Narrative:

Captain X and I departed chicago's (ord) with destination being green bay (grb). While en route we encountered thunderstorm activity which we deviated well east of our intended course (toward east side of halle, michigan) to avoid such activity. Once breaching out of most WX we proceeded direct grb. While en route it was obvious that severe WX was moving rapidly into the grb area by use of the airborne radar. With intentions of trying to outrun the thunderstorms into the grb airport we continued inbound. Approximately 25 NM out from grb we decided to abort the ILS 3G approach as the thunderstorms had moved within 10 NM of the field. We opted to hold southeast of grb VOR which we did for approximately 30 mins. Meantime discussing our options considering WX and alternate airport and fuel we chanted our alternate to central wisconsin's airport (cwa). (One of our scheduled landing airports.) after speaking with grb FSS and appearing the thunderstorm activity was moving south and east toward us, we decided to circumnav the storm to the west and possibly then north with intentions of landing grb by coming in from the northwest. As we proceeded further west it was obvious the line of WX extended well west of grb and could see this would not be an option to attempt grb from any direction. After discussing our situation with consideration of the WX further south toward milwaukee, chicago, madison and now west toward central wisconsin and appleton it was again obvious for the safety of our passenger we needed to land at a suitable airport. At this time was without question, oshkosh as visual WX conditions existed. This decision based on ATC and their advice that to arrive cwa we would be required to circumnav a line of thunderstorms as far south as wisconsin dells VOR. West to the back side of the storm and north to cwa. Again, another conversation with dispatch and discussing the possibility of rhinelander (as an alternate) which would have only put us through the WX we decided to land oshkosh. Proceeding to do this without declaring an emergency is probably part of what could be considered careless and reckless operation being we did not have the correct paperwork to do so. The actions taking place in this report are based on time critical sits due to fuel load. In our airlines general operations manual we could not conduct scheduled passenger or cargo operations at oshkosh which we had this knowledge and were told by dispatch. Due to the WX conditions developing and building so rapidly on this particular evening mutual decision by captain and myself to land at an airport in visual conditions with an 8001 ft landing strip (runway 36) seemed the most safety oriented thing to do. Our problem lies in the fact it's not an approved alternate and we did not have the appropriate landing data onboard to land at osh. Supplemental information from acn 280877: unfortunately we did not declare an emergency. It was 13 1/2 hours into my duty day and had flown over 8 hours at that point. In the previous 6 days I had flown 21 hours and 34 mins. By the time I landed at osh I had flown around 30 hours in 7 days. I was a little tired. I was also thinking about the crashes that had occurred during thunderstorms in the last 6 months, I did not want to add my name to that list. I've learned that I should have declared an emergency. I also landed without proper data for oshkosh.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER ACFT, DEVIATING WX, LANDS AT UNAUTH ARPT. DIVERSION TO ALTERNATE.

