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Publication deficiency inferred.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 280454 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199408 |
| Day | Mon |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : rno |
| State Reference | NV |
| Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | MD-80 Super 80 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | Other |
| Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground : holding |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| ASRS Report | 280454 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other flight crewa other other : unspecified |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
| Consequence | Other |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | Chart Or Publication |
| Air Traffic Incident | other |
| Situations | |
| Publication | Unspecified |
Narrative:
For departure from rno this aircraft had a thrust reverser placarded inoperative and after consulting the MEL we departed the gate normally. We taxied out for departure and as I took the runway for takeoff -- after briefing the takeoff -- I realized that I would have to use at least idle reverse on the inoperative thrust reverser if I desired automatic deflection of the spoiler system during an aborted takeoff. Keep in mind that the empirical order of events includes verification of deployment or manual use of the spoiler handle. I feel that a reminder note in the S80 MEL to remind the pilot to expect to use the operation reverser to generate automatic-spoiler or if by choice manual spoiler, to insure stopping safely during a high speed abort procedure. Please consider this note in addition to the descriptions in the operating manual to insure the flight crew's knowledge of the operating limitations with one thrust reverser inoperative. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter's aircraft had been svced by contract maintenance, not by his air carrier. When the air carrier disables the reverser they wire the reverser in the cockpit so that the reverse lever cannot be raised. When any one reverser is inoperative, that also makes the automatic spoiler inoperative in case of an abort, since it takes 2 reverse actuators to deploy the automatic spoilers. The air carrier pilot operating manual or the MEL requirements do not spell out the fact that the pilot must use manual deployment of the spoilers in this case, as the manual use is inferred and quite obvious when one reverser is wired down. The contract ground crew did not wire the reverser lever down so PIC considered the use of that lever if he had an abort. Reporter wants the air carrier to remind flcs that they must have both reverse levers operative or plan on manual extension during aborts. The air carrier is working with the manufacturer to develop a procedure whereby the aft inoperative section of the reverser is wired closed but the reverse lever in the cockpit is not wired down. This would enable normal abort procedures with one inoperative reverser to deploy the automatic spoilers in a normal fashion. Reporter was not sure that the air carrier had done anything with his suggestion.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PUB DEFICIENCY INFERRED.
Narrative: FOR DEP FROM RNO THIS ACFT HAD A THRUST REVERSER PLACARDED INOP AND AFTER CONSULTING THE MEL WE DEPARTED THE GATE NORMALLY. WE TAXIED OUT FOR DEP AND AS I TOOK THE RWY FOR TKOF -- AFTER BRIEFING THE TKOF -- I REALIZED THAT I WOULD HAVE TO USE AT LEAST IDLE REVERSE ON THE INOP THRUST REVERSER IF I DESIRED AUTOMATIC DEFLECTION OF THE SPOILER SYS DURING AN ABORTED TKOF. KEEP IN MIND THAT THE EMPIRICAL ORDER OF EVENTS INCLUDES VERIFICATION OF DEPLOYMENT OR MANUAL USE OF THE SPOILER HANDLE. I FEEL THAT A REMINDER NOTE IN THE S80 MEL TO REMIND THE PLT TO EXPECT TO USE THE OP REVERSER TO GENERATE AUTO-SPOILER OR IF BY CHOICE MANUAL SPOILER, TO INSURE STOPPING SAFELY DURING A HIGH SPD ABORT PROC. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS NOTE IN ADDITION TO THE DESCRIPTIONS IN THE OPERATING MANUAL TO INSURE THE FLC'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS WITH ONE THRUST REVERSER INOP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR'S ACFT HAD BEEN SVCED BY CONTRACT MAINT, NOT BY HIS ACR. WHEN THE ACR DISABLES THE REVERSER THEY WIRE THE REVERSER IN THE COCKPIT SO THAT THE REVERSE LEVER CANNOT BE RAISED. WHEN ANY ONE REVERSER IS INOP, THAT ALSO MAKES THE AUTO SPOILER INOP IN CASE OF AN ABORT, SINCE IT TAKES 2 REVERSE ACTUATORS TO DEPLOY THE AUTO SPOILERS. THE ACR PLT OPERATING MANUAL OR THE MEL REQUIREMENTS DO NOT SPELL OUT THE FACT THAT THE PLT MUST USE MANUAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE SPOILERS IN THIS CASE, AS THE MANUAL USE IS INFERRED AND QUITE OBVIOUS WHEN ONE REVERSER IS WIRED DOWN. THE CONTRACT GND CREW DID NOT WIRE THE REVERSER LEVER DOWN SO PIC CONSIDERED THE USE OF THAT LEVER IF HE HAD AN ABORT. RPTR WANTS THE ACR TO REMIND FLCS THAT THEY MUST HAVE BOTH REVERSE LEVERS OPERATIVE OR PLAN ON MANUAL EXTENSION DURING ABORTS. THE ACR IS WORKING WITH THE MANUFACTURER TO DEVELOP A PROC WHEREBY THE AFT INOP SECTION OF THE REVERSER IS WIRED CLOSED BUT THE REVERSE LEVER IN THE COCKPIT IS NOT WIRED DOWN. THIS WOULD ENABLE NORMAL ABORT PROCS WITH ONE INOP REVERSER TO DEPLOY THE AUTO SPOILERS IN A NORMAL FASHION. RPTR WAS NOT SURE THAT THE ACR HAD DONE ANYTHING WITH HIS SUGGESTION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.