Narrative:

Shortly after takeoff at about 800 ft AGL, the #1 engine strut overheat warning light came on. I called for the 'strut overheat' procedure. The engineer began the procedure and advised that the right air conditioning pack had tripped off during the takeoff roll due to an overheat. Therefore, since the #1 engine was supplying the left air conditioning pack, closing the #1 bleed would cause us to lose cabin pressure. Since we were at low altitude this was only a distracting factor. After the completion of the strut overheat procedure the flight engineer reset the right air conditioning pack and attempted to re- pressurize the aircraft. At this time we were at 5000 ft MSL. The cabin would not pressurize below 3000 ft. We requested radar vectors to runway 30 left at stl. The strut overheat light went out after 30 seconds. I considered landing weight charts and determined that we had the capability to land on runway 30L at our current weight of 167000 pounds, 17000 ft over maximum gross landing weight, and avoid dumping fuel. I coordinated the procedures and checklists with the flight engineer and handled ATC and cabin communications. The first officer was designated to fly the aircraft. The overweight landing was accomplished without event. (The engine #1 bleed air modulation valve was leaking at the connection to the ducting causing the warning.) the first officer and flight engineer performed their duties in a very professional, coordinated and competent manner. Cockpit resource management training was evident in the crew's performance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT MUST RETURN LAND DUE TO ENG STRUT OVERHEAT WARNING AND AIR CONDITIONING PACK FAILURE AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF AT ABOUT 800 FT AGL, THE #1 ENG STRUT OVERHEAT WARNING LIGHT CAME ON. I CALLED FOR THE 'STRUT OVERHEAT' PROC. THE ENGINEER BEGAN THE PROC AND ADVISED THAT THE R AIR CONDITIONING PACK HAD TRIPPED OFF DURING THE TKOF ROLL DUE TO AN OVERHEAT. THEREFORE, SINCE THE #1 ENG WAS SUPPLYING THE L AIR CONDITIONING PACK, CLOSING THE #1 BLEED WOULD CAUSE US TO LOSE CABIN PRESSURE. SINCE WE WERE AT LOW ALT THIS WAS ONLY A DISTRACTING FACTOR. AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE STRUT OVERHEAT PROC THE FE RESET THE R AIR CONDITIONING PACK AND ATTEMPTED TO RE- PRESSURIZE THE ACFT. AT THIS TIME WE WERE AT 5000 FT MSL. THE CABIN WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE BELOW 3000 FT. WE REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS TO RWY 30 L AT STL. THE STRUT OVERHEAT LIGHT WENT OUT AFTER 30 SECONDS. I CONSIDERED LNDG WT CHARTS AND DETERMINED THAT WE HAD THE CAPABILITY TO LAND ON RWY 30L AT OUR CURRENT WT OF 167000 LBS, 17000 FT OVER MAX GROSS LNDG WT, AND AVOID DUMPING FUEL. I COORDINATED THE PROCS AND CHKLISTS WITH THE FE AND HANDLED ATC AND CABIN COMS. THE FO WAS DESIGNATED TO FLY THE ACFT. THE OVERWT LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT EVENT. (THE ENG #1 BLEED AIR MODULATION VALVE WAS LEAKING AT THE CONNECTION TO THE DUCTING CAUSING THE WARNING.) THE FO AND FE PERFORMED THEIR DUTIES IN A VERY PROFESSIONAL, COORDINATED AND COMPETENT MANNER. COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING WAS EVIDENT IN THE CREW'S PERFORMANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.