Narrative:

As captain (C) of a cl-601-3A on oct/xx/94, I was scheduled for a trip from white plains, ny, (hpn) to lawrenceville, GA (lzu), with a passenger drop at lzu, followed by a deadhead return. I was at the controls on the flight from hpn to lzu. This leg of the flight was uneventful. After dropping our passenger and refueling, I proceeded to taxi from the FBO ramp on the north side of the airport. Approaching the northernmost taxiway ('1' on the enclosed airport diagram). I asked the first officer if the taxiway 'went all the way to the end, ' meaning the approach end of runway 25. He replied that he believed so. We checked visually and concurred that it did. We had obviously mistaken the closed runway '2' for runway 25. This area of the airport is lower in elevation than that of runway 25, which was not visible to us. We continued to taxi, accomplishing the appropriate checklists, including the standard takeoff briefing for a first officer takeoff. We discussed the possibility of traffic at an uncontrolled airport, the first officer noting that there were no TCASII targets. As we approached the end of taxiway '1' I noted a yellow line across the taxiway, which I took to be the hold short line. I asked the first officer and he concurred, both of us noting that there were no other markings prior to the end of the closed runway. After completing the checklist and taxiing into position we both noted markings on the runway which we interpreted as a displaced threshold. We executed a standard right seat takeoff, wherein C advances the power and first officer 'trims' the power to takeoff setting. C maintains control of power throughout the takeoff, first officer assumes the flight controls at 80 KTS. The first officer rotated at rotation speed and a normal climb out was effected. After takeoff we discussed how little runway we had and that something wasn't right.' after reviewing our takeoff computations, which proved to be correct, I called the FBO on the flight phone and asked the general manager of the FBO if runway 25 is in fact, 6000 ft as indicated on the approach chart. He, having witnessed the takeoff, informed me that we had departed off the closed runway. We subsequently continued the flight, landing uneventfully at hpn. We thought we had all our bases covered on this one, but obviously we didn't. Mitigating circumstances: it was an uncontrolled airport and we are always concerned about traffic conflicts. The sun was very low in the sky hampering our vision. Taxiway markings are nonexistent on the north side of the airport. Extensive taxi, before takeoff and after landing aircraft checklists divert much attention inside the aircraft. Our company procedure for a right seat takeoff requires, for a brief period of time, both sets of eyes in the cockpit while setting and adjusting takeoff power. The closed runway is not marked as such on the airport diagram. This potential incident could have been averted by noting the runway heading and/or by consulting the airport diagram. A future occurrence could be prevented at this particular airport by taxiway signage and by closing off the northernmost txwys at the X's marked on the enclosed airport diagram. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states this was at one time a runway and still gives the appearance of one. The hold line was quite visible and also gave the appearance of a runway entrance. When taxiing onto the 'runway' there were diagonal lines which looked like a displaced threshold indication. These were apparently half of an 'X.' reporter conversation with general manager of FBO was well received and he feels perhaps some action will be taken. Reporter suggested 3 dimensional 'X's' so that they will be visible from the ground as well as the air. And of course his suggestions for barricade so that aircraft cannot taxi onto the 'runway' itself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CORPORATION JET DEPARTS ON CLOSED RWY.

