Narrative:

Beginning the third leg of a duty day that approached 11 hours, after 2 legs of heavy thunderstorm deviations began final leg to domicile. Exiting pit ramp received taxi clearance to runway 28L. After a quick look at the taxi diagram, and a rather lengthy discussion with the first officer who was closely checking the diagram, we decided we understood the clearance and began taxiing. After moving approximately 150 yards we were informed that we had made the wrong approach to the desired taxiway -- no conflict occurred. The controller emphasized that we should question the clearance if clarification is needed, which is exactly the point -- 2 experienced pilots. One with the chart to their nose and a discussion with each other and what was considered a good decision. Something is drastically wrong! 1) the signage at pit is more than inadequate. In many cases it is nonexistent. 2) the taxiway chart, because of the size limitations of 1 small sheet rather than the multi-fold version is lacking in adequate detail. 3) the controllers apparently assume anyone using their facility has the degree of local knowledge they possess. This reporter feels compelled to say that pit is the next perfect place for an accident/incident like dtw experienced with the DC9-727 taxi/takeoff collision. Something needs to be done about pit. The lack of adequate signs, information, and verbal communication are as bad as any place in the united states. Should it happen, it would have been rather easy to prevent, other facilities do a far better job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG TAKES WRONG TXWY LEAVING RAMP.

Narrative: BEGINNING THE THIRD LEG OF A DUTY DAY THAT APCHED 11 HRS, AFTER 2 LEGS OF HVY TSTM DEVS BEGAN FINAL LEG TO DOMICILE. EXITING PIT RAMP RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 28L. AFTER A QUICK LOOK AT THE TAXI DIAGRAM, AND A RATHER LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH THE FO WHO WAS CLOSELY CHKING THE DIAGRAM, WE DECIDED WE UNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC AND BEGAN TAXIING. AFTER MOVING APPROX 150 YARDS WE WERE INFORMED THAT WE HAD MADE THE WRONG APCH TO THE DESIRED TXWY -- NO CONFLICT OCCURRED. THE CTLR EMPHASIZED THAT WE SHOULD QUESTION THE CLRNC IF CLARIFICATION IS NEEDED, WHICH IS EXACTLY THE POINT -- 2 EXPERIENCED PLTS. ONE WITH THE CHART TO THEIR NOSE AND A DISCUSSION WITH EACH OTHER AND WHAT WAS CONSIDERED A GOOD DECISION. SOMETHING IS DRASTICALLY WRONG! 1) THE SIGNAGE AT PIT IS MORE THAN INADEQUATE. IN MANY CASES IT IS NONEXISTENT. 2) THE TXWY CHART, BECAUSE OF THE SIZE LIMITATIONS OF 1 SMALL SHEET RATHER THAN THE MULTI-FOLD VERSION IS LACKING IN ADEQUATE DETAIL. 3) THE CTLRS APPARENTLY ASSUME ANYONE USING THEIR FACILITY HAS THE DEGREE OF LCL KNOWLEDGE THEY POSSESS. THIS RPTR FEELS COMPELLED TO SAY THAT PIT IS THE NEXT PERFECT PLACE FOR AN ACCIDENT/INCIDENT LIKE DTW EXPERIENCED WITH THE DC9-727 TAXI/TKOF COLLISION. SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE ABOUT PIT. THE LACK OF ADEQUATE SIGNS, INFO, AND VERBAL COM ARE AS BAD AS ANY PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES. SHOULD IT HAPPEN, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN RATHER EASY TO PREVENT, OTHER FACILITIES DO A FAR BETTER JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.