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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 275939 |
Time | |
Date | 199407 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mem |
State Reference | TN |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 1000 msl bound upper : 1000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : mem |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff climbout : initial ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 9500 flight time type : 4000 |
ASRS Report | 275939 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
After starting the left engine the captain stated that we would do a single engine taxi out to the runway, we then completed the after start checklist. After we started to taxi it was apparent that it would be a short taxi out to the runway and the captain asked me to start the right engine. We completed the delayed engine start checklist and I started the right engine. After the right engine was started we completed the after start checklist and the before takeoff checklist. At some point while reading the before start checklist the tower controller cleared us for takeoff, he did this over the ground control frequency. I switched over to the tower control frequency and we finished the checklist. After departure at 1000 ft AGL the captain called for the flaps up and the slats retract. At this point my attention was diverted. My hand was on the flap/slat control handle and I retracted the slats. At this time the captain apologized for rushing the departure. While doing the after takeoff checklist I got this feeling that I did not put the flaps up and wondered if we took off with the flaps in the zero degree confign. I normally put the flaps down and extend the slats to the takeoff confign before we start the taxi out. They are extended as part of a flow pattern I use. If a single engine taxi procedure is used I then rechk the flaps and slats using a flow pattern. The flaps and slats are then rechked again by both the first officer and captain while doing the before takeoff checklist. Here is what I think may have happened: 1) I may have put the flaps up at 1000 ft while my attention was diverted without consciously thinking about what I was doing. 2) the captain may have put the flaps up at 1000 ft, which they occasionally do. I then retracted the slats. 3) we departed with the flaps in the zero degree confign, they are supposed to be set to either 5 or 15 degrees. Here is what I think may have contributed: 1) crew fatigue. We had a scheduled XX27 layover which was reduced because of our late arrival the night before. 2) inadequate rest. The hotel is located at the departure end of a runway. I was awakened early by the cargo hub departure. 3) short taxi to the runway which caused us to rush. I cannot say if the flaps were up or down for takeoff. I do know that the slats were extended for takeoff.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: POSSIBLE TKOF WITH NO FLAPS.
Narrative: AFTER STARTING THE L ENG THE CAPT STATED THAT WE WOULD DO A SINGLE ENG TAXI OUT TO THE RWY, WE THEN COMPLETED THE AFTER START CHKLIST. AFTER WE STARTED TO TAXI IT WAS APPARENT THAT IT WOULD BE A SHORT TAXI OUT TO THE RWY AND THE CAPT ASKED ME TO START THE R ENG. WE COMPLETED THE DELAYED ENG START CHKLIST AND I STARTED THE R ENG. AFTER THE R ENG WAS STARTED WE COMPLETED THE AFTER START CHKLIST AND THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. AT SOME POINT WHILE READING THE BEFORE START CHKLIST THE TWR CTLR CLRED US FOR TKOF, HE DID THIS OVER THE GND CTL FREQ. I SWITCHED OVER TO THE TWR CTL FREQ AND WE FINISHED THE CHKLIST. AFTER DEP AT 1000 FT AGL THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE FLAPS UP AND THE SLATS RETRACT. AT THIS POINT MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED. MY HAND WAS ON THE FLAP/SLAT CTL HANDLE AND I RETRACTED THE SLATS. AT THIS TIME THE CAPT APOLOGIZED FOR RUSHING THE DEP. WHILE DOING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST I GOT THIS FEELING THAT I DID NOT PUT THE FLAPS UP AND WONDERED IF WE TOOK OFF WITH THE FLAPS IN THE ZERO DEG CONFIGN. I NORMALLY PUT THE FLAPS DOWN AND EXTEND THE SLATS TO THE TKOF CONFIGN BEFORE WE START THE TAXI OUT. THEY ARE EXTENDED AS PART OF A FLOW PATTERN I USE. IF A SINGLE ENG TAXI PROC IS USED I THEN RECHK THE FLAPS AND SLATS USING A FLOW PATTERN. THE FLAPS AND SLATS ARE THEN RECHKED AGAIN BY BOTH THE FO AND CAPT WHILE DOING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. HERE IS WHAT I THINK MAY HAVE HAPPENED: 1) I MAY HAVE PUT THE FLAPS UP AT 1000 FT WHILE MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED WITHOUT CONSCIOUSLY THINKING ABOUT WHAT I WAS DOING. 2) THE CAPT MAY HAVE PUT THE FLAPS UP AT 1000 FT, WHICH THEY OCCASIONALLY DO. I THEN RETRACTED THE SLATS. 3) WE DEPARTED WITH THE FLAPS IN THE ZERO DEG CONFIGN, THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO BE SET TO EITHER 5 OR 15 DEGS. HERE IS WHAT I THINK MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED: 1) CREW FATIGUE. WE HAD A SCHEDULED XX27 LAYOVER WHICH WAS REDUCED BECAUSE OF OUR LATE ARR THE NIGHT BEFORE. 2) INADEQUATE REST. THE HOTEL IS LOCATED AT THE DEP END OF A RWY. I WAS AWAKENED EARLY BY THE CARGO HUB DEP. 3) SHORT TAXI TO THE RWY WHICH CAUSED US TO RUSH. I CANNOT SAY IF THE FLAPS WERE UP OR DOWN FOR TKOF. I DO KNOW THAT THE SLATS WERE EXTENDED FOR TKOF.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.