Narrative:

Inbound to geg we notified the station on company frequency that we would require fuel outbound. During our 20 min turn on the ground no fuel truck arrived and we were distracted by the ground crew. During climb out on the outbound leg to sea we noticed that we only had about 800 pounds of fuel on board -- insufficient to reach sea with an adequate reserve. After discussing the situation we decided to land in ykm, wa, to obtain more fuel. On the ground there, I called our flight follower in sea and informed him of what was happening and he gave us a flight number for the outbound leg. We loaded 800 pounds of fuel (we already had 450 pounds still on board) and departed ykm after about 10 mins on the ground there. The flight arrived approximately 20 mins late in sea. The problem was mainly due to inattn on our part but several other factors were involved: recent events with our company had occupied our conversation inbound and on the ground with the ground crew (this station is slated to be closed soon). This had distracted us and the ground crew (who would have been calling for fuel) during our 20 min turn on the ground. Also the before start checklist had recently been changed from challenge and response ('fuel quantity and balance -- checked') to a single pilot operation performed by the captain while the first officer closes the cabin door. Had the checklist been performed as a challenge and response the low fuel quantity probably would have been detected on the ground and the situation averted. This underscores the importance of vigilance during even the most routine operations. It's so easy to become complacent flying the same aircraft on the same rtes over and over. Also, stress from events beyond your control need to be left outside the aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 276443: after landing and the passenger had departed, I got out of the plane to make a head call. Both the captain and I were a little rushed. I sat back up in the cockpit while the captain boarded the passenger and filled out the weight and balance form. I finished with the takeoff data while the captain climbed in the cockpit and proceeded with the prestart checklist. Neither of us checked the fuel gauge, assuming that the fuel truck had arrived and gone while I was in the head. As it was, we could have avoided the incident entirely by taking our time and thoroughly covering all aspects of the checklist.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LTT DEPARTED WITHOUT REFUELING ON QUICK TURN AROUND.

Narrative: INBOUND TO GEG WE NOTIFIED THE STATION ON COMPANY FREQ THAT WE WOULD REQUIRE FUEL OUTBOUND. DURING OUR 20 MIN TURN ON THE GND NO FUEL TRUCK ARRIVED AND WE WERE DISTRACTED BY THE GND CREW. DURING CLBOUT ON THE OUTBOUND LEG TO SEA WE NOTICED THAT WE ONLY HAD ABOUT 800 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD -- INSUFFICIENT TO REACH SEA WITH AN ADEQUATE RESERVE. AFTER DISCUSSING THE SIT WE DECIDED TO LAND IN YKM, WA, TO OBTAIN MORE FUEL. ON THE GND THERE, I CALLED OUR FLT FOLLOWER IN SEA AND INFORMED HIM OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING AND HE GAVE US A FLT NUMBER FOR THE OUTBOUND LEG. WE LOADED 800 LBS OF FUEL (WE ALREADY HAD 450 LBS STILL ON BOARD) AND DEPARTED YKM AFTER ABOUT 10 MINS ON THE GND THERE. THE FLT ARRIVED APPROX 20 MINS LATE IN SEA. THE PROB WAS MAINLY DUE TO INATTN ON OUR PART BUT SEVERAL OTHER FACTORS WERE INVOLVED: RECENT EVENTS WITH OUR COMPANY HAD OCCUPIED OUR CONVERSATION INBOUND AND ON THE GND WITH THE GND CREW (THIS STATION IS SLATED TO BE CLOSED SOON). THIS HAD DISTRACTED US AND THE GND CREW (WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN CALLING FOR FUEL) DURING OUR 20 MIN TURN ON THE GND. ALSO THE BEFORE START CHKLIST HAD RECENTLY BEEN CHANGED FROM CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE ('FUEL QUANTITY AND BAL -- CHKED') TO A SINGLE PLT OP PERFORMED BY THE CAPT WHILE THE FO CLOSES THE CABIN DOOR. HAD THE CHKLIST BEEN PERFORMED AS A CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE THE LOW FUEL QUANTITY PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN DETECTED ON THE GND AND THE SIT AVERTED. THIS UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF VIGILANCE DURING EVEN THE MOST ROUTINE OPS. IT'S SO EASY TO BECOME COMPLACENT FLYING THE SAME ACFT ON THE SAME RTES OVER AND OVER. ALSO, STRESS FROM EVENTS BEYOND YOUR CTL NEED TO BE LEFT OUTSIDE THE ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 276443: AFTER LNDG AND THE PAX HAD DEPARTED, I GOT OUT OF THE PLANE TO MAKE A HEAD CALL. BOTH THE CAPT AND I WERE A LITTLE RUSHED. I SAT BACK UP IN THE COCKPIT WHILE THE CAPT BOARDED THE PAX AND FILLED OUT THE WT AND BAL FORM. I FINISHED WITH THE TKOF DATA WHILE THE CAPT CLBED IN THE COCKPIT AND PROCEEDED WITH THE PRESTART CHKLIST. NEITHER OF US CHKED THE FUEL GAUGE, ASSUMING THAT THE FUEL TRUCK HAD ARRIVED AND GONE WHILE I WAS IN THE HEAD. AS IT WAS, WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE INCIDENT ENTIRELY BY TAKING OUR TIME AND THOROUGHLY COVERING ALL ASPECTS OF THE CHKLIST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.