Narrative:

Iah-las on aug/xx/94. Gate agents have got to get accuload and pre-departure clrncs to flcs in a prompt and timely matter. As the aircraft door was ready to close the flight crew had received neither. In a hasty manner the gate agent retrieved both and handed them through the cockpit window on the captain's side. The clearance was correct. The accuload was not, however, neither the captain or first officer recognized fully that the accuload was for a different aircraft type until later. The first officer saw no V speeds at the bottom of accuload and thought the printer had screwed up and left them off. He called load planning on the radio. He got V speeds from them and out of habit reread the zero fuel weight and maximum trim setting. Load planning verified both as correct readbacks, although it is impossible that they could have been. He recalled them to verify that flaps were 11 degrees for takeoff. Later on the captain and first officer realized that the gross weight on the fuel totalizer had to be much too light for an aircraft that had every seat occupied. If accuload had been received before push time, I believe the crew would have recognized that they had an accuload for a different aircraft type and flight number before takeoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC RECEIVED WRONG LOAD DATA FROM DISPATCHER AFTER THE CABIN DOOR WAS SHUT AND DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT WAS FOR ANOTHER ACFT UNTIL LATER.

Narrative: IAH-LAS ON AUG/XX/94. GATE AGENTS HAVE GOT TO GET ACCULOAD AND PRE-DEP CLRNCS TO FLCS IN A PROMPT AND TIMELY MATTER. AS THE ACFT DOOR WAS READY TO CLOSE THE FLC HAD RECEIVED NEITHER. IN A HASTY MANNER THE GATE AGENT RETRIEVED BOTH AND HANDED THEM THROUGH THE COCKPIT WINDOW ON THE CAPT'S SIDE. THE CLRNC WAS CORRECT. THE ACCULOAD WAS NOT, HOWEVER, NEITHER THE CAPT OR FO RECOGNIZED FULLY THAT THE ACCULOAD WAS FOR A DIFFERENT ACFT TYPE UNTIL LATER. THE FO SAW NO V SPEEDS AT THE BOTTOM OF ACCULOAD AND THOUGHT THE PRINTER HAD SCREWED UP AND LEFT THEM OFF. HE CALLED LOAD PLANNING ON THE RADIO. HE GOT V SPDS FROM THEM AND OUT OF HABIT REREAD THE ZERO FUEL WT AND MAX TRIM SETTING. LOAD PLANNING VERIFIED BOTH AS CORRECT READBACKS, ALTHOUGH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD HAVE BEEN. HE RECALLED THEM TO VERIFY THAT FLAPS WERE 11 DEGS FOR TKOF. LATER ON THE CAPT AND FO REALIZED THAT THE GROSS WT ON THE FUEL TOTALIZER HAD TO BE MUCH TOO LIGHT FOR AN ACFT THAT HAD EVERY SEAT OCCUPIED. IF ACCULOAD HAD BEEN RECEIVED BEFORE PUSH TIME, I BELIEVE THE CREW WOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THEY HAD AN ACCULOAD FOR A DIFFERENT ACFT TYPE AND FLT NUMBER BEFORE TKOF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.