Narrative:

Right after rotation 5 pallets of cargo, a combined total of approximately 20000 pounds shifted aft the length of 2 position damaging cargo liner, damaging several circumferential and stringers, knocking a 6 inch by 5 inch whole in the fuselage skin. Nose pitched up to 22 degrees, airspeed dropped to below V2 full elevator forward and stabilizer trim full nose down and 25 degree bank required to keep airplane from stalling. Accelerating in the turn, pulling flaps and gear up, airplane porpoising. Gradually gaining some altitude and as speed increased, some elevator control. At 10000 ft first officer and flight engineer ordered back to pull one 5000 pound pallet forward 2 position, then regained more elevator authority/authorized, able to land at santo domingo with 35 degrees flaps. Ground crew had neglected to properly secure cargo. But PIC held responsible for proper loading of aircraft.supplemental information from acn 280666: first officer's leg normal taxi, normal rotation. At approximately 6-8 degrees nose up I felt the aircraft shudder and begin to pitch up rather quickly. I began to control slight nose down and to trim nose down. At approximately 14-16 degrees the aircraft continued to pitch nose up. By this time I had nearly full forward pressure on the yoke and continued to trim nose down captain then also began to put forward pressure on the yoke and together we were holding the yoke to the full forward position and still trimming nose down. The aircraft was beginning to loose airspeed rather quickly and was still pitching up, to approximately 22 degrees. Captain stated we must put in a 25-30 degree bank to try to get the nose to pitch down and he initiated a left bank. The airspeed had dropped to approximately vr (120 KTS) and I could no longer hear the trim horn sounding. The aircraft seemed to hang in limbo for about 5 seconds and although I don't recall what the exact speed or pitch was at that time I remember thinking to myself about another 5-10 KT loss would create a stall. The aircraft began to slowly increase in speed and decrease in pitch while still holding the yoke full forward until it began to ever so slowly to become more manageable. To go back to see what had happened and if he could do anything. The captain told me that he had control of the aircraft and for me to go back and see if I could help. The aircraft was porpoising slightly at this time. I went back briefly and tried to help move the pallets forward to no avail. We told him that if we could possibly get a slight nose down attitude that we could possibly be able to move the pallets. He sent us back again and apparently by pulling back the power was able to pitch down slightly enough for us to move one heavy pallet forward about 1 or 2 positions and tie it into place. The movement of that pallet gave us approximately 1 degree of trim to play with and with a shallow descent and straight in approach, captain was able to land successfully at mdsd. Upon further investigation we found a pallet wedged upright, a hole in the fuselage upper left hand at P-10, broken stringer, severe damage to sidewalls, tracks bent and bear traps missing. Crew coordination was exemplary during this crisis and we were able to keep cool heads although at one point for a couple of seconds I must admit I thought we might not be able to regain control of the aircraft. In closing I would like to thank the rest of the crew for their diligent efforts, we were able to avert a critical situation due solely to improper cargo loading and securing. The cargo handlers must be trained in the importance of proper loading and securing techniques. There was no load master and no one spoke any english to alert us to any possible problems. It seems quite obvious that several bear traps must have been left unattached out of our view. I respectfully decline any further mdpp trips until such time as some drastic safety measures are taken to insure the quality of loading at this station. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: callback to the reporter revealed that this operation was a charter flight operated by the air carrier for a group in the dominican republic. The ground personnel were hired randomly as independent operators. Reporter felt that thegnd crew had no training in the proper tie down procedures on the dc-8. The air carrier did send a team of 2 mechanics to 'fix' the aircraft but it was done in a makeshift way -- with the logbook sign off being very vague as to what the original problem had been in any detail. Just a temporary repair that did not allow the reporter to feel safe in flying that aircraft. The repair crew flew back on another air carrier! The reporter has been advised to resign or be terminated. His 'local association' of pilots have heard his case which he said was a 'joke' as the pilot group isn't well founded. The air carrier held a meeting with the FAA. The reporter was 'notified' by the air carrier in calling and advising his 13 yr old daughter about it. The reporter did contact the FAA hotline and stated that the '30 day period of consideration' was just about up. He is going to call again if nothing is heard from the FAA hotline personnel. He further stated that the poi failed to react as expected since he has a close relationship with the owner of the air carrier, being a personal friend of his. The director of flight operations for the air carrier went down and flew the 'repaired' aircraft back, using the 'captain' of the incident as a first officer. The other 2 crew were afraid of losing their jobs so did fly the aircraft. They didn't, however, have any maintenance backgnd. Reporter wants to take the pictures he took to the NTSB and douglas. He said he isn't finished with this issue. Other crews have reported problems, though not so severe as this one. Supplemental information from acn 280564: I feel that a bilingual load master would have easily prevented this near tragic incident from occurring.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARGO PALLETS SHIFT ON TKOF. LOSS OF ACFT CTL. FOREIGN AIRSPACE.