Narrative: AS CAPT (C) OF A CL-601-3A ON OCT/XX/94, I WAS SCHEDULED FOR A TRIP FROM WHITE PLAINS, NY, (HPN) TO LAWRENCEVILLE, GA (LZU), WITH A PAX DROP AT LZU, FOLLOWED BY A DEADHEAD RETURN. I WAS AT THE CTLS ON THE FLT FROM HPN TO LZU. THIS LEG OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER DROPPING OUR PAX AND REFUELING, I PROCEEDED TO TAXI FROM THE FBO RAMP ON THE N SIDE OF THE ARPT. APCHING THE NORTHERNMOST TXWY ('1' ON THE ENCLOSED ARPT DIAGRAM). I ASKED THE FO IF THE TXWY 'WENT ALL THE WAY TO THE END, ' MEANING THE APCH END OF RWY 25. HE REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED SO. WE CHKED VISUALLY AND CONCURRED THAT IT DID. WE HAD OBVIOUSLY MISTAKEN THE CLOSED RWY '2' FOR RWY 25. THIS AREA OF THE ARPT IS LOWER IN ELEVATION THAN THAT OF RWY 25, WHICH WAS NOT VISIBLE TO US. WE CONTINUED TO TAXI, ACCOMPLISHING THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS, INCLUDING THE STANDARD TKOF BRIEFING FOR A FO TKOF. WE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF TFC AT AN UNCTLED ARPT, THE FO NOTING THAT THERE WERE NO TCASII TARGETS. AS WE APCHED THE END OF TXWY '1' I NOTED A YELLOW LINE ACROSS THE TXWY, WHICH I TOOK TO BE THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I ASKED THE FO AND HE CONCURRED, BOTH OF US NOTING THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER MARKINGS PRIOR TO THE END OF THE CLOSED RWY. AFTER COMPLETING THE CHKLIST AND TAXIING INTO POS WE BOTH NOTED MARKINGS ON THE RWY WHICH WE INTERPRETED AS A DISPLACED THRESHOLD. WE EXECUTED A STANDARD R SEAT TKOF, WHEREIN C ADVANCES THE PWR AND FO 'TRIMS' THE PWR TO TKOF SETTING. C MAINTAINS CTL OF PWR THROUGHOUT THE TKOF, FO ASSUMES THE FLT CTLS AT 80 KTS. THE FO ROTATED AT ROTATION SPD AND A NORMAL CLBOUT WAS EFFECTED. AFTER TKOF WE DISCUSSED HOW LITTLE RWY WE HAD AND THAT SOMETHING WASN'T RIGHT.' AFTER REVIEWING OUR TKOF COMPUTATIONS, WHICH PROVED TO BE CORRECT, I CALLED THE FBO ON THE FLT PHONE AND ASKED THE GENERAL MGR OF THE FBO IF RWY 25 IS IN FACT, 6000 FT AS INDICATED ON THE APCH CHART. HE, HAVING WITNESSED THE TKOF, INFORMED ME THAT WE HAD DEPARTED OFF THE CLOSED RWY. WE SUBSEQUENTLY CONTINUED THE FLT, LNDG UNEVENTFULLY AT HPN. WE THOUGHT WE HAD ALL OUR BASES COVERED ON THIS ONE, BUT OBVIOUSLY WE DIDN'T. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES: IT WAS AN UNCTLED ARPT AND WE ARE ALWAYS CONCERNED ABOUT TFC CONFLICTS. THE SUN WAS VERY LOW IN THE SKY HAMPERING OUR VISION. TXWY MARKINGS ARE NONEXISTENT ON THE N SIDE OF THE ARPT. EXTENSIVE TAXI, BEFORE TKOF AND AFTER LNDG ACFT CHKLISTS DIVERT MUCH ATTN INSIDE THE ACFT. OUR COMPANY PROC FOR A R SEAT TKOF REQUIRES, FOR A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME, BOTH SETS OF EYES IN THE COCKPIT WHILE SETTING AND ADJUSTING TKOF PWR. THE CLOSED RWY IS NOT MARKED AS SUCH ON THE ARPT DIAGRAM. THIS POTENTIAL INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED BY NOTING THE RWY HDG AND/OR BY CONSULTING THE ARPT DIAGRAM. A FUTURE OCCURRENCE COULD BE PREVENTED AT THIS PARTICULAR ARPT BY TXWY SIGNAGE AND BY CLOSING OFF THE NORTHERNMOST TXWYS AT THE X'S MARKED ON THE ENCLOSED ARPT DIAGRAM. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THIS WAS AT ONE TIME A RWY AND STILL GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF ONE. THE HOLD LINE WAS QUITE VISIBLE AND ALSO GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF A RWY ENTRANCE. WHEN TAXIING ONTO THE 'RWY' THERE WERE DIAGONAL LINES WHICH LOOKED LIKE A DISPLACED THRESHOLD INDICATION. THESE WERE APPARENTLY HALF OF AN 'X.' RPTR CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL MGR OF FBO WAS WELL RECEIVED AND HE FEELS PERHAPS SOME ACTION WILL BE TAKEN. RPTR SUGGESTED 3 DIMENSIONAL 'X'S' SO THAT THEY WILL BE VISIBLE FROM THE GND AS WELL AS THE AIR. AND OF COURSE HIS SUGGESTIONS FOR BARRICADE SO THAT ACFT CANNOT TAXI ONTO THE 'RWY' ITSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.