Narrative: CAPT X AND I DEPARTED CHICAGO'S (ORD) WITH DEST BEING GREEN BAY (GRB). WHILE ENRTE WE ENCOUNTERED TSTM ACTIVITY WHICH WE DEVIATED WELL E OF OUR INTENDED COURSE (TOWARD E SIDE OF HALLE, MICHIGAN) TO AVOID SUCH ACTIVITY. ONCE BREACHING OUT OF MOST WX WE PROCEEDED DIRECT GRB. WHILE ENRTE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT SEVERE WX WAS MOVING RAPIDLY INTO THE GRB AREA BY USE OF THE AIRBORNE RADAR. WITH INTENTIONS OF TRYING TO OUTRUN THE TSTMS INTO THE GRB ARPT WE CONTINUED INBOUND. APPROX 25 NM OUT FROM GRB WE DECIDED TO ABORT THE ILS 3G APCH AS THE TSTMS HAD MOVED WITHIN 10 NM OF THE FIELD. WE OPTED TO HOLD SE OF GRB VOR WHICH WE DID FOR APPROX 30 MINS. MEANTIME DISCUSSING OUR OPTIONS CONSIDERING WX AND ALTERNATE ARPT AND FUEL WE CHANTED OUR ALTERNATE TO CENTRAL WISCONSIN'S ARPT (CWA). (ONE OF OUR SCHEDULED LNDG ARPTS.) AFTER SPEAKING WITH GRB FSS AND APPEARING THE TSTM ACTIVITY WAS MOVING S AND E TOWARD US, WE DECIDED TO CIRCUMNAV THE STORM TO THE W AND POSSIBLY THEN N WITH INTENTIONS OF LNDG GRB BY COMING IN FROM THE NW. AS WE PROCEEDED FURTHER W IT WAS OBVIOUS THE LINE OF WX EXTENDED WELL W OF GRB AND COULD SEE THIS WOULD NOT BE AN OPTION TO ATTEMPT GRB FROM ANY DIRECTION. AFTER DISCUSSING OUR SIT WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE WX FURTHER S TOWARD MILWAUKEE, CHICAGO, MADISON AND NOW W TOWARD CENTRAL WISCONSIN AND APPLETON IT WAS AGAIN OBVIOUS FOR THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX WE NEEDED TO LAND AT A SUITABLE ARPT. AT THIS TIME WAS WITHOUT QUESTION, OSHKOSH AS VISUAL WX CONDITIONS EXISTED. THIS DECISION BASED ON ATC AND THEIR ADVICE THAT TO ARRIVE CWA WE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO CIRCUMNAV A LINE OF TSTMS AS FAR S AS WISCONSIN DELLS VOR. W TO THE BACK SIDE OF THE STORM AND N TO CWA. AGAIN, ANOTHER CONVERSATION WITH DISPATCH AND DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF RHINELANDER (AS AN ALTERNATE) WHICH WOULD HAVE ONLY PUT US THROUGH THE WX WE DECIDED TO LAND OSHKOSH. PROCEEDING TO DO THIS WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMER IS PROBABLY PART OF WHAT COULD BE CONSIDERED CARELESS AND RECKLESS OP BEING WE DID NOT HAVE THE CORRECT PAPERWORK TO DO SO. THE ACTIONS TAKING PLACE IN THIS RPT ARE BASED ON TIME CRITICAL SITS DUE TO FUEL LOAD. IN OUR AIRLINES GENERAL OPS MANUAL WE COULD NOT CONDUCT SCHEDULED PAX OR CARGO OPS AT OSHKOSH WHICH WE HAD THIS KNOWLEDGE AND WERE TOLD BY DISPATCH. DUE TO THE WX CONDITIONS DEVELOPING AND BUILDING SO RAPIDLY ON THIS PARTICULAR EVENING MUTUAL DECISION BY CAPT AND MYSELF TO LAND AT AN ARPT IN VISUAL CONDITIONS WITH AN 8001 FT LNDG STRIP (RWY 36) SEEMED THE MOST SAFETY ORIENTED THING TO DO. OUR PROB LIES IN THE FACT IT'S NOT AN APPROVED ALTERNATE AND WE DID NOT HAVE THE APPROPRIATE LNDG DATA ONBOARD TO LAND AT OSH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 280877: UNFORTUNATELY WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. IT WAS 13 1/2 HRS INTO MY DUTY DAY AND HAD FLOWN OVER 8 HRS AT THAT POINT. IN THE PREVIOUS 6 DAYS I HAD FLOWN 21 HRS AND 34 MINS. BY THE TIME I LANDED AT OSH I HAD FLOWN AROUND 30 HRS IN 7 DAYS. I WAS A LITTLE TIRED. I WAS ALSO THINKING ABOUT THE CRASHES THAT HAD OCCURRED DURING TSTMS IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS, I DID NOT WANT TO ADD MY NAME TO THAT LIST. I'VE LEARNED THAT I SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER. I ALSO LANDED WITHOUT PROPER DATA FOR OSHKOSH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.