Narrative: RIGHT AFTER ROTATION 5 PALLETS OF CARGO, A COMBINED TOTAL OF APPROX 20000 LBS SHIFTED AFT THE LENGTH OF 2 POS DAMAGING CARGO LINER, DAMAGING SEVERAL CIRCUMFERENTIAL AND STRINGERS, KNOCKING A 6 INCH BY 5 INCH WHOLE IN THE FUSELAGE SKIN. NOSE PITCHED UP TO 22 DEGS, AIRSPD DROPPED TO BELOW V2 FULL ELEVATOR FORWARD AND STABILIZER TRIM FULL NOSE DOWN AND 25 DEG BANK REQUIRED TO KEEP AIRPLANE FROM STALLING. ACCELERATING IN THE TURN, PULLING FLAPS AND GEAR UP, AIRPLANE PORPOISING. GRADUALLY GAINING SOME ALT AND AS SPD INCREASED, SOME ELEVATOR CTL. AT 10000 FT FO AND FE ORDERED BACK TO PULL ONE 5000 LB PALLET FORWARD 2 POS, THEN REGAINED MORE ELEVATOR AUTH, ABLE TO LAND AT SANTO DOMINGO WITH 35 DEGS FLAPS. GND CREW HAD NEGLECTED TO PROPERLY SECURE CARGO. BUT PIC HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR PROPER LOADING OF ACFT.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 280666: FO'S LEG NORMAL TAXI, NORMAL ROTATION. AT APPROX 6-8 DEGS NOSE UP I FELT THE ACFT SHUDDER AND BEGIN TO PITCH UP RATHER QUICKLY. I BEGAN TO CTL SLIGHT NOSE DOWN AND TO TRIM NOSE DOWN. AT APPROX 14-16 DEGS THE ACFT CONTINUED TO PITCH NOSE UP. BY THIS TIME I HAD NEARLY FULL FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE AND CONTINUED TO TRIM NOSE DOWN CAPT THEN ALSO BEGAN TO PUT FORWARD PRESSURE ON THE YOKE AND TOGETHER WE WERE HOLDING THE YOKE TO THE FULL FORWARD POS AND STILL TRIMMING NOSE DOWN. THE ACFT WAS BEGINNING TO LOOSE AIRSPD RATHER QUICKLY AND WAS STILL PITCHING UP, TO APPROX 22 DEGS. CAPT STATED WE MUST PUT IN A 25-30 DEG BANK TO TRY TO GET THE NOSE TO PITCH DOWN AND HE INITIATED A L BANK. THE AIRSPD HAD DROPPED TO APPROX VR (120 KTS) AND I COULD NO LONGER HEAR THE TRIM HORN SOUNDING. THE ACFT SEEMED TO HANG IN LIMBO FOR ABOUT 5 SECONDS AND ALTHOUGH I DON'T RECALL WHAT THE EXACT SPD OR PITCH WAS AT THAT TIME I REMEMBER THINKING TO MYSELF ABOUT ANOTHER 5-10 KT LOSS WOULD CREATE A STALL. THE ACFT BEGAN TO SLOWLY INCREASE IN SPD AND DECREASE IN PITCH WHILE STILL HOLDING THE YOKE FULL FORWARD UNTIL IT BEGAN TO EVER SO SLOWLY TO BECOME MORE MANAGEABLE. TO GO BACK TO SEE WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND IF HE COULD DO ANYTHING. THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT HE HAD CTL OF THE ACFT AND FOR ME TO GO BACK AND SEE IF I COULD HELP. THE ACFT WAS PORPOISING SLIGHTLY AT THIS TIME. I WENT BACK BRIEFLY AND TRIED TO HELP MOVE THE PALLETS FORWARD TO NO AVAIL. WE TOLD HIM THAT IF WE COULD POSSIBLY GET A SLIGHT NOSE DOWN ATTITUDE THAT WE COULD POSSIBLY BE ABLE TO MOVE THE PALLETS. HE SENT US BACK AGAIN AND APPARENTLY BY PULLING BACK THE PWR WAS ABLE TO PITCH DOWN SLIGHTLY ENOUGH FOR US TO MOVE ONE HVY PALLET FORWARD ABOUT 1 OR 2 POSITIONS AND TIE IT INTO PLACE. THE MOVEMENT OF THAT PALLET GAVE US APPROX 1 DEG OF TRIM TO PLAY WITH AND WITH A SHALLOW DSCNT AND STRAIGHT IN APCH, CAPT WAS ABLE TO LAND SUCCESSFULLY AT MDSD. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION WE FOUND A PALLET WEDGED UPRIGHT, A HOLE IN THE FUSELAGE UPPER L HAND AT P-10, BROKEN STRINGER, SEVERE DAMAGE TO SIDEWALLS, TRACKS BENT AND BEAR TRAPS MISSING. CREW COORD WAS EXEMPLARY DURING THIS CRISIS AND WE WERE ABLE TO KEEP COOL HEADS ALTHOUGH AT ONE POINT FOR A COUPLE OF SECONDS I MUST ADMIT I THOUGHT WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO REGAIN CTL OF THE ACFT. IN CLOSING I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE REST OF THE CREW FOR THEIR DILIGENT EFFORTS, WE WERE ABLE TO AVERT A CRITICAL SIT DUE SOLELY TO IMPROPER CARGO LOADING AND SECURING. THE CARGO HANDLERS MUST BE TRAINED IN THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPER LOADING AND SECURING TECHNIQUES. THERE WAS NO LOAD MASTER AND NO ONE SPOKE ANY ENGLISH TO ALERT US TO ANY POSSIBLE PROBS. IT SEEMS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT SEVERAL BEAR TRAPS MUST HAVE BEEN LEFT UNATTACHED OUT OF OUR VIEW. I RESPECTFULLY DECLINE ANY FURTHER MDPP TRIPS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SOME DRASTIC SAFETY MEASURES ARE TAKEN TO INSURE THE QUALITY OF LOADING AT THIS STATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK TO THE RPTR REVEALED THAT THIS OP WAS A CHARTER FLT OPERATED BY THE ACR FOR A GROUP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE GND PERSONNEL WERE HIRED RANDOMLY AS INDEPENDENT OPERATORS. RPTR FELT THAT THEGND CREW HAD NO TRAINING IN THE PROPER TIE DOWN PROCS ON THE DC-8. THE ACR DID SEND A TEAM OF 2 MECHS TO 'FIX' THE ACFT BUT IT WAS DONE IN A MAKESHIFT WAY -- WITH THE LOGBOOK SIGN OFF BEING VERY VAGUE AS TO WHAT THE ORIGINAL PROB HAD BEEN IN ANY DETAIL. JUST A TEMPORARY REPAIR THAT DID NOT ALLOW THE RPTR TO FEEL SAFE IN FLYING THAT ACFT. THE REPAIR CREW FLEW BACK ON ANOTHER ACR! THE RPTR HAS BEEN ADVISED TO RESIGN OR BE TERMINATED. HIS 'LCL ASSOCIATION' OF PLTS HAVE HEARD HIS CASE WHICH HE SAID WAS A 'JOKE' AS THE PLT GROUP ISN'T WELL FOUNDED. THE ACR HELD A MEETING WITH THE FAA. THE RPTR WAS 'NOTIFIED' BY THE ACR IN CALLING AND ADVISING HIS 13 YR OLD DAUGHTER ABOUT IT. THE RPTR DID CONTACT THE FAA HOTLINE AND STATED THAT THE '30 DAY PERIOD OF CONSIDERATION' WAS JUST ABOUT UP. HE IS GOING TO CALL AGAIN IF NOTHING IS HEARD FROM THE FAA HOTLINE PERSONNEL. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE POI FAILED TO REACT AS EXPECTED SINCE HE HAS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OWNER OF THE ACR, BEING A PERSONAL FRIEND OF HIS. THE DIRECTOR OF FLT OPS FOR THE ACR WENT DOWN AND FLEW THE 'REPAIRED' ACFT BACK, USING THE 'CAPT' OF THE INCIDENT AS A FO. THE OTHER 2 CREW WERE AFRAID OF LOSING THEIR JOBS SO DID FLY THE ACFT. THEY DIDN'T, HOWEVER, HAVE ANY MAINT BACKGND. RPTR WANTS TO TAKE THE PICTURES HE TOOK TO THE NTSB AND DOUGLAS. HE SAID HE ISN'T FINISHED WITH THIS ISSUE. OTHER CREWS HAVE RPTED PROBS, THOUGH NOT SO SEVERE AS THIS ONE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 280564: I FEEL THAT A BILINGUAL LOAD MASTER WOULD HAVE EASILY PREVENTED THIS NEAR TRAGIC INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.