EXHAUST CLAMP ALSO. NO OTHER COM METHOD WAS POSSIBLE AT THAT TIME DUE TO VE 104 BEING UNMANNED AND WITHOUT A TELEPHONE OR BASE RADIO FOR THE CUSTOMER EITHER. AFTER APPROX 10 MINS WITHOUT GETTING ANY FURTHER RESPONSE FROM COMPANY, I ATTEMPTED TO RE- ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM TO LEARN WHAT ACTION OPS WISHED ME TO DO NEXT. I WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT COMPANY AT THAT TIME. I CONTACTED FLC IN ANOTHER ACFT ON 123.45 AND HAD HIM RELAY TO OPS THAT I WAS WAITING FOR GUIDANCE AS WHAT TO DO NEXT. HE INFORMED ME THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE YET. I THEN HAD HIM RELAY THAT, TO CONSERVE MY BATTERY, I WAS GOING TO TURN OFF THE BATTERY AND ATTEMPT TO RECONTACT OPS BTWN XX25 AND XX30. AT THAT TIME, I INFORMED MY PAX THAT I WAS WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM OPS DUE TO THE SEVERITY OF THE PROB AND THAT, IF I WAS TOLD TO MOVE THE ACFT SOMEWHERE ELSE, THEY WOULD NOT BE GOING WITH ME. I ALSO INFORMED THEM THE DECISION MIGHT BE MADE TO REPAIR IT AT V3 104, IN WHICH CASE WE WOULD BE RIDING A BOAT. AT XX25 I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT OPS AND WAS AGAIN UNSUCCESSFUL. I WAS ALSO UNSUCCESSFUL IN RAISING ANYONE ON 123.45. I WAS ABLE TO CONTACT COMPANY ON THE CUSTOMER FM RADIO. HE CALLED OPS AT MY REQUEST AND INFORMED ME 'I COULD DO WHATEVER I THOUGHT I HAD TO DO TO GET THE ACFT TO WHERE IT COULD BE REPAIRED, 'BUT THAT 'I SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY CUSTOMERS WITH ME.' MY THOUGHT WAS TO GET THE ACFT TO OUR CLOSEST BASE. BY FIRST STARTING #2 ENG FOLLOWED BY #1, USING ENG #1 TO TKOF OF THE PLATFORM AND THEN SECURE #1 ENG AND FLY TO CAMERON ON ENG #2 ONLY. AFTER THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND THE TKOF WAS MADE, I SECURED #1 ENG AND FLEW THE ACFT. THE #1 ENG WAS OPERATIONAL FOR NO MORE THAN 5 MINS AT THAT TIME. DURING THAT 100 PERCENT 5 MINS, TOT WAS 760 AND N1 BEGAN TO FLUCTUATE BTWN 100 AND 65 PERCENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.